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ABSTRACT 
 
Alexandra Graddy-Reed:  The Private Provision of Public Goods: Three essays on the evolving 
public economics of philanthropy  
(Under the direction of Maryann P. Feldman) 
 
 
This dissertation contributes to the literature on the private provision of public goods 
through three papers. The first paper is focused on the organizational level of providing public 
goods. The paper collects survey data on North Carolina for-profit and nonprofit organizations and 
empirically demonstrates variation in organizational practices not captured by legal designation.  
This paper then addresses how private provision of public goods changes in response to economic 
recession and how responses vary by organizational type and strategy. The second paper addresses 
the issue of classification of nonprofit entities to consider the role of strategic giving.  A 
classification model based on source of funding and grantmaking strategy is put forth and vetted 
using a dataset constructed from IRS Form 990s over a five year time period. The paper analyzes 
differences in giving trends by this classification system during and post-recession and shows how 
grant size and total giving are impacted by both an organization’s funding source and their 
grantmaking strategy. The third paper expands the nonprofit theoretical base by creating an 
innovation production model to assess the role of competition in nonprofit organizations focused 
on disease treatment and eradication. An empirical estimation of the model with multiple innovative 
outcomes highlights the importance of market share and labor quality to innovation-related 
investments. Together, these papers add to the theoretical and empirical understanding of how the 
private provision of public goods changes in response to economic and market conditions and how 
responses vary by organizational characteristics and strategies.  
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CHAPTER ONE: THE PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Nonprofit organizations support the United States (US) economy as direct providers of 
public goods, and as employers and revenue generators.  They account for a growing share of the 
economy (5.5% of GDP in 2010) and provide almost 10% of wages for the American workforce 
(National Center for Charitable Statistics, 2013b). Philanthropy’s existence in the US has been 
constant throughout its history and encouraged by the cultural norm to give back and by the tax 
code that rewards it.   
However, our understanding of these organizations as public good providers is limited – we 
lack information about what types of organizations are involved in philanthropy and what they 
contribute to the public good. A varied set of terms is used to describe philanthropy, which can 
confuse the discussion and empirical analysis.  Generally referred to as the third sector to distinguish 
it from the for-profit and public spheres, it contains nonprofit organizations, which include 
philanthropic foundations and charitable organizations that aim to provide for the common good.  
But confusion is growing over terminology as many nonprofit organizations incorporate revenue-
generating streams, resembling those in the for-profit world. Additionally, research in this field is 
constrained by the available data on these organizations and their practices. 
This dissertation addresses these deficiencies and confusion in three papers on the private 
provision of public goods.  The three papers apply different methods and data to examine the 
current strategies of philanthropy in the US.  This dissertation contributes to the literature by 
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developing the theory around organizational philanthropic practices and by using three datasets to 
analyze their behavior that crosses over traditionally accepted boundaries. 
 
1.2 The Provision of Public Goods 
As Federal and state governments continue to debate the extent of their role in the provision 
of public goods and the regulation of other public good providers, it becomes especially relevant to 
understand how private individuals and organizations are changing to provide public goods and 
services.  It is well accepted that public goods exist because they are goods that cannot be optimally 
provided for in the market due to their inherent nature as non-excludable and non-rivalrous. This 
market failure puts the onus on government to provide pure public goods like ensuring air quality, 
providing defense, and maintaining infrastructure, due to its size and capital.  
However, in the US, a sector of nonprofit organizations, the third sector, exists to also 
provide quasi-public goods, acting as private providers of public goods. These quasi-public goods1 
differ from pure public goods in that they could be excludable.  They include social services like 
education and job training, food and nutrition, and health care – items benefiting the individual 
directly receiving them and the community in which these individuals live through positive 
externalities. These public goods usually affect a smaller scale of individuals or community and often 
provide a private benefit in addition to the public good.  Nonprofits serve as private providers of 
public goods since government will only provide public goods up to the desire of the median voter, 
leaving residual demand (Weisbrod, 1975). The US supports their efforts with two key financial 
incentives: nonprofit organizations themselves are exempt from many taxes paid by for-profit 
organizations, and individuals receive tax deductions for supporting nonprofit organizations.  
                                                
1 Also known as mixed or partial public goods 
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Through these incentive structures, the Federal government indirectly supports nonprofits as public 
good providers.   
In addition to the third sector, many for-profit organizations provide public goods, though 
to a lesser extent and in a different form than their nonprofit counterparts. Firms can offer benefits 
to their employees that improve their quality of life, support programs that benefit their surrounding 
community, or engage in positive environmental action.  These activities can occur within the profit-
driven mission of the firm or as an additional act of corporate social responsibility.  These actions 
may be profit-maximizing in the long run and certainly affect communities and the quality of 
community life.  
Individuals can also be private providers of pubic goods through philanthropy. Large and 
small donations from individuals to existing nonprofits, through their firm, or by creating a 
philanthropic foundation can lead to the provision of public goods. These different sources of 
philanthropy are well documented throughout the literature.  The foundation of this work provides 
an understanding of the motivations behind individual philanthropy (Andreoni, 1990; Atkinson & 
Stern, 1974; Diamond, 1973; King, 1986).  This is complemented by a line of research on the 
crowding in and out of government and private provision of public goods both through donations 
to nonprofit organizations (Andreoni & Payne, 2003, 2011; Bergstrom, Blume, & Varian, 1986; 
Bernheim, 1986), and to the funding of innovative activity (Blume-Kohout, Kumar, & Sood, 2009; 
Connolly, 1997; David, Hall, & Toole, 2000; Goldfarb, 2008). 
The role of philanthropic foundations in the US overtime has been well documented 
(Fleishman, 2007; Hall, 2006; Salamon, 2002) with recent attention to the growth of more aggressive 
and business-like approaches to giving (deCourcy Hero, 2001; Feldman & Graddy-Reed, 2014; 
Frumkin, 2003; Letts, Ryan, & Grossman, 1997). Further, the development of similar practices 
across legal structure has also been researched, presenting the growth of hybrid organizations and 
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entrepreneurs with a strong social drive (Dacin, Dacin, & Tracey, 2011; Dart, 2004; Dees, 2008; 
Mulgan, 2006; Young & Salamon, 2002). 
But it is not well known how these evolutions in organizational approach have affected the 
private provision of public goods. This dissertation contributes to the literature by documenting the 
changing organizational forms of philanthropy across legal structures, developing the theory of these 
organizations so that they may be more accurately classified by their behavior, and evaluating their 
provision of public goods using unique datasets. This chapter follows with a discussion of the 
theoretical foundations of this dissertation, methodological challenges and paths, and chapter 
summaries.  
 
1.3 Theoretical Foundations 
Public economics extends the foundations of microeconomic theory as related to market 
failures and considers the transaction costs of the government provision of public goods (Auerbach 
& Hines, 2002). It allows for the examination of issues related to individual decision-making, 
organizational behavior, and the effectiveness of tax policy at increasing a community’s welfare 
relative to the tax burden.  Public economics serves as the theoretical foundation for this dissertation, 
with a focus on the theory of public good provision.  
The potential crowding out of private giving from public funding is an important and 
popular question in the literature on the provision of many types of public goods.  With respect to 
dollars to donations, some studies have shown that there is crowding out of private giving from 
government grants to charities as a result of decreased fundraising efforts after receiving the grant 
(Andreoni & Payne, 2003, 2011).  Earlier work focuses on the distribution of givers and non-givers 
in the effort of efficiently providing for nonprofits. A transfer of wealth from non-givers to givers 
will increase donations, but a redistribution from givers to non-givers will not necessarily decrease 
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donations, as some non-givers may become givers with the additional income (Bergstrom et al., 
1986).  Bernheim (1986) extends this work to examine if individuals give toward a desired aggregate 
level, and argues that this does not hold if people enjoy giving – if they receive a personal benefit 
from donating (Bernheim, 1986). This points to the role of alternate motivations to giving that 
include public and private benefits. Andreoni’s (1990) impure altruistic model accounts for these 
motivations and concludes that a redistribution to more altruistic people will increase the total 
provision of giving, supporting the work of Bergstrom (1986), and that crowding out will be 
incomplete (Andreoni, 1990). Payne (1998) extends Andreoni’s framework by including firms 
producing the charitable good and individual’s acting through voting and donating.  When 
controlling for firm heterogeneity and political and economic factors, Payne (1998) confirms 
incomplete crowd-out (Payne, 1998).  
This theoretical base is extended to include the theories of institutional change and 
organizational behavior.  These theories provide the ability to frame and evaluate individual, 
organizational, and institutional level changes overtime. Olson’s (1965) theory of collective action 
argues that unless the group is small in number, or there are individual incentives or coercion to 
make individuals act in larger groups, rational self-interested individuals will not act in the interest of 
the common good. This idea of the role of individual incentives and coercion is argued here to be 
the shape of social norms and pressure and can lead to the private provision of public goods 
discussed previously. The role of institutional norms is key to the extent of American philanthropy 
as they bound individuals to a culture that can change only incrementally (North, 1990; Ostrom, 
2009). Philanthropists have prospered in motivating social change by working as elites within these 
confines and set roles (Bartley, 2007). 
As a field, social innovation lacks a conclusive theoretical framework but has been framed as 
an extension in the theories of entrepreneurship and innovation (Brozek, 2009; Dees, 2008; Martin 
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& Osberg, 2007; Peredo & McLean, 2006; Reis & Clohesy, 2001).  This dissertation uses this 
foundation of entrepreneurship and innovation to evaluate and explain the work of foundations, 
nonprofits, and for-profit organizations in providing public goods.  Griliches (1979) first put forth 
the knowledge production function to estimate the role of R&D activity on growth and knowledge 
(Griliches, 1979).  Since then, the production function has been applied to measure the impact on 
various innovation output (Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; Feldman, 1994; Freel, 2005; Geroski, 1990; 
Slavtchev & Fritsch, 2005).  Studies have found positive relationships between knowledge spillovers 
and firm innovation (Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; Feldman, 1994; Slavtchev & Fritsch, 2005), and 
that innovation also builds on experience so existing innovation furthers future work (Feldman, 
1994). Thus, knowledge production should be studied at the spatial unit, as opposed to firm-level 
(Audretsch & Feldman, 2004).  This thorough literature on innovation production needs to be 
applied more often to the empirical analysis of social innovation to better understand the 
motivations and consequences of its actions.  
 
1.4 Methodological Considerations 
Good data is a hurdle to assessing the private provision of public goods.  There is little 
required reporting from organizations, especially with respect to social support.  Active nonprofit 
organizations must file a form, the Form-990 or Form 990-PF, annually with the IRS.  This form 
provides information on the financial standing of the organization and their grantmaking and 
lobbying activity. While the data is publicly available there is substantial cost and time associated 
with extracting it.  Some organizations provide propriety data from the forms in a more usable 
format. Other information on organization’s structures, programs, and policies in place are made 
publically available at the will of organizations or by watchdog entities that collect and assess 
organizations. But there is little data available through any source on the issue of outcomes and 
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impacts for nonprofits as it is very challenging to evaluate the success of a nonprofit’s program or 
properly capture its impact. Evaluation efforts are thus limited. 
The papers in this dissertation work past these data deficiencies by collecting and utilizing 
data from a variety of sources and applying multiple methodological research designs to employ 
rigorous quantitative and mixed methods approaches. The first paper designs and implements a 
survey to collect quantitative data on organization’s behavior that is analyzed with econometrics. 
The second paper presents a hypothesized model of the types of philanthropic organizations.  It 
then vets this classification scheme with econometric analysis of quantitative and qualitative data. 
The third paper develops a theoretical model for nonprofit organizations grounded in the theories 
of innovation, nonprofits, and competition and then empirically estimates the model.  
 
1.5 Overview of the Dissertation 
1.5.1 Chapter Two: Stepping Up: An empirical analysis of the role of social innovation in 
response to an economic recession  
Categorizing organizations as either for-profit or nonprofit is a false dichotomy as existing 
for-profit firms are becoming more socially conscience while nonprofits are adopting profit-making 
activities to ensure their viability. This paper conceptualizes the array of social practices as a 
continuum of social innovation and empirically demonstrates variation not captured by legal 
designation. Designing and analyzing a survey from the US state of North Carolina, this paper 
examines how organizations across the continuum responded to the 2008 economic recession. 
Results indicate that more socially innovative organizations responded to the increase in need by 
increasing environmental, community, and employee support. 
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1.5.2 Chapter Three: What’s in a Name? Disambiguating philanthropic grantmakers and 
their strategies  
With the recent growth in American philanthropy has come increased attention to the results 
of foundations and nonprofits. However, there is still confusion about the types of organizations 
that comprise it, complicating the evaluation of nonprofits.  Nonprofit, foundation, and association 
are classifying terms used interchangeably in organizations across legal and funding structure. This 
paper begins to address concerns of categorization and evaluation by presenting a classification of 
grantmakers by their funding source and strategy.  Using data from the IRS Form 990 and Form 
990-PF, this paper analyzes descriptive characteristics to vet this classification scheme and then 
analyzes grant-making behavior across the categories to assess their differences. Results show that 
focused organizations, both donation-based and endowed, provide more through grantmaking in 
terms of total giving and size of grant. 
 
1.5.3 Chapter Four: The Race for a Cure: Collaborators or Competitors? Modeling the effects 
of competition in disease-specific charities 
Economic theory holds that competition promotes innovation in the private market. In the 
third sector, however, the role of competition is uncertain: multiple nonprofits working toward the 
same goal likely means higher transaction costs from increased fundraising, marketing, and salaries. 
Disease-specific charities are driven to find cures, improve treatments, and provide patient support. 
In recent years, they have become more aggressive in funding research and providing public 
advocacy, even if their cause affects a small number of people. However, it is unclear whether this 
increased attention has led to a change in the rate of progress. 
This paper contributes to the literature on research & development and nonprofit 
competition by developing and evaluating the first innovation production function for disease-
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specific charities. The model develops the conditions that promote and deter progress in curing 
diseases, with careful attention to the role of competition. Using OLS regression analysis, the 
theoretical model is empirically tested in a sample of disease-specific and research-driven nonprofits. 
Data from the annual IRS Form 990 are used to test the effects of competition, organizational 
demographics, and expenditures on innovative outcomes. The estimation finds a positive effect of 
market share on grant investments, meaning that large organizations contribute more to research 
through grant making in more concentrated (less competitive) markets.   
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Table 1.1 Overview of Dissertation 
 
 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 
Organization 
Type 
North Carolina 
For-profits & 
Nonprofits 
Grantmaking 
Nonprofits 
Disease-specific Nonprofits 
Data 
Survey Data on 
Organizational 
Practices, 2012 
Grant, Financial, & 
Organizational Data, 
2007 – 2011 
Financial, & Organizational 
Data, 2008 – 2011 
Central Aims 
--Document the 
variation in use of 
socially innovative 
practices across legal 
structure 
--Demonstrate how 
social innovation is 
used in reaction to 
economic recession 
--Provide a simplified 
classification of 
grantmaking nonprofits 
--Estimate changes to 
grantmaking strategies 
by type during and 
after an economic 
recession 
--Develop an innovation 
production model to evaluate 
the conditions that promote 
and deter progress 
--Evaluate the production 
function with multiple 
innovation-related outcomes 
Policy 
Implications 
--Highlights value and 
accuracy of hybrid legal 
structures for fostering 
public good provision 
--Demonstrates a 
positive link between 
socially innovative 
practices and 
supportive responses to 
economic downturn 
--Shows variation in 
grantmaking strategies 
by revenue source and 
mission focus such that 
focused nonprofits give 
more towards research. 
--Total giving 
decreased for most 
nonprofits during the 
recession but average 
grant size was 
maintained. 
--Indicates competitive 
markets may reduce 
nonprofit public good 
investments 
--Demonstrates the 
importance of labor quality 
on innovative outcomes 
--Highlights the relative 
effectiveness of large 
nonprofits in the face of 
rapid growth of small 
nonprofits 
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CHAPTER TWO: STEPPING UP: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF 
SOCIAL INNOVATION IN RESPONSE TO AN ECONOMIC RECESSION 
 
(With Maryann P. Feldman)2 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Organizations are typically either characterized as for-profit or nonprofit – an outdated 
dichotomy that does not accommodate the observed blended range of organizational practices and 
the improvised adaption to changing economic circumstances. Many for-profit businesses have 
made substantial changes to their practices to be more socially conscience at a time of greater need 
while nonprofit enterprises have adopted profit-making activities to ensure their viability in light of 
decreased government support and fewer private donations (Graddy-Reed, Feldman, & Trembath, 
2013). Moreover, both for-profit and nonprofit organizations may be important contributors to their 
local economy depending on the quality of employment benefits provided, concerns for 
environmental sustainability, and contributions to address quality of life concerns in their 
community (Feldman, 2014). Relatively little is known about how organizational practices have 
shifted across the legal distinction of for-profit and nonprofit or how the 2008 recession affected the 
use of different practices.  This paper contributes by examining the role socially innovative practices 
play in responding to economic challenges and considering how these practices vary by legal 
structure.   
                                                
2 This chapter has been accepted for publication. This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version 
of the article accepted for publication at the Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy, and Society 
following peer review. The version of record will be available online. 
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 A variety of labels have been used to describe organizations that blend for-profit models 
with social goals. The terms social enterprise and social entrepreneurship have been applied to the adoption 
of revenue-generating models within nonprofit organizations (Dees, 2007; Foundation Center, n.d.-
b) as well as to for-profit organizations operating with a social mission (Fleishman, 2007; Peredo & 
McLean, 2006).  Terms like triple bottom line and corporate social responsibility are used to describe for-
profit firms that attempt to create social benefit, while legal incorporation schemes, such as Low-
Profit Limited Liability Corporation are introduced as a hybrid tax status. Other terms, like fourth 
sector, are being introduced more recently in a search for new definitions, with uncertain degrees of 
precision.  There are discrepancies between the terms organizations use, their legal structure, tax 
status, and what they actually do. To move the agenda forward, we use the umbrella term social 
innovation to broadly capture organizational efforts aimed at alleviating social problems. Our focus is 
on innovative practices used by organizations to address societal problems and concerns.  
This paper analyzes a survey of organizational practices in the US state of North Carolina to 
understand the range of practices in use and specifically examine how organizations responded to 
the 2008 economic recession. We conceptualize the use of social innovation practices as a 
continuum and reveal variation that is not captured by prevailing legal distinctions. The paper 
provides empirical evidence about how organizations across the continuum from for-profit firms to 
nonprofit organizations used social innovation to respond to the 2008 economic recession. Results 
indicate that many organizations, across the range of legal structure, responded to the recession by 
increasing support to the environment, their local community, or their employees.   Existing social 
practices positively influenced the decision to provide support, indicating a deepening of 
commitment during the economic recession. This paper contributes to the process of identifying 
socially innovative organizations, documents variation in the use of social innovation practices 
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across legal structure, and demonstrates how social innovation was used in reaction to increased 
need due to an economic shock.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the theory and literature 
regarding social innovation.  Section three presents the research design with a review of North 
Carolina’s economy, the survey design, and empirical methods. Results are presented in section four. 
The final section concludes with discussion and implications of our finding, and suggestions for 
future research.  
 
2.2 Defining Social Innovation: Existing Theory & Literature 
Social innovation is an emerging field of research that lacks a conclusive definition and 
theoretical framework. While the practice is not new, the concept has grown in popularity in recent 
years as seen by President Obama’s creation of the Office of Social Innovation in 2009 and the 
increased presence of the topic in academic publications3 (Figure 2.1).  
The burgeoning field has a spectrum of prior research that utilizes varying definitions and 
research methods. According to Stanford’s Center for Social Innovation (2009), social innovation “is 
a novel solution to a social problem that is more effective, efficient, sustainable, or just than present 
solutions and for which the value created accrues primarily to society as a whole rather than private 
individuals”.  Much of the existing literature follows this definition and frames social innovation as 
an extension of innovation applied to social problems (Brozek, 2009; Dees, 2008; Martin & Osberg, 
2007; Peredo & McLean, 2006; Reis & Clohesy, 2001). Related terms of social entrepreneurship and 
social enterprise are also used in the literature to describe individuals and organizations that strive to 
create social innovation (Dees, 2008; Foundation Center, n.d.-b; Martin & Osberg, 2007; McGrath 
& Desai, 2010; Peredo & McLean, 2006). While efforts to define the concept have focused on ties to 
                                                
3 Conducted using Scopus Database, this number includes journal articles, conference papers, and 
book chapters. 
 14 
innovation and entrepreneurship literature, theoretical developments have been made by grounding 
the practice in institutional theories of social capital, organizational change, and legitimacy (Agrawal 
& Hockerts, 2013; Habisch & Adaui, 2013).    
While much progress has been made in developing our understanding of social innovation, 
we are still limited in our knowledge of how social innovation is produced.  Social innovation can be 
understood as the process of creating novel solutions to further a social good – it is innovation 
relating to the solution of a social problem (Mulgan, 2006; Pol & Ville, 2009).  Thus there may be 
direct and indirect paths and as a result multiple motives that lead to its creation. When discussing 
production however, the literature focuses on social entrepreneurship as the only route to social 
innovation, thus ignoring other viable organizational pathways.  Other literatures highlight 
alternative ways that organizations provide for the public good without reference to their common 
goal of achieving social innovation. 
Figure 2.2 presents the multiple paths to social innovation that existing literature has focused 
on separately.  The most direct path is through organizations, whether they be for-profit, nonprofit, 
or a hybrid structure, that are created with the explicit aim to attempt to address a social problem. 
For example, TOMS Shoes is a for-profit entity with a business model that provides a pair of shoes 
to a person in need with every pair of fashion shoes purchased.  
However there are indirect paths as well. Any innovation may have a social effect: profit-
seeking business technological or organizational innovation can produce externalities that generate 
social benefit (Pol & Ville, 2009). Thus businesses can indirectly create a social innovation through a 
positive externality with a social application.  For example, a firm can offer training to enable current 
employees to engage with new production processes.  This would be an alternative to closing a plant 
and moving to a greenfield site.  
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For-profits may also create social innovation through their social involvement, namely their 
corporate social responsibility practices. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is the practice by for-
profit firms to give back to their community through the provision of time, funding, or services.  
Reis and Clohesy (2001) find that female and young entrepreneurs as well as family-firms have the 
largest CSR profiles. Delevingne, (2009) finds that CSR is perceived to positively influence firm 
reputation, suggesting that firms may decide to expand their CSR programs in the wake of poor 
economic conditions. CSR’s affect on financial performance has been indeterminate, with the most 
rigorous studies finding no effect (Aupperle, Carroll, & Hatfield, 1985; McWilliams & Siegel, 2000).  
This may be due to the diversion of profits into social innovation, which is reflected in marketing 
strategies (Hess, Rogovsky, & Dunfee, 2002). However, CSR decisions could be treated as profit 
maximizing investments that increases revenue more than the associated costs for a firm 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2001).  
These three alternative routes suggest that social innovation will not be limited to social 
enterprises but will span the range of organizational forms.  
 
2.2.1 Innovation Out of Necessity: The Role of Economic Crisis  
 There is a more altruistic orientation that describes the rise of social innovation in the wake 
of an economic slump. As the economy slumps, firms may increase their philanthropy not just to 
garner more consumer support but also to sustain their community (Acs & Phillips, 2002).  Our 
hypothesis is that organizations adopt new socially innovative practices in times of economic 
downturn, responding directly to greater need.  
 Given the lingering effects from the recent recession, there is a great deal of opportunity for 
organizations to step in where government funding is falling short. Many traditionally for-profit 
organizations are implementing more socially responsible, environmentally sustainable, and 
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community-oriented practices. This is occurring not only because of connection to local 
communities, but also out of necessity. In these difficult economic times, having first mover 
advantage and being the low cost producer are no longer sufficient strategies; thus, organizations are 
adopting a range of nontraditional practices, and offering a means to create viability in local 
communities at a time of decreased government capacity. Recognizing the importance of their 
workforce and their local community context motivates organizational response. 
 The multiple sources of social innovation coupled with the potential influence of economic 
conditions prompts three research questions:  
What types of organizations engage in socially innovative behavior and what role does legal structure play?  Since 
social innovation can come from any type of legal structure it is unclear if one type is more likely to 
create social innovation or more generally, attempt to create it.  
What role does socially innovative behavior play in responding to a recession? As organizations are faced with 
business decisions in response to economic downturn, is their business behavior motivated by their 
social behavior?   
What role does socially innovative behavior play in providing increased social support in response to the recession? We 
expect that those organizations that are more socially innovative would be more likely to increase 
social support when need is higher due to worsened economic conditions.  
 
2.3 Research Design  
To answer these questions, this study uses data from the 2012 North Carolina Social 
Innovation Survey to examine what role legal structure plays in achieving social innovation and how 
both influenced responses to the 2008 economic recession. The design utilizes one US state, North 
Carolina, to control for economic, political, and cultural conditions.  
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 While social innovation as a practice benefits from a business’ ability to create change and an 
entrepreneur’s innovative approaches, it is weakened by the difficulty of defining and measuring 
social success (Dees, 2008). Thus a primary challenge to studying social innovation is finding an 
appropriate measure of it. As discussed previously, existing methods of classifying socially 
innovative organizations rely on legal structure or self-identification.  Legal structure fails to capture 
socially innovative behavior that is occurring across multiple legal structures.  Self-identifying terms 
are also a poor indicator as it assumes a universally accepted and known definition of the behavior.  
But there is no consensus on a common definition and the terms in use are not widely spread. These 
methods are biased and inefficient at classifying socially innovative organizations.   
 We, instead, proxy for social innovation by measuring an organization’s investment in social 
goals, captured by the practices they have in place.  Practices in place identify common behavior 
across organizations that may or may not describe themselves as socially innovative and across legal 
structure.  It captures what an organization is actually doing to work towards social progress as 
opposed to what they would like to do. By surveying a variety of practices we are able to categorize 
behavior into classes around how challenging and costly they are to implement and by their area in 
the business process, whether it be in production, delivery, or investment. This approach, of using 
existing practices, provides a more concrete perspective to social engagement and provides 
perspective as to how organizations are operationalizing the concepts with which they may or may 
not identify. 
 This section follows with a brief presentation of North Carolina’s economic and business 
environment, a review of the survey design and sample statistics, creation of key variables, and the 
methods for analysis.  
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2.3.1 Legal Structure and the Impact of the Recession in North Carolina 
 North Carolina, the 10th largest US state, has a population of approximately nine million 
residing in 85 rural and 15 urban counties. While currently growing, North Carolina’s economy is in 
a state of transition as it moves away from labor-intensive manufacturing industries to technology 
and service industries with manufacturing losing over 100,000 jobs in the state since 2007 (Bunn & 
Ramirez, 2011). Although North Carolina’s real GDP grew at a faster rate than the US from 2004 
and 2009, the recession significantly damaged the state’s economy and as of 2011, the state’s median 
household income had declined to 84% of the US average, with high concentrations of wealth in the 
urban counties (Bunn & Ramirez, 2011). Further, the state unemployment rate rose from 5 to 11.2% 
between April 2008 and February 2009, with the poorest counties experiencing the highest peak of 
13.3% in March 2010 (Bunn & Ramirez, 2011; Center on Poverty, Work and Opportunity, 2010). 
 Each state in the US is responsible for oversight of the legal structure of organizations 
within their boundaries. North Carolina has a common set of available legal structures for 
organizations. Traditional for-profit business forms include the corporation and the Limited Liability 
Company (LLC) or Partnership (LLP). These structures can be used by social enterprises as they 
permit flexibility, allow for private investment, and are often viewed as more efficient than nonprofit 
forms. Corporations make profits their primary aim but can incorporate social benefits as a factor in 
long-term profitability calculations while LLCs and LLPs incorporate a social purpose into the 
operating agreement (Graddy-Reed et al., 2013). North Carolina organizations may also form as a 
for-profit entity with cooperative principles in place. These organizations consist of members who 
share in ownership and governance rights.  
 These for-profit structures can also obtain a third-party certification of their social efforts. 
The most well-known option is the B Corp certification, which requires an impact assessment by B 
Lab, a private association. This is not the same as the benefit corporation business structure, which 
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is available in some states and is a for-profit organization with a social mission that submits an 
annual report on their social impact (Foundation Center, n.d.-b). 
 The Low-Profit Limited Liability Corporation (L3C) is a hybrid legal form of a for-profit 
business structure with an explicit charitable mission. It became available in North Carolina in 2010 
for organizations that met the statutory requirements to advance a social goal, with the creation of 
profits as not a significant goal, and no political or legislative purpose. This form enables for-profit 
organizations to receive financing from private philanthropic foundations that previously was only 
available to nonprofits. However, the North Carolina legislature repealed the L3C as an available 
legal structure effective January 2014. Meaning no new organizations could register as an L3C but 
existing organizations could remain as such (Graddy-Reed et al., 2013). 
 North Carolina allows for the formation of tax-exempt nonprofit corporations. These 
organizations exist solely for a social mission and allow financing in the form of donations and 
grants. Nonprofits can incorporate for-profit strategies to accomplish their mission as long as the 
business activity is significantly related to its social purpose (Graddy-Reed et al., 2013).  
 
2.3.2 Survey Design 
 The 2012 North Carolina Social Innovation Survey was a web-based survey.  It received a 
20% response rate from organizations in the state of North Carolina regarding their business, 
employee, community, and environmental practices. It was not a randomized study but utilized 
samples aimed at capturing statewide responses in urban and rural areas across industry and legal 
structure. Survey responses appear to be representative of organizations in the state and completion 
rates were not correlated to the size, age, or location of the organization. However, other limitations 
do exist from self-selection and non-response bias. Further, the survey was given out to 
organizations in the Fall of 2012, after the Great Recession, meaning the survey responses are 
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representative of organizations that survived the recession or were created after it; there is no 
information on the behavior of firms that failed as a result of the recession.  
Seventy-one of the 100 counties are represented in the survey from across the state (Table 2.1). 
There is an oversampling of urban respondents, who account for 71% of the sample while 
accounting for 58% of establishments with employees in the state (Figure 2.3). 
 North Carolina’s Department of Commerce classifies each of the 100 counties in one of 
three economic distress tiers. Tier 1 is made up of the 40 most economically distressed counties, 
Tier 2 accounts for the middle 40 counties, and Tier 3 comprises the 20 least distressed. Counties are 
ranked annually based on their unemployment rate, median household income, population change, 
and property values in the previous year (Weisbecker, 2012). The designations are used in multiple 
state programs that provide tax credits to promote economic development (NC Department of 
Commerce, 2013). The 2013 classifications are used in this analysis because they were based on the 
2012 economic conditions, the year of the survey. The survey sample’s distribution of economic 
distress tiers is similar to the state’s, however, Tier 2 establishments are somewhat underrepresented 
in the sample while Tier 3 organizations are overrepresented (Figure 2.4).  
 Of the 29 counties not represented in the survey, 20 are Tier 1 counties, or the most 
economically distressed. Their absence may be tied to a lack of Internet access. Since the survey was 
only available online, many potential respondents were not able to respond. More than 15 percent of 
the state’s rural population lacks high-speed Internet access and all Tier 1 counties are rural, thus 
include areas without broadband coverage (NC Broadband, n.d.). This is a limitation in the results 
and of all internet-based surveys. It also limits the generalizability of the analysis of Tier 1 
organizations to those with Internet access.   
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2.3.3 Sample & Descriptive Statistics  
The sample for this analysis uses complete survey responses from organizations located in 
North Carolina counties, excluding government and quasi-government organizations. This produced 
a sample of 556 organizations. 4  Table 2.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample and by 
sub-samples of legal structure and use of self-identifying terms.  
 
Legal Structure  
Legal structure historically identifies the types of practices and strategies an organization 
employs. However, these boundaries are blurring as nonprofits adopt for-profit strategies and for-
profits become more socially involved.  Survey respondents provided their legal structure.  These 
values were categorized into three groups: For-profit, Nonprofit, and Hybrid. For-profit organizations 
consist of those that are not incorporated, operate as an LLC or LLP, or as an S or C corporation. 
Nonprofit organizations consist of those that reported a 501(c)3, 501(c)4, 501(c)6, or other nonprofit 
designation. Hybrid organizations are those with either an L3C or cooperative structure. As seen in 
Table 2.2, nonprofit or hybrid organizations were more likely to provide increased community 
support following the recession and have more community practices in place than for-profit 
organizations. However, for-profits provide similar levels of environmental and employee support 
and benefits. The similarities in many areas confirm that legal structure is not a clean indicator of 
socially engaged organizations.  
 
Terminology 
Respondents were asked to self-identify, using multiple classifying terms including 
entrepreneurial, green enterprise, environmentally responsible, hybrid, for benefit, fourth sector, triple bottom line, and 
                                                
4 Respondents were asked to provide address information, which was optional.  The survey received 
1,004 responses with a survey completion rate of 62%. 
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social enterprise. These were grouped by type as Entrepreneurial, Green (containing green enterprise and 
environmentally responsible), or Social/Hybrid (containing hybrid, for benefit, fourth sector, triple bottom line, and 
social enterprise). Because there is no well-accepted definition of social innovation, the use of a 
definitive term is not an appropriate means of identifying socially innovative organizations. However, 
many do use terms that imply a social mission appropriately. Within this sample, those that used a 
social term of identification were significantly more likely to have increased environmental and 
community support in response to the recession, and have more environmental and community 
practices in place. It is important to note that those using social terms were also more likely to be in 
an urban county. This may mean that such terms are not geographically widespread in their use, 
another signal that they should not be used as the sole means of identification.  
 
Innovation  
Innovation is a process rather than simply an outcome. In order to innovate, firms must by 
definition try new things. Trying something new is risky and thus susceptible to failure. By asking 
firms about practices they have tried and their subsequent failures, there is an understanding of the 
risks they are taking and thus their efforts to innovate. Respondents were asked about failed or 
incomplete projects and socially engaged practices to capture this risk-taking behavior and 
innovative process. Both risk types and the combination of either attempt are fairly evenly 
distributed across respondents both by legal structure and self-identifying terminology, confirming 
that these distinctions do not serve as accurate measures to capture social innovation.  
 
Responses to the Recession 
Respondents were asked how they responded to the recession through two questions that 
addressed the introduction of new products and methods and changed practices.  Regarding 
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products and methods, organizations were asked if following the recession they introduced new or 
improved: goods, services, methods of manufacturing or production, support processes, marketing 
methods, or methods of logistics, delivery, or distribution. The count of these responses creates the 
Recession Introductions variable, ranging from zero to six with a mean of 2.03 introductions. Twenty 
percent of survey respondents reported no new or improved introductions and approximately 27% 
reported one introduction.  The most frequent response was introducing a new or improved service 
with roughly 40% of respondents followed with 37% reporting new or improved marketing 
methods.  
 Respondents were also asked if in response to the recession, their organization changed 
certain business and social practices.  This included changes to decrease costs by: decreasing 
employment, increasing operating efficiency, and increasing material efficiency.  Over half of 
respondents reported decreasing employment in response to the recession. The question also 
included options related to social involvement of: increasing environmentally sustainable practices, 
increasing assistance to the local community, and increasing assistance to employees. Environmental 
practices had the highest response of this set with 28% reporting increases.  Only 16% of 
respondents indicated they increased support to their employees.  
 Respondents were also provided an additional option of other and space to describe these 
alternative changes.  Almost 8% of respondents specified additional changes.  Write-in responses fell 
into two categories of further methods of decreasing costs and expansion.  Regarding cost related 
activities, respondents also reported that they decreased wages and benefits of existing employees 
and increased prices of goods and services to consumers. Regarding expansion, some respondents 
reported increasing employment and expanding into new branches of products and services. While 
these write-in responses could not be used in the analysis, as they were not posed to all respondents, 
they do provide a broader understanding of how organizations respond to an economic shock.   
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Scales of Social Engagement  
Respondents were also asked about their engagement with a series of social practices – 11 
environmental, 13 community, and 13 employee. Appendix Table 2.1 lists each of these practices, 
their frequency, and differences by legal structure and use of self-identifying terms. Figure 2.5 
presents the quartile distribution of all practices by legal structure.  Although there are heavier tails 
in either direction for each structure, both are well represented across the distribution again signaling 
that legal structure does not alone capture the social motivations of an organization 
 These practices were combined to form three series of scales.  These scales proxy for socially 
innovative activity by capturing an organization’s investment in social goals – how involved they are 
in achieving a social good based on the practices they are actually engaged in. The first series of 
scales are grouped around the focus area of practices.  They are count scales of the number of 
environmental, community, and employee practices an organization has in place. These scales do not 
capture how valuable or innovative any one practice is but instead captures the breadth of support 
an organization has in either the environment, their community, or their employees with the premise 
that organization’s with a higher number of practices are more socially engaged and devoted to 
meeting a social mission.  
  The second series of scales was created by dividing the former by type of practices. 
Environmental practices were divided into two categories of basic (recycle, conserve water, and save 
energy) or advanced (track emissions, produce renewable energy, etc.) practices. Community 
practices were divided into three categories of production related (local suppliers, suppliers with 
good practices, etc.), donation-based (company service day, donate use of facilities, etc.), and 
outreach activities (support K-12 education, promote economic equality). Employee practices were 
divided into two categories of benefits (retirement contributions, health insurance, etc.) and 
investments (job-training, employee education, etc.) in employees. These more detailed scales group 
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practices by focus and attempt to capture the value of practices as they relate to solving social 
problems.  
 The third series of scales groups these more detailed scales across focus area to capture a 
more fluid picture of social engagement.  This consists of three scales: basic, production, and 
investment. The basic scale includes the employee benefits and basic environmental practices.  
These are practices that are important at an individual level but do not directly work to solve a large 
social problem and are well spread across organizations. The production scale includes the advanced 
environmental and production-related community practices. These practices likely provide personal 
advantages and benefits to the organization but also contribute to meeting larger social goals.  
Finally, the investment scale includes the community donation, community activities, and employee 
investment practices. These practices may also provide some benefit to the organization but are 
significantly contributing to a social mission – they are practices that signal a desire to improve a 
community through innovative strategies. 
 
2.3.4 Methods 
Three models were run using the survey data to assess the role of legal structure in social 
engagement and how both impacted responses to the 2008 economic recession. Adjustments were 
made to certain variables. Start Year Categories was created from the year an organization began to 
categorize respondents into one of four bins given the average lifespan of a firm is now fifteen years 
(Gittleson, 2012). New firms contains organizations created between 2008 and 2012; Young firms, those 
15 years old or younger, were created between 1997 and 2007; Established firms were created between 
1981 and 1996, and Lasting firms were created before 1980. The number of employees was also 
categorized and divided into groups to create the variable Employee Categories. It is comprised of five 
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bins of: Very small (two to four employees), Small (five to 15), Medium (16 to 85), Large (86 to 500), 
and Extra Large (over 500 employees). 
 
Organizational Traits in Socially Innovative Practices  
Given the challenges in identifying socially innovative organizations it is unknown what 
types of organizations are engaged in this behavior. The scales of social engagement are used here as 
a proxy for social innovation as they capture the breadth of investment an organization makes 
towards a social aim. The organizational factors are then examined that influence the number of 
practices an organization has incorporated. Equation 2.1 regresses the number of practices an 
organization has in place on legal structure and other organizational traits.  log  (!"#$%&  !"#$#%&%"'  !"#$%) = ! +   !!!" + !!!"# + !!!     2.1  
The key independent variable of interest is the legal structure of the organization. Legal structure is 
included as a categorical variable with binary indicators for nonprofit (NP) and hybrid (Hyb) with 
for-profits as the referent group. Additional covariates (Z) included are the types of self-
identification terms used by an organization (entrepreneurial, social/hybrid, and green), age of 
organization, size by number of employees, location in an economic distress tier, and presence of 
innovative behavior.  
 This model evaluates the importance of organizational traits across multiple scales including 
the count scale of all social practices in place, the combination of employee and community 
practices, and then the three grouped scales of investment, production, and basic practices. This will 
help establish if certain traits are more important to certain types of social involvement.  
 Since each of the scales are count variables, either a negative binomial or Poisson model is 
used.  For each regression a Poisson model was run and a goodness of fit test calculated.  If the 
Poisson model was rejected, the negative binomial model was run and confirmed through the 
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likelihood ratio test. The Poisson model was used for the production and basic practices scales but 
rejected for the combination scales and investment scale, resulting in the use of a negative binomial 
model.  
 
Responding to the Recession: Introduction of New Products & Methods  
The differing social scales are then used as explanatory variables in assessing the response to 
the recession made by organizations.  Were more engaged organizations more likely to be proactive 
in their business response to the recession? Equation 2.2 addresses this question by regressing the 
business response of an organization on their scale of practices, legal structure, and other 
organizational demographics.  log  (!"#$%&  !"  !"#"$$%&'  !!"#$%&'"($!)) = ! + !!!"#$% +   !!!" + !!!"# + !!!     2.2  
The outcome variable used is the number of introductions made in response to the recession.  As 
discussed above this is a count ranging from zero to six and includes the introduction of new or 
improved goods, services, logistics, processes, marketing, or manufacturing methods. This captures 
how diversified organizations were in responding to the economic downturn.  
 The key independent variable is the scale of social engagement.  Three models are run using 
different types of scales.  The first uses the simple count scales by type of practice – environmental, 
community, and employee.  The second utilizes the three grouped scales of investment, production, 
and basic practices.  The third uses the detailed scales of basic and advanced environmental, 
production, donation, and activity in the community, and employee benefits and investment.  
 Legal structure is also included as a categorical variable with nonprofit and hybrid structures 
in reference to for-profits, as it was in the modeling of social innovation (Equation 2.1). It is 
included here to account for any additional impact it may have outside of its influence on the social 
engagement scales. Control variables included the types of self-identification terms used by an 
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organization (entrepreneurial, social/hybrid, and green), age of the organization, number of employees, 
location in an economic distress tier, and presence of innovative behavior.  
 Due to the count nature of the outcome, both a negative binomial and Poisson model were 
fitted. However with each case, the Poisson was rejected through the goodness of fit and likelihood 
ratio tests resulting in the use of the negative binomial model.  
 
Responding to the Recession: Increasing Social Support 
Finally, the social scales are used to examine what types of organizations responded to the 
increased need from the recession with increased social support. Equation 2.3 regresses the decision 
to increase any type of social support (environmental, community, or employee) on a series of 
organizational characteristics and demographics (Z) and the scales of practices in place.  log !"#$%&'%(  !"#$%&  !"##$%& = ! + !!!"#$%& +   !!!     2.3  
The key independent variables are the individual social scales by either general type (environmental, 
community, and employee) or detailed type (basic and advanced environmental, production, 
donation, and activity in the community, and employee benefits and investment). Control variables 
include whether the organization is a for-profit or not, the age of the organization, number of 
employees, economic distress tier of their county, the types of self-identification terms used by an 
organization (entrepreneurial, social/hybrid, and green), and the presence of innovative behavior.  
There is, however, the potential for endogeneity between responsiveness to increased need and the 
number of social practices currently in place. To obviate this concern, additional models were run by 
each type of social support (environmental, community, and employee) while omitting the 
corresponding type of practices, correcting for any potential endogeneity (Equations 2.4-2.6).  
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Due to their binary outcome values, these equations were fitted with logit models to examine what 
factors influence an organization’s decision to increase social support in response to the recession.  
 
2.4 Results 
Empirical results are presented in Tables 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5, which are discussed in turn.  
 
2.4.1 Organizational Traits in Socially Innovative Practices  
Table 2.3 presents the marginal effects resulting from Equation 2.1 evaluated at the various scales of 
social practices. The estimations’ predicted means slightly overestimate the real sample means but 
are very similar. The importance of organizational traits vary by scale.  
Looking first at model 5, basic practices, we see that age and size most impact the number of 
practices in place.  These practices are widespread across organizations and in high frequency and 
thus least likely to be an indicator for socially innovative organizations.  The results show no 
significant effect from innovation or using entrepreneurial or hybrid terminology.  Further, legal 
structure has only a small effect with nonprofits providing a third of a practice more on average than 
similar for-profit organizations.   
 However, in model 3, with the outcome of investment practices, we see large and significant 
effects from legal structure and innovation activity. Being a hybrid as opposed to a for-profit is 
associated with an additional 4.3 investment practices on average while being a nonprofit has a 
smaller but still significant effect of less than one additional practice than a for-profit. Being 
innovative or using hybrid terminology similarly are associated with almost one more additional 
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practice, on average. Being a larger organization or in a less economically distressed area are also 
positive and significant indicators of investment practices.  
 Model 2 uses the count of employee and community practices in total  - this includes the 
investment practices but also practices less likely to be associated with social innovation. Results 
show similar but larger effects than in model 3.  Isolating the production related practices in model 4 
that may lead to social aims but also benefit the organization so much weaker effects than model 3.  
 These results indicate that legal structure and terminology are indicators of social behavior 
and they are positively associated with the use of practices more strongly linked to social innovation 
(model 3). This effect indicates that those that select a hybrid legal structure are doing so 
appropriately as they have a policy significant number of more practices in place, as compared to for-
profits. There is less of an obvious distinction between nonprofits and for-profits with an average 
difference of less than one practice.  This indicates that these traditional legal structures are not a 
good indicator of one being inherently more socially innovative.  
 Use of a social term is a positive but not a strong indicator of social innovation with having 
almost one more practice on average than those that did not use a social term. This confirms that 
using self-identification, as a means of classifying socially innovative organizations, is not a good 
policy.  This may be because there are not set definitions of the terms and that the terms are not 
widespread. Overall, hybrid legal structure is the strongest predictor of investment related practices, 
signifying the importance of these alternative structures in promoting social innovation. 
 
2.4.2 Responding to the Recession: Introduction of New Products & Methods   
Table 2.4 presents the marginal effects resulting from the negative binomial model of 
introductions made in response to the recession. The model fitted an average of 1.96 introductions 
as compared to the sample average of 1.88.  
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Self-identifying as entrepreneurial had a consistent positive and significant effect of 0.6 
additional introductions following the recession. Innovation had a smaller but still consistent 
positive and significant effect of 0.4 additional introductions on average.  However, legal structure 
failed to have a significant effect on introductions as did an organization’s age and location.  
 In model 1, the general count of environmental and community practices are positively 
associated with introductions.  In model 2, these elements are highlighted again with production-
related and investment practices being significant.  When broken down by detailed type in model 3, 
only advanced environmental practices are significant with 0.14 more introductions on average.  
Given the predicted average of 1.96 practices, this represents approximately a 7.3% change in the 
average outcome. Though significant this is a much smaller indicator than self-identifying as 
entrepreneurial which represented a 30.6% change from the fitted average. The results indicate that 
organizations with advanced environmental practices are slightly more likely to respond to the 
recession with more business changes but the overall minimal effect of socially innovative practices 
indicates that they are not a strong driver of business-related introductions post recession.  
 
2.4.3 Responding to the Recession: Increasing Social Support 
Table 2.5 presents the marginal effects from the logistic regressions used to analyze the 
response of increased social support. Models 1 and 2 on any social support produced a similar fitted 
average to the sample mean of of 0.41 as compared to the sample mean of 0.43. Models 3 and 4 run 
similar models for environmental support only, while models 5 and 6 examine the effects on 
community support, and models 7 and 8 on employee support; all with similar predicted means to 
their sample means. 
 The number of community practices is positively and significantly associated with increasing 
environmental and employee support with a 3.3 or 3.9 percentage point increase in probability on 
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average, respectively. Increased employee practices are positively and significantly associated with 
increased community support but not environmental. These results hold with the detailed scales 
with production-related community practices, community activities, and investment in employees 
positively affecting additional social support. Increased investment in employees, practices that are 
associated with social innovation, is associated with a 3.8 percentage point increase on average in the 
probability of providing additional community support in response to the recession. Similarly, 
increased community activities, practices also associated with social innovation, are associated with 
an increase of 5.0 percentage points in the probability of providing employee support.  These results 
indicate that socially innovative practices are small indicators of providing additional social support 
following an increase in need. 
 Innovative activity and self-identification as entrepreneurial are stronger indicators of 
increasing employee support with an average increase in probability of approximately 9 percentage 
points. Use of a social or hybrid identification term is associated with roughly a 10 percentage point 
increase in the probability of providing community support.  Community support was the only type 
for which legal structure matters – being a for-profit decreases the probability of providing 
community support by approximately 10 to 12 percentage points, on average.  Being in a Tier 2 as 
opposed to Tier 1 county increased the probability of providing community support by 
approximately 17 percentage points on average, while there was no statistical difference between 
Tier 1 and Tier 3 county residents. This may mean that Tier 2 counties, those that are distressed but 
still have resources had the increased need and had the resources to meet it while Tier 3 had less 
need and Tier 1, less resources.  
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2.5 Discussion  
 Organizations have begun to adopt a range of socially engaged practices in an attempt to 
create viability in local communities at a time of decreased government capacity. In an effort to 
determine identification of socially innovative organizations, this analysis highlights the importance 
of hybrid legal structures. Though the L3C is no longer available in the state of North Carolina, 
organizations that incorporated as L3Cs and as cooperatives did so appropriately – they self-selected 
into a legal structure that allowed for their high level of social engagement. The results suggest that 
this tax status encourages greater involvement from organizations in the provision of public goods 
and provides support for the value of having this option.  Given the low cost to states to implement 
hybrid legal structures that do not decrease tax revenue North Carolina should reconsider their 
policy regarding the L3C.  This analysis also provides support for the introduction of the L3C as a 
means of fostering social involvement from private organizations in other US states, where debate is 
underway on whether to adopt the structure.  
 Regarding terminology, many organizations that engage in socially innovative practices do 
not use a social term to self identify.  Although the various labels have proliferated they have not 
widely diffused and still lack a definitive definition. Many who are socially innovative do not identify 
with a social term thus making it an inefficient indicator of socially innovative organizations. The 
many organizations pushing these multiple terms should instead focus their efforts on providing 
support to organizations to be more socially engaged.  A widely accepted and simple term and 
definition are necessary for this type of work to flourish. Such consensus can shift the focus away 
from marketing terminology and towards behavioral change. If the goal is increasing social support, 
the actions by these support organizations should be focused on educating organizations about 
practices they can implement, not terms they can use.    
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 In considering responses to the recession, many organizations introduced new or improved 
products and methods to survive the economic downturn. Organizations that did so were more 
likely to be innovative and have advanced environmental practices. Legal structure did not provide a 
means of identifying these organizations, nor did age or location. This implies that organizations 
across type and place were proactive responders to the recession.  
 In terms of social support, many organizations increased their support to sustaining the 
environment, their local community, or their employees in response to the recession. Organizations 
with more socially innovative practices were more likely to increase social support. When the 
recession increased need for such support, many organizations working towards social goals 
responded by increasing support to their employees and communities. With global concern over 
government’s ability to provide or sustain public good provision, private organizations are becoming 
more valuable in their service to their communities. Encouraging this social involvement and focus 
in organizations may then increase support to the public at the crucial time of an economic 
downturn. 
 The 2012 North Carolina Social Innovation Survey has some limitations. Since it was 
executed in 2012, it provides no record of organizations that did not survive the economic recession 
of 2008. These organizations would have provided a valuable counterfactual in terms of their social 
engagement and perhaps enlightened organizational characteristics correlated with not surviving the 
recession. In addition, many Tier 1 counties, those that are the most economically distressed, were 
not represented. This may be due in part to the limited Internet access available in those counties. 
Internet-based surveys prevent this segment of the population from participating and thus responses 
are not representative of those without access. There are also limitations to using one state as a case 
study. Using one state as a case limits the external validity of the results, as the interpretation of 
results cannot be extrapolated to other states or regions. However it does provide a starting point to 
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evaluate the response to a recession through social practices while controlling for the political, 
economic, and cultural atmospheres of a state.  
 More research is needed from a larger sample that crosses over state boundaries. This will 
allow the results to be vetted in multiple geographies to examine if different states inherently 
respond differently to crises. Also, a follow-up study should be done within North Carolina to see if 
the introductions and increased social support in response to the recession had lasting affects for the 
organizations and if these efforts improved their surrounding economy.  
 This paper examines the difficulty in identifying socially innovative organizations as their 
behavior crosses legal boundaries, self-identification, and organizational characteristics and puts 
forth a classification method that utilizes how organizations operationalize their social mission. 
Knowing the extent to which organizations are incorporating practices provides a means of 
accurately identifying the more socially engaged organizations. These more engaged organizations 
were more pro-active in responding to the economic recession by providing needed support to their 
employees and communities. This paper contributes to the literature on social innovation by 
clarifying the pathways to social innovation, demonstrating the organizational traits associated with 
socially innovative practices, highlighting the value and accuracy of hybrid legal structures, and 
demonstrating a link between socially innovative practices and supportive responses to economic 
downturn.  
 
  
 36 
Figures  
 
Figure 2.1: Frequency of “Social Innovation” and related terms in academic publications  
 
 
Source: Scopus Database 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Sources of Social Innovation 
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Figure 2.3: Comparison of State and Sample Rural-Urban Distributions of Establishments with Employees 
 
 
Source: NC Employment Security Commission 2011 via the Rural Center Data Bank 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Comparison of State and Sample Economic Distress Tier Distributions of Establishments with 
Employees 
 
 
Source: NC Employment Security Commission 2011 via the Rural Center Data Bank 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Quartile Distribution of All Social Practices by Legal Structure 
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Tables  
 
Table 2.1: Comparison of State and Survey Sample County Distributions  
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics by Legal Structure and Hybrid Terminology Sub-Samples 
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Table 2.3: Scale of Social Innovation Regression Results  
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Table 2.4: Scale of Post-Recession Introductions Negative Binomial Regression Results  
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Table 2.5: Post Recession Increases to Social Support Logistic Regression Results  
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CHAPTER THREE: WHAT’S IN A NAME? DISAMBIGUATING PHILANTHROPIC 
GRANTMAKERS AND THEIR STRATEGIES 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This paper examines the philanthropic strategies of US nonprofit grantmaking organizations. 
Philanthropy, though inspired from an innate American quality to give back, is encouraged by the 
tax code that now provides incentives to donate to charitable organizations and create private 
foundations. Nonprofits are given a reprieve from taxes because they are not driven by profit-
maximization, but instead are expected to work for the common good – to be private providers of 
public goods.  They do so through support of scientific research, direct service provision of basic 
needs, economic and community development, and support of arts and education.  
Charitable organizations have been a constant force in the US throughout its history and are 
continuing to grow in numbers and size: in 2013 there were 1.4 million nonprofit organizations 
registered with the IRS, consisting of nearly 950,000 public charities, 97,000 private foundations, and 
365,000 other types of nonprofit organizations; a growth of 2.7% from 2003 (National Center for 
Charitable Statistics, 2013a). These organizations accounted for almost 10% of wages and 5.5% of 
GDP in 2010 (National Center for Charitable Statistics, 2013b). It is also one of the fastest-growing 
sectors for job growth with an annual increase of 2.1% from 2000 to 2010, even adding jobs during 
the recession while for-profit firms lost jobs (Salamon, Sokolowski, & Geller, 2012). 
Despite its size and importance, organizations within this sector are still developing 
processes of evaluation with little available data on the frequency with which these organizations 
evaluate their operations.  It is reported that more nonprofit organizations are adding measurement 
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policies into their operations for internal evaluation (Lumley, 2013), though the type and extent 
varies.  For foundations, estimations of evaluation efforts are low, as evaluation of both internal 
efforts and external impacts of grants are murky endeavors (Fleishman, 2007; Preston, 2012). 
Evaluation is made challenging for a variety of reasons: cost, cooperation from organizations, ability 
to receive accurate information, identification of relevant concepts to quantify, difficulties measuring 
impact and effectiveness, and lack of valid comparisons (Grant Space, n.d.-b; Preston, 2012).  Some 
watchdog organizations, like Charity Navigator, rely on financial analysis to assess nonprofits, while 
others like Guidestar, are trying to incorporate impact assessments on an individual level (GuideStar, 
n.d.-c, n.d.-d; Waide, 2012).  
Complicating the evaluation process is the lack of a clear, multi-dimensional classification 
system of philanthropic organizations. Current classifications of nonprofits group organizations by 
their IRS tax code, which addresses legal ramifications, or NTEE code, which reports the subject 
area of focus.  With minor exceptions, current approaches do not address an organization’s 
expenditures (Internal Revenue Service, 2011; National Center for Charitable Statistics, n.d.). 
Further, terms such as nonprofit, foundation, association, endowment, and trust are used 
interchangeably for organizations that vary by tax and funding structure. For example, the California 
Community Foundation is registered as a public charity with the IRS, while the Lilly Endowment is 
as a private foundation. The systematic differences in funding approaches also crossover these terms 
and funding distinctions: The Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, which has a group classification with the 
IRS, has an aggressive, focused, and risk tolerant funding strategy, while the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, an appropriately named private foundation, runs closely managed and evaluated 
programs in multiple fields, and the Bank of America Charitable Foundation, a private corporate 
foundation provides loans, investments, and donations at the local level to promote community 
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development (Bank of America, n.d.; Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, n.d.; Feldman & Graddy-
Reed, 2014). 
The overlapping characteristics in current categorizations highlight the need for a more 
descriptive classification system that can uniquely group organizations by meaningful distinctions. 
This paper addresses this deficit by developing a classification scheme of nonprofit grantmaking 
organizations based on both how they receive and spend money. Using data from charity watchdog 
organizations and the IRS Forms 990 and 990-PF, the classification scheme is vetted against 
descriptive characteristics and grant-making behavior to assess what qualities distinguish these 
categories.  
This paper proceeds with Section 2, which reviews the growth of strategic philanthropy and 
efforts to evaluate these organizations. Section 3 describes the existing classification models and puts 
forth a new classification system of grantmaking charitable organizations based on how they receive 
and spend money. The research design and methods for testing the model are presented in Section 4 
and the data and sample are discussed in Section 5.  Results are presented in Section 6 and discussed 
in Section 7.  
 
3.2 The State of American Philanthropy  
3.2.1 A Reappearing Act: Strategic Grantmaking in American Philanthropy  
An American Quality to Give, and Other Motivations 
As de Tocqueville highlights in 1835, there is a cultural tradition and expectation among 
Americans to give.  This quality has been commonly cited as the foundation to the US’s strong third 
sector of nonprofit charitable organizations and private philanthropic foundations (Acs & Phillips, 
2002; Salamon, 2002). While altruism is often cited as the primary reason for giving, there are other 
motivations behind it. Large private foundations yield political and economic power (Boulding, 
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1962). Individuals, as a result, are also driven by the desire for social capital – prestige and respect 
(Olson, 1965), or to fight negative perceptions (Becker, 1974). Philanthropists shape social change 
by working as elites after gaining credibility in the private sector (Bartley, 2007). Carnegie, 
Rockefeller, and Mellon each maintained control as they used their wealth to benefit society, 
expanding their own social capital in the process (Harvey, Maclean, Gordon, & Shaw, 2011). 
Following empirical results that show the limitations of the pure altruistic model (Andreoni, 1988; 
Bernheim, 1986; Roberts, 1984; Warr, 1982), Andreoni (1990) developed a model of impure altruism 
better matched to observed philanthropy that accounts for these public and private motivations to 
give (Andreoni, 1990).  
 
Strategic Giving, Again 
These differing motivations may lead to different strategies in giving. Andrew Carnegie 
argued in 1889 in The Gospel of Wealth that there is an obligation for the wealthy to improve society 
with their riches within their lifetime. He along with other tycoons setup massive foundations to 
distribute their wealth to tackle serious problems and spur innovation that the risk-averse 
government could not.  But other philanthropists created foundations without the same motivation 
for fundamental change, instead seeing value in keeping a legacy alive. Now, there has been a return 
to Carnegie’s push, to give away wealth now, not to hoard it.  The movement is seen through 
countless examples of America’s wealthiest pledging to give away their wealth before the die – Gates, 
Buffett, and Bloomberg, for example (Barbaro, 2013; Buffett, 2013; Thelin, 2013).   
 Beyond giving their money away, there is also a strong revival in the practice of thoughtful 
giving – that philanthropists should give their money wisely, strategically. Since large foundations 
have the funding to act on a mammoth scale, they could innovate the process of philanthropy itself 
through strategic giving (Rogers, 2013; Sacks, 1960).  Strategic or venture philanthropy grew as a 
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named concept in the late 1990’s with the rise of tech tycoons, following in the footsteps of former 
business moguls, creating their own philanthropic foundations. The results-oriented funding model 
they employ aims for their dollars to be investments rather than gifts.  They provide administrative 
support, maintain an active presence with the grantee, evaluate outcomes, and provide follow-on 
funding (deCourcy Hero, 2001; Fleishman, 2007; Frumkin, 2003; Letts et al., 1997; Wagner, 2002).  
Many of these strategic foundations are also pushing the boundaries of charitable donations by 
making investments in for-profit companies, blurring the lines between sectors and paths to social 
good (Feldman & Graddy-Reed, 2014). Social enterprises are even creating new legal structures that 
encourage such relationships (Graddy-Reed & Feldman, Forthcoming).   
With the tech boom, many of American’s most prolific philanthropists became young: in 
2012, three of the top five donors were under 40. And with their youth comes a different approach 
than their parents: young philanthropists are funding research and science, looking for innovative 
solutions to problems and measuring impact (CNBC, 2013; Preston, 2013). For example, John and 
Laura Arnold are among the top (young) philanthropists and are motivated to solve problems, not 
to meet an immediate need (Reagan, 2013). This larger motivation leads them to invest in long-term 
research projects to find solutions (Reagan, 2013).  The Arnold Foundation is afforded the right to 
be patient in their approach to philanthropy because they are not accountable to the public. As a 
private foundation they have a luxury forbidden to the government: they can take risks in what they 
fund, and take their time, not having to worry about the next election cycle. Modern mega-
philanthropists are seeing the benefits that the American system provides, and taking advantage.  
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3.2.2 Evaluating Success in Philanthropy 
Ruling Through Regulation 
As a result of their tax-exempt status, charitable organizations are subject to regulation and 
reporting through the IRS.  Charitable organizations are required to file a version of the Form 990 
annually, which provides details on the organization’s revenue sources and expenditures, including 
their grantmaking activity. These forms are publically available by law. The Form 990 has been a 
required reporting form for most charitable organizations since 1943.  There was a major revision to 
the document in 2007, which provided much more non-financial information on the form including 
mission and program activity (Arnsberger, Ludlum, Riley, & Stanton, 2012). Overtime, Congress and 
the IRS have clarified and revised the restrictions surrounding the behavior of charitable 
organizations as an effort to regulate them through revisions to the tax code, most significantly from 
1909 through 1969.5 The Revenue Act of 1950 established the unrelated business income tax for 
charities.  Before then, nonprofits received reprieves from income taxes for both charitable 
operations and unrelated commercial business. With the Tax Reform Act of 1969, clear rules were 
established for private foundations, including the minimum payout requirement and an excise tax on 
net investment income (Arnsberger et al., 2012). Limits on the lobbying and political activity of 
charities were regulated with the Revenue Act of 1934, Tax Reform Act of 1976, and the Revenue 
Reconciliation Act of 1993 (Arnsberger et al., 2012). 
 
A Look Within: Internal Evaluation 
Many internal and external stakeholders have called on the importance of evaluation of 
philanthropic foundations and the nonprofit organizations they support.  However, there are varying 
strategies championed by these stakeholders with little common ground or widespread practices in 
                                                
5 See Arnsberger et. al 2008 for detailed listing of tax policies related to charitable organizations 
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place.  The push for foundation’s to evaluate their grantmaking, and in conjunction, for charities to 
evaluate their outcomes has led to a rise in nonprofit’s measuring outcomes of their work, with 
some reporting 75% of charities measure outcomes (Lumley, 2013).  
However, institutional and organizational characteristics make defining a clear set of best 
practices difficult.  While for-profit organizations measure success through profits, a nonprofit’s 
desired outcome of accomplishing their mission, is difficult to measure accurately, and nears 
impossible with more abstract missions (Herman & Renz, 1998; Preston, 2012; Sawhill & 
Williamson, 2001). In addition, unlike for-profits, nonprofits do not have the same risks of failure. 
They will not go out of business from bad grantmaking, only from bad investing (Boulding, 1962). 
As a result of this challenge, impact evaluation within nonprofits takes a variety of forms 
(some useful and others not), if it is done at all (Herman & Renz, 1999; Sheehan, 1996). For many 
with missions associated with high risk and requiring significant innovations, organizations are more 
likely to evaluate effectiveness through measures of procedures (inputs and processes) rather than 
outcomes (Herman & Renz, 1998).  
Some organizations have implemented multi-level measurements to address separately 
effectiveness of mission success, goals achieved, and capacity (Sawhill & Williamson, 2001).  
Organizations succeed at developing these measures when they establish specific criteria that reflects 
the larger, more abstract mission rather than trying to quantify it directly (Sawhill & Williamson, 
2001). Others have struggled with how to separate their impact from overall activity towards their 
mission.  The American Cancer Society avoided this challenge by accepting progress as progress no 
matter what organization or agency caused it.  Instead, they have chosen to focus on using their 
resources most efficiently based on what actions they know to be effective from previous research 
(Sawhill & Williamson, 2001), a resource most nonprofits do not have.  
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Fleishman (2007) points out the lack on information on program failures within private 
foundations, finding only four foundations in his sample that have ever graded one of their 
programs as failing and finding RWJF to be the major exception to the lack of public admissions of 
failure with their public postings of reports on grants completed no matter the result.  Since 
foundations are private entities, they are not required to report on the success or failure of their 
efforts, raising the growing concern over the lack of accountability and transparency in private 
foundations. Further, even when organizations engage in evaluation, they often fail to provide 
sufficient resources to properly evaluate the grantmaking: a 2009 survey of 31 foundations found the 
median budget for evaluation was 2.2% of their grantmaking budget with 40% spending less than 
1% (Preston, 2012).  
Some foundations, like the Gates Foundation are vocal supports of evaluation and work to 
spread its gospel.  The Gates Foundation views evaluation as the optimal tool for improving 
program effectiveness and defines it as “the systematic and objective assessment of an intervention, 
project, policy, program or partnership, it is different from monitoring or tracking results because it 
can tell us what works best to achieve results, how and why they are or are not achieved, and what 
we can do to improve execution” (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, n.d.). But even with such 
staunch support, they do not use evaluation with all of their investments, only those where them 
deem it would provide the most value (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, n.d.), though it is not 
clear how that is determined. The vague but strong push from many for evaluation is often of 
concern for recipients and staff as they do not know how they will be evaluated or the consequences 
of a poor evaluation (Preston, 2012).  
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Determined Watchdogs: External Evaluation  
In addition to these efforts, there has also been increased support regarding external 
evaluation – efforts made by watchdog organizations to evaluate the quality of private foundations 
and the nonprofit organizations that foundations and individual donors both support.  But outsiders 
face similar challenges to evaluating these organizations – in the absence of a clear outcome it is 
challenging to measure progress towards said outcome and difficult to compare across subjects.  As 
a result, there was a long focus of evaluating nonprofits based on financial indicators, numbers that 
all nonprofits share.  The focal point of these efforts was the ‘overhead’ rate, or the proportion of 
their expenditures on fundraising and administrative costs. However, there is now a trend to avoid 
these measures – noting that all organizations need to spend money on these supporting 
expenditures to be able to provide program related services in the long term (Perry, 2013a, 2013b).  
Many watchdog organizations are instead trying to refocus evaluation on measures of transparency, 
governance, leadership, and outcomes (Perry, 2013b), though little guidance is given on how to 
quantify the latter, leaving evaluation as still heavily process oriented.  
The two most prominent watchdog organizations are Guidestar and Charity Navigator.6  
Guidestar was launched in 1994 by Philanthropic Research to provide the public with access to 
nonprofit’s tax forms and information regarding their operations (GuideStar, n.d.-a). Guidestar has 
evolved with the modern push for impact evaluation from donors and expanded their information 
to include an impact assessment of a growing number of nonprofit organizations (GuideStar, n.d.-c). 
The assessment includes an impact statement and evidence of an organization’s effectiveness, their 
organizational strengths, and places for improvement (GuideStar, n.d.-c). However impact 
                                                
6 The Foundation Center and National Center for Charitable Statistics each provide vital data on 
private foundations and public charities.  They each maintain databases detailing organizational, 
financial, and grant details of nonprofit organizations. While a small portion of each dataset is 
publicly available, most of the data requires a subscription for a fee. Both databases are meant to 
serve as a source of information; neither includes any effort to evaluate an organization, however the 
data would be very useful to many such efforts.   
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statements are contributed by nonprofits and vary greatly in their content and quality.  A subset of 
nonprofits file a Charting Impact report, which includes five questions: what are your aims, what are 
your strategies to accomplish these aims, what are your capabilities to do so, how will you know if 
you have made progress, and what have you accomplished so far (GuideStar, n.d.-b). While 
Guidestar links effectiveness to mission success they recognize the difficulty in assessing this and 
defer to expert opinion for their assessments. Experts include foundation professionals, academics, 
researchers, and senior staff (GuideStar, n.d.-c). However, expert reviews are currently only available 
on approximately 2,300 organizations and are provided based on those most popular with said 
experts so there is a bias towards well-regarded organizations.  
Guidestar has also introduced ‘exchange levels’ that serve as certificates of quality to 
potential donors.  The levels are based on meeting certain criteria but are also associated with 
benefits to participating organizations. A bronze level seal requires an organization to provide basic 
information to the site such as location, contacts, mission statement, area served, and leadership. A 
silver level requires access to financial statements while the gold level requires a Charting Impact 
report and effectiveness information. Benefits to the organization include access to a seal logo to use 
on the organization’s website and discounts to Guidestar products and services (GuideStar, n.d.-d).  
Given the benefit to organizations for participating in this program there is a bias of inclusion 
towards organizations that rely on public support who would benefit from a quality distinction 
signal. Thus private foundations are underrepresented in the population of participants. 
Charity Navigator was launched in 2002 to help donors make informed giving decisions by 
compiling financial details of charities and later their protection of donor’s personal information 
(Charity Navigator, n.d.-b). Charity Navigator (minus a few exceptions) only evaluates public 
charities, not private foundations.  It argues that private foundations are not comparable to public 
charities because they fill out different versions of the Form 990. However the more likely reasoning 
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is that Charity Navigator operates to inform potential donors as opposed to evaluate nonprofits.  As 
a result they are not interested in self-supported private foundations.  
Charity Navigator stands in contrast to other watchdog organizations by standing by the use 
of financial measures to evaluate nonprofits. In defense of the numbers, Charity Navigator argues 
that they inform donors on the financial health of an organization and how responsible they are 
based on their expenditure proportions, savings, and growth rates (Waide, 2012). Further, they argue 
that charities share a similar goal in financial terms: to maximize the funds they spend toward their 
mission by increasing revenues and decreasing other expenditures, thus they can be compared along 
these lines (Waide, 2012). One metric of note is their financial capacity performance measure, which 
assesses how a charity’s financial capacity is maintained over time – how it fares against economic 
shocks, to help show donors which charities are more stable providers.  
Charity Navigator is, however, moving to be more results-oriented in their evaluation.  They 
are working to introduce a third dimension of evaluation in addition to their financial and 
accountability measures of results reporting. Results reporting aims at capturing how successful an 
organization is at reaching their specified goal and how valuable to society that impact is (Charity 
Navigator, n.d.-a). However, the actual data reporting is still process rather than outcome driven.  It 
will include five elements: alignment of mission with solicitation materials, whether the charity has a 
reasonable, evidence based link between their strategy and goal, whether charities provide 
information on their websites about their external rankings, whether the charity uses feedback from 
constituents, and whether they publish evaluation reports of their activity. Charity Navigator plans 
to rate 10,000 charities with this method by 2016. (Charity Navigator, n.d.-a). Their efforts are 
focused on the communication of results opposed to the results themselves. Results reporting will 
be a useful addition to Charity Navigator’s system, while still cautiously avoiding quantifying 
progress of an organization.  
  54 
3.3 A Model of Organizational Classification 
3.3.1 Existing Classification Systems 
There is no widespread clear and concise classification of philanthropic organizations that 
captures multiple characteristics of the organization. Legal tax code, funding structure, giving-style, 
and giving-focus each capture an element of a philanthropic venture.  Current classification systems 
are reviewed below and then a new model is put forth.  
 
IRS Classification of Nonprofit Organizations  
While there are 31 distinct forms of nonprofit organizations under the IRS code, most 
people are familiar and concerned with organizations classified as 501(c)(3) organizations.  These 
organizations fall into one of two types: private foundations and public charities.  The default is 
private foundation unless the organization meets criteria to be a public charity (Internal Revenue 
Service, 2011) 
Private foundations are nonprofits with funding usually from an individual, family, or 
corporation, which manages a grantmaking portfolio to aid some general or specific charitable 
purpose (Grant Space, n.d.-a). Private foundations are required to meet a “payout requirement” 
where a minimum of 5% of their assets must be paid out through their charitable activity annually. 
The vast majority of foundations have payout rates at or very near 5% (Renz, 2012).  Private 
foundations may be operating or non-operating.  Non-operating foundations describe the majority 
of private grantmaking foundations.  Operating foundations run their own charitable programs 
internally and rarely make outside grants.  Instead, they meet the payout requirement by funding 
their own programs.  As an alternate IRS classification they are subject to a different set of 
regulation.  To meet their payout requirement, operating foundations must distribute either 85% of 
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their net income or 4.25% of their assets annually (Internal Revenue Service, 2011). All private 
foundations are required to file the Form 990-PF annually.   
Public charities are nonprofit organizations that receive most of their funding from public 
donations and grants from private foundations and the government.  Public charities may also be 
grantmaking organization, although they usually work towards a public good through direct services 
(Grant Space, n.d.-a). Most of these organizations are required to file the Form 990 annually. Public 
charities may also be further classified with the IRS as a group entity or supporting organization.  
Group entities can exist under many nonprofit codes, but as public charities, they are central 
organizations with a group exemption letter, which covers their subordinate units with their tax-
deductible status.  These organizations with affiliates only file one Form 990 annually to account for 
all sub-units’ activity.   
Supporting organizations are public charities that closely resemble private foundations but 
exclusively fund previously specified public charities.  There are three types of supporting 
organizations: Type 1 are those under the direct control of the supported organization; Type 2 
includes organizations under common control with the supported organization; and Type 3, which 
includes organizations not necessarily related to the supported organization. Supporting 
organizations must distribute at least 85% of their annual income to their supported charities 
(Internal Revenue Service, 2011). Figure 3.1 diagrams the IRS classifications of 501(c)(3) nonprofits.  
 
Common Types of 501(c)(3) Nonprofits 
There are additional types of 501(c)(3) nonprofits that do not hold distinct IRS 
classifications, but are unique either from their funding source or funding strategy.  These include: 
community foundations, family foundations, and corporate foundations. Family foundations are 
private foundation that received their endowment funding from a single family.  This family is 
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typically strongly involved in the grantmaking activities of the foundation and family members often 
serve on the board or as officers. Corporate foundations are also private foundations but receive 
their funding from a for-profit company. However, this endowment is independent from the 
company.  Grantmaking activity follows the for-profit company’s interests. Community foundations, 
unlike the name would suggest, are actually registered as public charities with the IRS.  They receive 
funds from multiple donors, which are then held in a common endowment.  Grants are made to 
benefit a specific community or region. Community foundations often receive support from 
supporting organizations that are setup to specifically fund them.  
Figure 3.2 alters Figure 3.1 to include these common types of charitable organizations that 
do not have unique IRS classifications. As seen from Figure 3.3, the IRS distinctions of these tax-
exempt organizations dictate regulation and reporting of these organizations but do not uniquely 
describe their funding sources and behavior.  Figure 3.4 illustrates the overlap between legal 
structure and grantmaking activity. Public charities and private foundations can be only grantmaking 
organizations or grantmaking and grant-receiving organizations.   
A further complication to the value in the current legal classification system is the lack of 
value in a name.  The word ‘foundation’ has no legal meaning by itself.  So many organizations, and 
even sets of organizations can be named as a ‘foundation’ while not necessarily being classified by 
the IRS as a private foundation. Community foundations, for example, are a set of grantmaking 
public charities, not private foundations. Likewise, not all private foundations refer to their status in 
their name (e.g. the Carnegie Corporation of New York).  Other words like ‘association’, ‘society’, 
‘trust’, and ‘endowment’ are commonly used across legal status in names of organizations, further 
complicating the identification process. Figure 3.5 lists a set of examples that shows the range of 
legal structure, names, and grantmaking behavior crossover.  
 
  57 
NCCS NTEE Classification System  
In 1987, the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) developed the National Taxonomy for 
Exempt Entities (NTEE).  The NTEE classification system codified tax-exempt nonprofit 
organizations in the US around their focus area to provide a better means for describing nonprofits 
(NCCS). The IRS and NCCS use the system to classify nonprofit organizations by subject area.  It is 
also used by the Foundation Center in their classification of grants and grant recipients from 
foundation funding (National Center for Charitable Statistics, n.d.). The system was created to help 
the analysis of nonprofit organizations, given the lack of any classification system beyond IRS legal 
codes.  
The IRS began using the system in the 1990s.  The version used by the IRS contains 
approximately 400 codes within a hierarchical model. The system consists of ten major groups: Arts, 
Culture, & Humanities, Education, Environment & Animals, Health, Human Services, International 
& Foreign Affairs, Public, Societal Benefit, Religious, Mutual/Membership Benefit, and 
Unknown/Unclassified. Within these groups there are 26 major codes illustrated by a letter and then 
each major code has a series of numeric categories (National Center for Charitable Statistics, n.d.). 
The NTEE classification system is quite useful in identifying organizations by subject area and can 
be used in combination with the IRS code to have a broader understanding of a charitable 
organization. There is little consistency between NTEE codes and IRS legal status.  Figure 3.6 
updates Figure 3.5 to include NTEE codes to show this variation.  
 
Foundation Center Taxonomy  
The Foundation Center has been developing its own classification system, the Philanthropy 
Classification System, to attempt to deal with these variations. They began redeveloping the system 
in 2012 to assist in analysis of philanthropic operations. The updated system includes six 
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components to cover many facets of the philanthropic organization: Population served, Subject area, 
Organization type, Support strategy, Transaction type, and Geographical area served (Foundation 
Center, n.d.-a). The Population code consists of approximately 170 options and can be applied to 
the grantmaker, recipient, and grant to describe who is being supported. The Subject area code 
contains roughly 690 types to describe the area of focus of the grantmaker, recipient, or grant. There 
are 80 organization types to be applied to the grantmaker or recipient.  Support strategies entail 
roughly 100 options to be applied to the grantmaker or grant that provides detail on the purpose of 
the funds, for example if it is a travel award or research grant. There are approximately 50 
Transaction type and an endless number of geographical areas at the nation, state, county, and 
inhabited area levels (Foundation Center, n.d.-a). The benefit to this system is the extreme detail it 
will provide regarding grantmaking organizations, their recipients, and the individual grants they 
make. However, the tradeoff to such detail is that it is quite complicated and since most can receive 
multiple codes there seems to be almost a unique combination for each organization and grant. 
Further, it does not capture the motivation or strategy behind a grantmaker’s portfolio. 
 
3.3.2 A New Model of Classification 
This paper puts forth a hypothesized paradigm of philanthropic grantmaking organizations 
defined by two key characteristics: the funding model employed and mission focus of the 
organization. It is a system to classify organizations based on how they receive funds and how they 
spend funds.  
 The funding model captures tax code regulation, revenue source type, and expenditure 
requirements.  Philanthropic organizations are primarily funded through one of two options: 
endowment or donation-based.  Endowed organizations are initially setup with a large sum of 
money to be invested so as to produce additional money over time.  Grants and expenses are spent 
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from the endowment each year. Donation-based organizations have little or no endowment. Instead 
they rely on donations and outside grants to create their revenue, which is then used for operating 
expenditures, program expenses, and their own grantmaking.  
This distinction by funding structure classifies private foundations, including non-operating 
and operating, as endowed organizations. This includes family and corporate foundations. Donation 
based organizations are comprised of public charities, which includes group entities.  It also includes 
community foundations. Supporting organizations, although public charities are grouped with 
endowment-based organizations because their funding comes from a single donor, family, or 
business and they behave more like a foundation, as discussed previously.  
The second classification used in this model is to separate organizations based on their 
mission focus.  Mission focus addresses how organizations give: do they have a specific focus in 
their mission or do they operate within a general purpose. This captures if organizations are strategic 
in their giving as more focused organizations are more likely to reach innovative outcomes.  As 
discussed previously, nonprofit organizations often have vague missions due to the large public 
good problems they are attempting to tackle, making it challenging to evaluate their effectiveness.  
McDonald (2007) puts forth a model of mission-driven innovation, which argues and shows that 
nonprofit organizations with clear and explicit mission lead to more innovation by focusing the 
attention of the organization to accomplishable goals and providing goals that can be evaluated 
(McDonald, 2007).  
  Additional literature on mission statements and performance uses content analysis to assess 
if different words or phrases are associated with organizational performance.  Short & Palmer (2007) 
do so with a sample of business schools and find language around activity and action is positively 
associated with external rankings (Short & Palmer, 2008). From the for-profit literature, Bartkus & 
Glassman (2007) find that the use of social issue terms in mission statements, like environment and 
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diversity, are significantly associated with corresponding behaviors (Bartkus & Glassman, 2007). 
While Bart & Laurier (1998) find that mission statements that listed organizational values and 
purpose had higher firm performance (Bart & Baetz, 1998). 
The challenge with using a mission statement to measure strategy is in a smooth assignment 
process of coding organizations as focused or general in purpose. A classification system is only as 
valuable as it is usable so it must have an objective coding system so as to be applied broadly. To 
account for this, a signal variable is coded as focused if nonprofits meet one of three criteria based 
on the number of fields of interest, types of support provided, and key words in mission statements.  
Regarding fields, organizations that are only interested in one broad field (e.g. Education or Health) 
or two subjects (e.g. Cancer Research, Breast Cancer) are coded as focused. This allows for minor 
flexibility in interest areas but maintains a focus in attention. Organizations are also coded as 
focused if they provide support for research or program-related investments (PRI).  These types of 
support are included because they are associated with outcome-oriented strategies, especially in 
comparison to alternative types of support such as building support or capital campaigns.  
Finally, nonprofits are also coded as focused if their mission statements contain words 
related to strategy, collaboration, efficiency, outcome-orientation, or social innovation. (See 
Appendix Table 3.1 for list of words used). The list of words was chosen based on the key principles 
surrounding strategic grantmaking articulated previously.  Various sets of words were tried in this 
sampling process and tested on a sample of mission statements for accuracy.  In addition, a more 
restrictive signal variable was also created that omits the criterion regarding types of support.  The 
data were analyzed using this system as well and produced similar results, but were slightly smaller in 
magnitude.  Appendix Table 3.2 shows the distribution between the two systems.  
These two classifications, funding structure and mission focus are exogenous to each other, 
producing four classifications of philanthropic organizations (Figure 3.7). The first category of 
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strategic or venture foundations are endowed and mission-driven organizations.  With endowments, 
strategic foundations should have little if any other revenue sources funding their operations. Given 
their mission focus, these foundations should be following venture-like practices and providing 
larger and longer-term grants with administrative support while also fostering relationships with 
their grantees (Feldman & Graddy-Reed, 2014; Fleishman, 2007; Letts et al., 1997). 
Strategic or venture public charities are also mission-based organizations but are donation-
based, meaning they receive most of their revenue from private donations, grants, and fee-for-
service programs. Strategic charities are similar to strategic foundations in their high-mission focus, 
making them likely to exhibit similar grant-making behavior of larger and longer-term grants. 
However, their less-secure funding structure should affect their giving strategy.  Strategic charities 
should be more likely to incorporate revenue generating streams like royalty stipulations and 
licensing agreements than their foundation counterparts, which will help improve their own financial 
security. They should also be more likely to cultivate partnerships between grantees and outside 
stakeholders to help secure follow-on funding for successful projects (Bercovitz, Feldman, & 
Graddy-Reed, Working Paper; Feldman & Graddy-Reed, 2014; Ledford, 2011). 
Non-strategic public charities are donation-based and have general social aims. They are 
similarly funded from private donations and grants and program revenues.  However, they are not 
mission focused. Instead they have a set of general aims that motivate their grant-making efforts. 
This is likely to lead them to be less dynamic in their funding strategy overtime, less likely to be 
evaluating their impact, and more likely to provide smaller grants across more types of projects and 
in less goal-oriented areas.  Traditional foundations also have general social aims but are endowed.  
Because they have no revenue pressures and less focus, they are more likely to provide smaller 
grants in multiple areas and payout a smaller percentage of their endowment each year than their 
strategic counterparts.   
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Looking back to the set of example nonprofits, Figure 3.8 updates the set to include their 
category with this classification system (non-grantmaking organizations are excluded since this 
system refers only to grantmaking entities).  As can be seen from the table, the new classification 
system crosses over self-identifying terms, IRS legal structure, funding sources, and focus areas to 
describe nonprofits by their revenues funding structure and expenditure focus.   
 
3.4 Research Design & Methods: Applying & Evaluating the Model  
Section three puts forth a classification model of philanthropic organizations based on 
funding structure and funding strategy, creating four organization types. Following the assignment 
process, the classification model is vetted to assess what organizational characteristics distinguish 
categories, and then applied to estimate how organization type affects grantmaking practices.   
 
3.4.1 Vetting the System  
In the first part of the analysis, a multinomial logit model is estimated by regressing the 
categories on a set of organizational and financial characteristics to vet the system by nonprofit i 
(Equation 4.1). The multinomial logit model assesses probabilities of assignment to the non-ordered 
categorical outcome of classification category as a function of characteristics of the nonprofit, the 
decision-maker.  The marginal effects of the model do not depend on the other alternatives, 
assuming the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) holds.7 Just as with a binary logit 
model, marginal effects describe how a change in the decision-maker’s characteristics changes the 
estimated probability of being in a specific category.   !"#$$%&%'#(%)*!#(! = ! +   !!!"#$"%&'(! + !!!"#$%&"'(! + !!    4.1  
                                                
7 The IIA was tested using a Hausman omitting each category and ‘passed’ on each account, failing 
to reject the null hypothesis that differences in the coefficient were not systematic.  
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 Nonprofit characteristics include whether the organization provides an impact statement, if 
they require an application form for potential grants, if they have a single state geographical focus in 
their giving, if they are members to regional grantmaking associations, or to affinity groups, and if 
their fields of interest include arts and culture, health or science research, the environment, or health 
care.  The IRS ruling year is also included to capture nonprofit age.  Financial characteristics include 
the nonprofits total revenue and share of expenditures on salaries in the first year of the dataset.   
The model is also run on the binary outcome of the financial distinction (donation-based 
versus endowed) to compare on what characteristics funding source distinguishes nonprofits versus 
the 2x2 model. For comparison, the same multinomial model is also run using each the Guidestar 
Exchange Level ranking and the Charity Navigator ranked status as alternate outcomes to assess 
what organizational variation they capture.  
 
3.4.2 Applying the System  
Given that there are meaningful distinctions between these organizations, the next question 
is how these distinctions affect behavior: How does a grantmaker’s funding source and strategy affect their 
grantmaking portfolios?  An OLS model is estimated by regressing a series of logged outcome variables 
on the classification system, lagged time-varying financial statistics, and lagged grantmaking behavior, 
clustering by the nonprofit (Equation 4.2).  ln  (!"#$%)!" = ! +   !!!"#$%&'(! +   !!!"#$%&"'(!"!!   +   !!!"(!"#$%)!"!!   + !!"   4.2  
The outcomes estimated are grouped into two levels of observation: year and grant.  At the year 
level, data are aggregated by nonprofit to their annual total. Models are run using annual logged 
outcomes of total giving, median grant size, total giving to universities, total giving through socially 
innovative practices, total giving for research, and total giving for health.  Total giving to universities 
is calculated based on the recipients name including college or university. Total giving through social 
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innovation is calculated based on the grant description including program/mission related investment/loan, 
micro-credit/enterprise/finance/entrepreneurship, social entrepreneur/enterprise, or social innovation. Total giving 
for research is also determined by the grant description including any of a series of words that 
describe the research process including research, clinical trial, proof-of-concept, analyze, case study, experiment, 
as well as others. Total giving for health is based off of descriptions including any of a series of 
words related to health care, specific conditions, or diseases (See Appendix Table 3.1 for full list). 
 At the grant level, the outcome variable is the logged grant size. The model is run on the full 
sample of grants as well as sub-samples of grants supporting research, arts and culture, the 
environment, health, health-disease related only, and health-care related only. As in the year level 
analysis, these fields are based on grant descriptions including sets of words (Appendix 3.1).   
 Control variables include lagged financial and grantmaking behavior.  At the year level 
analysis, controls include the lagged proportion of grantmaker-recipient state match (how many of 
the grants went to in-state recipients), lobbying activities, proportion of expenditures to salaries, 
proportion of expenditures to fundraising, and the outcome. In the grant level analyses, controls also 
include the lagged lobbying activities, proportion of expenditures to salaries, proportion of 
expenditures to fundraising, and the outcome. In addition, whether the grant is going in-state is 
included, as well as the lagged logged average grant size and lagged logged total giving for the 
outcome area (total giving for full sample, giving to research for research sub-sample).  For the full 
sample, lagged logged giving to research and lagged proportions of giving to universities, schools, 
and hospitals are each included. The nonprofit’s age based on IRS ruling year and lagged assets are 
controlled for in every model.  
Temporal variation is also examined to assess if grantmakers change their strategies in 
response to economic recession.  The analysis is rerun with samples during and post the Great 
Recession to identify how organizations vary behavior in changing economic conditions. The full 
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sample includes data from 2007 to 2011.  Since the Great Recession began in December of 2007 and 
ended in June 2009, data from 2008 and 2009 are treated as the recession and 2010 and 2011 are 
considered post-recession. 
As in the first part of the analysis with the multinomial logit model, comparison models are 
run using the same independent variables but changing the classification system. For the year and 
grant level analyses, IRS tax status, Guidestar Exchange Level, and Charity Navigator ranked status 
are used as alternate categorical systems to assess how they explain grantmaking behavior.  
 
3.5 Data  
To test and evaluate the hypothesized model of classification, data is compiled from the IRS 
Form 990 and Form 990-PF.  As previously discussed, these forms are required to be completed by 
foundations and public charities in the US. The data collected from these forms includes general 
financial information regarding revenue and expenditure streams and detailed information on the 
grants made by the organization. This data is augmented with descriptive information on the 
organizations, including age, location, and practices from charity watchdog organizations. 
 
3.5.1 The Sample of Organizations  
The sample for analysis consists of 708 foundations and public charities over a five-year 
period from 2007 to 2011. The compilation of foundations and public charities is not representative 
of the entire population of foundations or public charities but is skewed to focus on those that are 
active grantmaking organizations either as major givers, local champions, or dedicated supporters of 
a specific area. The specific areas highlighted were those that tend to have a mix of research and 
program support.  
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The organizations were sampled in part from lists ranking nonprofits by size in various types 
of giving compiled by the Foundation Center and by using the NCCS database. The Foundation 
Center ranking lists used to generate the sample were: largest foundations by total assets and total 
giving, largest family, operating, community, corporate, and independent foundations by total giving, 
largest foundations in states by total giving, largest foundations by total giving for health, medical 
research, science and technology, the environment (all for 2011). Organizations were also sampled 
from those that are NORD member organizations and NIH rare diseases foundations, Faster Cures 
panelists, Southeast Venture Philanthropy Summit panelists, and Stanford venture philanthropists to 
capture smaller nonprofits that tout strategic principles. The NCCS database was also sampled to 
capture large grantmaking public charities (based on size weights), excluding hospitals and schools.   
The list of organizations contains 382 private foundations, 18 operating foundations, 48 
supporting organization, 13 exempt groups, 243 public charities, and 2 non-exempt charitable trusts. 
Appendix Table 3.3 shows the proportion distribution of public charities and private foundations in 
the sample by state and the population distribution by state for active grantmaking public charities 
and private foundations. The sample is fairly representative of the population distribution with a few 
exceptions: Illinois, Michigan, North Carolina, and Virginia are over-represented while Florida, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin are under-represented.  
The time period selected was the most recent and complete five-year period available for the 
nonprofit’s Form 990s: 2007 to 2011.  This time period is of note because in the middle of the panel 
is the economic recession of 2008-2009. The Great Recession impacted foundations and public 
charities by decreasing the value of their endowments and reducing donation levels. Thus data from 
those years are not representative of funding levels in stronger economic times.  However, it does 
provide the ability to analyze the effect of the crash on the allocation of funding, and the behavior of 
these organization in a recovery period.  
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Although the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is the largest funder of philanthropy, it was 
omitted from this analysis because it is an outlier: with assets of $34,640,122,644 and total giving of 
$3,239,412,884 in 2011, the next largest foundations, respectively in the US reported assets of 
$10,984,721,000 and total giving of $487,795,351 for the same year (Foundation Center). Their 
strategies and behavior would overwhelm and skew the data.   
 
3.5.2 Data Collection Process 
This dataset consists of three parts: grant, financial, and organizational detail data. The grant 
data consists of each grant a foundation or public charity made in a given year for any specified 
amount of at least $4,000. The data includes the recipient, recipient’s location, amount of the grant, 
and brief description. The data were purchased from a private company (Metasoft) that pulls off this 
information from the Form 990 and Form 990-PFs. It provided data on 957,944 grants made by the 
708 foundations and public charities from 2007 to 2011 in 46 states. Coding was run on the 
recipient names and grant descriptions to create variables based on recipient type and grant subjects. 
Variable were also created using the grant data regarding total giving by nonprofit and year across 
various recipient types and subject areas.   
 The financial detail data was pulled from the Form 990 and Form 990-PFs.  For 291 
organizations the data was accessed with the NCCS database and for 340 organizations it was pulled 
by hand with the help of research assistants. It provides yearly values for each nonprofit of their 
revenue, in detail, expenditures, in detail, and net assets.   
 Organizational detail data was also pulled from the IRS, the Foundation Center, NCCS, 
Guidestar, and Charity Navigator. Data include IRS tax status, grantmaker type, founder type, age by 
IRS ruling year, mission statement, fields of interest for grantmaking, geographical focus, types of 
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support, application requirements, philanthropic memberships, and impact statement.  Ratings were 
pulled from watchdog organizations Guidestar and Charity Navigator.  
 
3.5.3 Descriptive Statistics  
Summary statistics are discussed at the nonprofit and grant level across the full sample and 
by classification category.  Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics at the nonprofit level. While 
each of the categories has a similar average spent on program-related expenditures (85-86%), there 
are important distinctions in size.  Donation-based and Endowed Focused organizations are larger 
than their broader counterparts in terms of total revenue and assets. However, there is revenue-
source based variation in the number of employees: Donation-based organizations have substantially 
larger staffs on average than the endowed nonprofits. Regarding grant-making practices, broad 
organizations had higher rates of giving only to pre-selected organizations (34% of Endowed Broad 
entities and 18% of Donation-based Broad) compared to focused nonprofits (16% of Endowed 
Focused and 7% of Donation-based Focused). In addition, Donation-based Focused organizations 
are the most likely to have program-related conference expenditures.  As discussed in the 
presentation of the classification model, it is expected that these organizations would be more likely 
to have such expenditures so they can cultivate partnerships that help secure additional external 
funding for their efforts. 
 Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics by category at the grant level. Endowed and 
Donation-based Focused organizations had the highest levels of total giving while Donation-based 
Focused organizations had the lowest average grant size (and Endowed Focused had the highest). 
Focused organization, both Endowed and Donation-based contributed more to research as a 
proportion of total giving than their broader counterparts. Regarding location, there is a revenue-
source distinction on the prevalence of in-state giving: Donation-based organizations made 53-56% 
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of their grants to in-state recipients while Endowed organizations made 31-37% of their grants to in-
state. Endowed Broad organizations had the highest rates of giving to arts and culture and social 
services, both in terms of number of grants and total giving. Across all categories, total giving 
relative to number of grants was smallest in the categories of religion and social services and highest 
in health and agriculture and the environment.  
 
Comparison Across Category 
Given the multiple options for classifying grantmakers it is of interest not just how 
organizations vary across this classification scheme but also how this approach matches to other 
options. Table 3.3 shows the distribution of nonprofits and grants across the classification system 
and other distinctions (IRS, Guidestar, and Charity Navigator) used for comparison in the analysis. 
Within the classification system, Donation-based Focused organizations represent 34% of grants but 
only 22% of organizations while Endowed Broad nonprofits consist of 33% of the sample 
organizations but only 20% of the grants. Regarding IRS tax status, public charities make up 34% of 
the sample organizations and 46% of the grants while supporting organizations consist of 7% of the 
sample but only 1% of grants. For Guidestar participants, Gold status members make up 5% of the 
sample by only 3% of the grants while Silver members consist of 23% of sample and 38% of the 
grants. Organizations not eligible to be ranked by Charity Navigator (mostly due to their 
organizational type) are evenly represented controlling 68% of organizations and 67% of grants.  
 Regarding the overlap of systems, Table 3.4 provides the distribution of IRS status, 
Guidestar ranking, and Charity Navigator status by classification categories as well as their 
availability of certain information through Guidestar. In terms of IRS status, group entities make up 
a larger proportion of focused donation-based organizations than broad while supporting 
organizations represent a larger share of broad endowed nonprofits than focused. Guidestar 
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rankings and information are heavily tied to revenue-source. While all donation-based organizations 
listed their mission statements with Guidestar, only 13-24% of Endowed organizations did so. 
However, Focused organizations, both Donation-based and Endowed, had the highest rates external 
assessments provided, signaling their popularity within the nonprofit community. Charity Navigator 
status also closely follows legal structure with endowed organizations mostly not eligible to be 
ranked.  However, Donation-based Focused organizations are ranked at a higher rate than their 
Broad counterpart. For those not eligible to be ranked, Endowed organizations are almost entirely 
not eligible because Charity Navigator does not rank private foundations.  For Donation-based 
nonprofits, most are not eligible because Charity Navigator has suspended their ranking of 
community foundations. However, 13% of Broad Donation-based organizations are ineligible 
because they have nontrivial fundraising expenditures, compared to only 4% of Focused Donation-
based organizations, pointing to a greater efficiency within Focused nonprofits.  
 
3.6 Results 
Results are presented below on the vetting of the system with the multinomial model and 
application of the system with the grantmaking behavior models at the year and grant level. 
Grantmaking results are presented for the overall sample, recession period, and post-recession 
period.  Comparison results for each of the three parts by alternate categories are presented and 
discussed in the Appendix in tables 3.4-3.6.  
 
3.6.1 Vetting the System: Multinomial Logit Results 
Table 3.5 presents the marginal effects from the multinomial logit model by classification 
category as well as financial distinction of donation-based as compared to endowed. The marginal 
effects by category are in reference to changes in the estimated probability of being in that category 
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as compared to not. Regarding the role of revenue source, both requiring an application form and 
having a single state geographical focus is associated with an increase in the probability of being 
donation-based while it decreases the probability of each of the endowed category probabilities. 
However it only increases the probabilities of being a Focused Donation-based organization.  
 Membership plays a role depending on the type of organization.  Regional association 
memberships are associated with a decrease in the probability of being a Donation-based Focused 
nonprofit but an increase in the probability of being an Endowed Focused organization.  Alternately, 
affinity group memberships tied to fields and focus areas increase the probability of being a Focused 
Donation-based nonprofit and decrease the probability of being a Broad Donation-based entity.  
 In terms of specific subject areas, support to arts and culture increases the probability of 
being a Broad Endowed entity and decreases the probability of being an Endowed Focused 
nonprofit. While Donation-based Focused organizations have a significant association with 
environmental support. Salary share has no significant effect on the probability any category or 
revenue-source distinction.  
 
3.6.2 Applying the System: OLS Results, Year-Level 
Tables 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 present the results from the OLS estimations of grantmaking 
behavior at the annual level for the overall sample, recession, and post-recession time periods, 
respectively. Across the time period, being a Broad Donation-based organization, as compared to a 
Focused Donation-based nonprofit, is associated with decreases in total giving, giving to universities, 
giving through social innovation, and giving for research.  While the decrease in total giving is 
associated with an approximately 12% change on average, the decrease in research giving is 
approximately 115%, holding all else constant. Endowed Focused organizations are associated with 
a larger median grant size as compared to Donation-based Focused organizations but have no other 
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statistically significant differences.  Endowed Broad nonprofits, as compared to Donation-based 
Focused organizations, are associated with decreases in total giving, giving to universities, giving 
through social innovation, and giving for research but they are associated with an increase in median 
grant size signaling that endowed organizations are providing larger grants, on average. Also of note, 
regarding other characteristics, having lobbying activities, as compared to not, in the previous year is 
associated with an increase in giving for research.  
 Turning to the recession, the restricted sample of 2008-2009 provides similar results. 
Endowed organizations (both Focused and Broad) are associated with higher median grant sizes, 
while being an Endowed Broad organization is associated with decreases in total giving, giving to 
universities, through social innovation, and for research.  However, being a Broad as compared to 
Focused Donation-based nonprofit is associated only with decreases in giving to universities and for 
research, holding all else constant. Also, during the recession, the lagged proportion of in-state 
recipients has a positive association with giving to health related activities.   
 Post-recession, many of the differences across classification category are dampened.  Broad 
as compared to Focused Donation-based entities are associated with decreases in giving to 
universities and through social innovation but no longer to research.  Endowed Broad organizations 
are only associated with decreases in giving through social innovation, while Endowed nonprofits 
still exhibit higher median grants, on average. The differences point to the greater stability within 
Focused Donation-based organizations compared to Broad nonprofits during the recession but 
more equity across type in more stable times.  It also indicates that Donation-based Focused 
nonprofits give more than Broad nonprofits through social innovation consistently.  The lack of 
significant differences between Donation-based and Endowed Focused organizations across 
samples may signal their similarity in giving approach.  
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3.6.3 Applying the System: OLS Results, Grant-Level 
Tables 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11 present the results from the OLS estimations of grantmaking 
behavior at the grant level for the overall sample, recession, and post-recession time periods, 
respectively. Turning to the overall results, grant-level analysis supports results from the annual-level 
analysis regarding grant size.  Endowed Focused nonprofits compared to Donation-based Focused 
entities are associated with larger grant sizes, on average, across all funding areas, grants for research, 
the environment, and health by a magnitude of approximately 52-65%.  Endowed Broad 
organizations are associated with higher grant amounts in the areas of arts and culture and health 
care as compared to Donation-based Focused organizations. Within Donation-based organizations, 
Broad entities are associated with decreases in grant size in support of research and the environment 
by approximately 37% and 34%, respectively, but increases in grant size for health care related 
funding. Holding the classification category constant, in-state recipients received higher grants on 
average.   
 The recession sub-sample shows very similar results to the overall sample. Endowed 
Focused nonprofits still exhibited higher grants on average, compared to Donation-based Focused 
organizations across all areas, the environment, and health disease related funding but no longer in 
terms of research or health care. Endowed Broad organizations are still associated with higher grant 
sizes in the arts and culture and health care but also the environment.  Broad Donation-based 
nonprofits exhibit the same pattern as the overall sample with decreases in grant size for research 
and the environment but increases in health care grants, compared to Focused Donation-based 
entities, on average. In-state recipients are also still associated with higher grant sizes, on average, 
holding classification category constant.  
 In the post-recession sub-sample, many results are consistent to recession estimates.  Broad 
Donation-based nonprofits, as compared to Focused, are associated with decreases in grant size for 
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research and the environment and increases for health care.  However they are also associated with 
decreases in health disease related funding. Endowed Focused organizations still have higher grant 
sizes overall, for research and the environment but now also for health care.  However they no 
longer have statistically significant higher grant sizes for health-disease related funding than 
Donation-based Focused nonprofits. Post-recession, Broad Endowed organizations exhibit higher 
grants than Donation-Based Focused nonprofits, on average, overall, for arts and culture, and health 
care. Across all three samples, in-state recipients have increased grant sizes across all funding, arts 
and culture, and health, but never significant differences for research. The similarities across 
temporal sub-samples point to consistency in differences in grant sizes between categories, in spite 
of economic shocks.  
 
3.7 Discussion  
The classification model put forth here argues that nonprofit organizations vary by their 
funding source and funding strategies.  Results from vetting this system against organizational 
characteristics find differences in factors that affect distinction by funding source and strategy.  
Regarding funding source, application requirement and geographical focus are associated with 
distinctions between donation-based and endowed organizations.  In terms of funding strategies, 
focused organizations are associated with membership to affinity groups and supporting 
environmental causes while organizations that support the arts are more likely to have a broad 
approach.  
 The categories of organizations behave differently in terms of their grantmaking portfolios. 
Regarding total giving, both during the recession and post, there were no statistically significant 
differences between Endowed and Donation-based Focused organizations. However, while Broad 
organizations, both Endowed and Donation-based had lower total giving to universities and for 
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research than Donation-based Focused organizations during the recession, only Donation-based 
Broad nonprofits had statistically significant lower total giving to universities compared to 
Donation-based Focused nonprofits post-recession.  After the recession, when the economy was 
recovering Broad Endowed organizations picked up their total giving levels to be more on par with 
Donation-based Focused entities, indicating that Focused Donation-based nonprofits were better 
prepared for the recession to maintain their total giving.  
 Grant size tells a different story.  Both during the recession and post, Endowed Focused 
nonprofits had larger grant sizes than Donation-based Focused nonprofits in terms of overall 
funding and funding to the environment. Post recession, Endowed Focused organizations also had 
higher grant sizes for research and health care related projects than Donation-based Focused 
nonprofits. While there is no significant difference in terms of total giving, during recession or 
recovery between Endowed and Donation-based Focused nonprofits, Endowed Focused entities do 
consistently provide larger grants in key fields.  
 Meanwhile, Broad organizations had larger grants than Donation-based Focused nonprofits 
to health care both during and after the recession.  Endowed Broad organizations also had larger 
grants to the arts and culture in both time periods while Donation-based Broad organizations had 
smaller grants compared to Donation-based Focused nonprofits in the areas of research and the 
environment during the recession and recovery, as well as in health disease related work in the post 
period. So Broad Donation-based organizations has lower total giving and smaller grant sizes in key 
subject areas, namely research, than Focused Donation-based nonprofits. Whereas, Endowed Broad 
organizations had less total giving during the recession overall and for research, and consistently 
provide larger grants to the arts and health care than Focused Donation-based organizations. 
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Grantmaking Strategies in Practice, Sometimes  
This model of classification and significant differences in grantmaking practices raises 
important implications.  Given the goal of nonprofits to provide for the public good, focused 
organizations appear to be doing more in terms of total giving to grantmaking compared to broad 
purpose organizations. They are putting more dollars in circulation. This is especially key during an 
economic recession. The result is most surprising for Donation-based focused organizations, which 
were hit by lower levels of revenue during the recession and should have shown to be more 
responsive in total giving compared to Endowed organizations. The decreases in Broad Endowed 
organizations point to both Donation-based Focused nonprofits as being more prepared and even 
dedicated to their constituents’ needs. The implication that grant size was maintained between 
recession and recovery but total giving changed is important to understanding the grantmaking 
strategy of maintaining grant ‘quality’, as measured by size, to fewer number of grants when 
constrained as opposed to providing less to a similar number of recipients.  
 The result on grant size highlight another key aspect to grantmaking strategies and an 
important distinction touted by strategic grantmakers: sufficient funding.  Donation-based focused 
organizations made consistently smaller grants than their Endowed Focused counterparts in key 
fields, like research. Smaller grants may not be as effective as larger ones, hindering the goals of 
donation-based organizations. Donation-based focused nonprofits did provide consistently larger 
grants than their broad counterpart in key fields of research, the environment, and health disease 
work, pointing to their success in comparison to broader organizations of similar revenue source.  
While Endowed Broad organization had larger grants on average than Donation-based Focused, 
they were in areas of the arts and health care as opposed to areas more often associated with 
problem-solving like research, health disease, and the environment. However, this distinction raises 
questions over where money should go.  While a Donation-based Focused nonprofit may tout its 
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large overall support of disease research, if they are doing so with many small grants to competing 
researchers they may be less effective at reaching an important goal than an Endowed Broad 
nonprofit that provides a large service provision grant for health care that will immediately treat a 
problem. While we can all agree it is better to effectively solve a problem than ineffectively treat it, it 
is not as clear that ineffectively trying to solve a problem is a better approach than effectively 
temporarily treating it.  
 
A Push for Evaluation, Again 
Policymakers need to recognize that private foundations and public charities are both 
publicly subsidized entities and thus we cannot just monitor public charities.  We need to be more 
aware of how private foundations are operating financially and with their grantmaking and how their 
efforts compare across organizational structure. To do so, we need to be a real emphasis on 
evaluation of outcomes, not just dollars out but results realized.  While many organizations, 
especially ones operating under strategic principles, tout the value of evaluation, few are practicing 
what they preach: in this sample only 77 of over 950,000 grants included evaluation related words in 
the description of activity, highlighting again that while organizations are hyping evaluation, few are 
supporting it. 
Watchdog organizations like Charity Navigator and Guidestar are trying to move towards 
more outcome-based evaluation methods but these efforts require buy-in from the nonprofits and 
financial support. As the charitable deduction often reappears in budgeting debates in Washington, 
we need to address outcome assessment within nonprofits to really understand what are effective 
policies in support of nonprofit public good provision and what are effective strategies by 
nonprofits as public good providers.  There is no doubt nonprofits are providing for the public 
good in ways the government cannot feasibly do so, but we need to understand how these 
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nonprofits can be more effective at it. Given that the Federal government subsidizes nonprofit 
public good provision, it needs to step up and evaluate that policy. This paper contributes to the 
literature by putting forth a useful and straightforward classification scheme that categorizes 
nonprofits across two key dimensions that can be used as a foundation to account for the limitations 
and needs of different organizational types when evaluating their programs. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 3.1 – Diagram of IRS 501(c)3 Classifications 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 – Diagram Adjusted for Common Types 
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Figure 3.3 – Table of Distinctions by IRS Classification & Common Types 
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Figure 3.4 – Relationships between Grantmakers & Grant-Recipients 
 
 
Key:  
Public Charities = Dark Blue; 
Private Foundations = Light Blue 
Grant Recipients = Rectangles  
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Figure 3.5 – Table of Variation Examples 
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Figure 3.6 – Table of Variation Examples with NTEE Codes 
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Figure 3.7: Organization Classifications by Funding Structure and Mission Focus  
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Figure 3.8 – Table of Variations updated to New Classification System 
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Tables 
 
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics – Nonprofit Level 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Sample Donation Focused Donation Broad
Endowed 
Focused Endowed Broad
IRS Ruling Year 1979.7 1976.3 1975.1 1977.4 1984.2
(20.66) (19.81) (19.00) (22.62) (18.59)
Total Revenue 106,890,339.1 171,766,647.7 110,993,602.3 123,724,014.2 60,218,503.4
(442881389.7) (754108406.3) (224940956.4) (416374927.1) (260144278.8)
Total Assets 394,550,141.2 441,584,379.7 244,594,644.6 733,363,004.9 200,143,654.5
(1.16681e+09) (1.63247e+09) (590550777.4) (1.54933e+09) (463928404.6)
Program Expenditure Share 0.859 0.856 0.865 0.869 0.850
Administrative Expenditure Share 0.0987 0.0917 0.0865 0.129 0.142
Fundraising Expenditure Share 0.0423 0.0523 0.0481 0.00209 0.00750
Program-Related Conference Expenses 0.585 0.759 0.582 0.286 0.105
Number of Employees 170.6 268.7 125.8 3.857 8.553
(1204.4) (1727.6) (374.2) (5.433) (40.05)
Number of Voting Board Members 20.86 23.50 23.80 10.43 8.447
(21.48) (21.19) (23.94) (6.489) (12.26)
Application Form Required 0.443 0.752 0.624 0.386 0.248
Contributes only to pre-selected organizations 0.217 0.0671 0.176 0.158 0.336
Membership: Regional 0.687 0.579 0.583 0.808 0.726
Membership: Affinity 0.719 0.850 0.597 0.760 0.584
Membership: Philanthropic Associations 0.678 0.767 0.736 0.726 0.478
Number of Fields of Interests 13.68 14.58 12.26 13.13 14.06
(11.40) (13.71) (6.995) (11.76) (7.941)
Number of Broad Subjects 5.430 5.703 6.333 4.832 5.580
(2.825) (3.553) (2.204) (2.620) (1.744)
Geographic Focus: International 0.139 0.205 0.156 0.188 0.0633
Geographic Focus: National 0.243 0.295 0.292 0.326 0.140
Org Type: Celebrity Founders 0.167 0.0915 0.0297 0.339 0.145
Observations 708 153 103 186 235
Mean (Standard Deviation) or Proportion reported; Nonprofit-Level data
Variable
  87 
Table 3.2 Summary Statistics – Grant Level 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Sample Donation Focused Donation Broad
Endowed 
Focused Endowed Broad
Total Giving 95,935,818.7 110,268,061.7 70,882,758.6 119,002,823.9 54,580,482.4
(121790589.1) (118781448.6) (97939738.9) (153971078.0) (61586889.6)
Grant Size 109,457.1 67,820.5 96,556.0 154,076.7 122,085.6
(2139949.9) (612385.4) (2042676.3) (2658962.8) (2911585.2)
Number of Grants Made 1,526.6 2,290.7 963.1 893.8 1,540.0
(2046.4) (2820.0) (846.2) (812.3) (1984.2)
Grantmaker-Recipient State Match 0.442 0.563 0.533 0.373 0.313
Proportion of Giving to Universities 0.153 0.156 0.123 0.178 0.128
Proportion of Giving to Schools (K-12) 0.0540 0.0571 0.0712 0.0464 0.0500
Proportion of Giving for Research 0.0525 0.0430 0.0140 0.0966 0.0302
Grants to Agriculture & Environment 0.0969 0.0874 0.0519 0.138 0.0782
Giving to Agriculture & Environment 0.0861 0.0809 0.0466 0.132 0.0554
Grants to Arts & Culture 0.178 0.155 0.102 0.198 0.259
Giving to Arts & Culture 0.134 0.118 0.0892 0.158 0.157
Grants to Community & Government 0.120 0.0652 0.0398 0.182 0.142
Giving to Community & Government 0.0979 0.0587 0.0369 0.157 0.0897
Grants to Education 0.182 0.130 0.140 0.222 0.215
Giving to Education 0.152 0.122 0.111 0.204 0.133
Grants to Health 0.0928 0.0774 0.0490 0.134 0.0878
Giving to Health 0.0808 0.0726 0.0427 0.124 0.0593
Grants to Recreation 0.0111 0.00912 0.00602 0.0144 0.0134
Giving to Recreation 0.00926 0.00852 0.00644 0.0126 0.00779
Grants to Religion 0.0318 0.0434 0.0516 0.0222 0.0119
Giving to Religion 0.0180 0.0184 0.0328 0.0184 0.00866
Grants to Social Services 0.0859 0.0723 0.0781 0.0695 0.120
Giving to Social Services 0.0634 0.0522 0.0567 0.0589 0.0709
Observations 957,944 324,318 126,769 293,631 194,620
Mean (Standard Deviation) or Proportion reported; Grant-Level data
Variable
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Table 3.3 Category Distributions  
 
 
 
 
  
Classification System Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Donation Focused 153 21.61% 324,318 33.86%
Donation Broad 103 14.55% 126,769 13.23%
Endowed Focused 186 26.27% 293,631 30.65%
Endowed Broad 235 33.19% 194,620 20.32%
Unclassified 31 4.38% 18,606 1.94%
IRS Type Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Private Foundation 382 54.11% 483,064 50.43%
Public Charity 243 34.42% 441,918 46.13%
Supporting Organization 48 6.80% 11,064 1.15%
Private Operating Foundation 18 2.55% 11,741 1.23%
Group Status 13 1.84% 9,169 0.96%
Non-Exempt 2 0.28% 988 0.10%
GuideStar Exchange Level Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Gold 32 4.53% 27,871 2.91%
Silver 159 22.52% 363,166 37.91%
Bronze 33 4.67% 78,960 8.24%
Participant, not to level 28 3.97% 30,315 3.16%
Does not participate 452 64.02% 445,795 46.54%
Not in guidestar 2 0.28% 11,837 1.24%
Charity Navigator Status Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Ranked 134 18.98% 235,258 24.56%
Potentially eligible 92 13.03% 74,897 7.82%
Not Eligible 477 67.56% 646,303 67.47%
Removed ranking 1 0.14% 81 0.01%
No Record 2 0.28% 1,405 0.15%
Nonprofit-Level Grant-Level
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Table 3.4 Category Comparisons  
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Donation 
Focused
Donation 
Broad
Endowed 
Focused
Endowed 
Broad
Guidestar Mission Listed 1 1 0.241 0.128
Guidestar Impact Statement Provided 0.431 0.394 0.0357 0.0213
Guidestar External Assement Provided 0.206 0 0.125 0.0213
IRS Status
Public Charity 0.935 0.971 0 0
Private Foundation 0 0 0.904 0.796
Supporting Organization 0 0 0.0642 0.153
Private Operating Foundation 0 0 0.0321 0.0511
Group Status 0.0654 0.0291 0 0
Non-Exempt 0 0 0 0
Guidestar Exchange Level
Gold 0.131 0.107 0 0.00426
Silver 0.556 0.583 0.0695 0.00426
Bronze 0.0327 0.0485 0.0749 0.0383
Participant, Not to Level 0.0654 0.233 0.0535 0.0213
Does Not Participate 0.216 0.0291 0.802 0.932
Not in Guidestar 0 0 0 0
Charity Navigator Status
Ranked 0.608 0.379 0 0.00851
Potentially Eligible 0.229 0.301 0.0267 0.0894
Not Eligible 0.157 0.311 0.968 0.902
Removed Ranking 0 0.010 0 0
No Record 0.00654 0 0.00535 0
Charity Navigator Reason Not Ranked*
Suspended ranking of community foundations 0.625 0.469 0 0
Suspended ranking of hospital foundations 0 0.0625 0 0
Suspended ranking of land trusts 0 0.0313 0 0
Not 501c3 public charity 0 0 0 0
Not Form 990 filer 0.0417 0.0625 0 0
Private Foundation 0 0 0.967 0.939
Donor advised funds 0.0417 0.0625 0 0
Service for individuals givers/revenue from one source 0.250 0.0625 0.0110 0.0236
Criteria not met: nontrivial fundraising expenses 0.0417 0.125 0.0221 0.0236
Criteria not met: filed at least 7 full years of form 990's 0 0.0938 0 0
Criteria not met: at least $1 million in revenues 0 0.0313 0 0.0142
Observations 153 103 187 235
Proportions reported; *Proportion of Not Eligible reported
Variable
  90 
Table 3.5 Multinomial Logit Result 
 
 
  
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
D
onation 
Focused
D
onation 
B
road
Endow
ed 
Focused
Endow
ed 
B
road
D
onation-
B
ased 
(C
om
pared to 
G
uidestar Im
pact S
tatem
ent P
rovided
0.612
0.293
1.001
-1.907
0.334***
(163.8)
(107.5)
(523.0)
(794.3)
(0.0651)
A
pplication: A
pplication Form
 R
equired
0.127*
0.111
-0.118**
-0.120***
0.243***
(0.0706)
(0.0725)
(0.0486)
(0.0386)
(0.0395)
G
eographic Focus: S
ingle S
tate
0.217***
0.0149
-0.143***
-0.0891**
0.240***
(0.0731)
(0.0655)
(0.0535)
(0.0411)
(0.0472)
M
em
bership: R
egional
-0.266***
-0.0559
0.300***
0.0215
-0.328***
(0.0613)
(0.0535)
(0.0812)
(0.0663)
(0.0615)
M
em
bership: A
ffinity G
roups
0.106*
-0.112**
0.0313
-0.0256
-0.00437
(0.0625)
(0.0460)
(0.0645)
(0.0469)
(0.0574)
S
ubject of Interest: A
rts &
 C
ulture
-0.0534
0.0762
-0.121**
0.0979**
0.0196
(0.0675)
(0.0623)
(0.0578)
(0.0469)
(0.0522)
S
ubject of Interest: H
ealth/S
cience R
esearch
0.0771
-0.0764
0.0812
-0.0819
0.00262
(0.0618)
(0.0590)
(0.0616)
(0.0539)
(0.0538)
S
ubject of Interest: E
nvironm
ent
0.169***
-0.0438
-0.0502
-0.0746
0.120**
(0.0567)
(0.0519)
(0.0563)
(0.0468)
(0.0471)
S
ubject of Interest: H
ealth C
are
-0.00234
0.117*
-0.172***
0.0569
0.108**
(0.0650)
(0.0613)
(0.0517)
(0.0437)
(0.0496)
S
alary S
hare of E
xpenditures
0.117
0.0351
-0.267
0.116
0.0192
(0.120)
(0.0866)
(0.260)
(0.115)
(0.0354)
Total R
evenue
8.13e-10**
-2.27e-10
3.39e-10
-9.24e-10*
5.33e-10**
(3.83e-10)
(4.36e-10)
(4.15e-10)
(4.94e-10)
(2.15e-10)
IR
S
 R
uling Year
-0.000420
-9.34e-05
-0.000741
0.00125
-0.000711
(0.00131)
(0.00114)
(0.00127)
(0.00104)
(0.00115)
O
bservations
243
243
243
243
242
M
N
L M
arginal E
ffects reported; S
tandard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variables
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Table 3.6 OLS Regression Results of Annual Data, 2007-2011 
 
   
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
LN
 Total 
G
iving
LN
 M
edian 
G
rant $
LN
 TG
 to U
N
Is
LN
 TG
 for 
Social 
Innovation
LN
 TG
 for 
R
esearch
LN
 TG
 for 
H
ealth
C
lassification C
ategory (R
eferent: D
onation Focused)
D
onation B
road
-0.122**
0.0531
-0.660***
-0.372***
-1.150***
-0.334
(0.0603)
(0.0533)
(0.211)
(0.113)
(0.382)
(0.389)
E
ndow
ed Focused
-0.0367
0.624***
0.150
0.135
0.202
-0.415
(0.0697)
(0.141)
(0.310)
(0.525)
(0.931)
(0.865)
E
ndow
ed B
road
-0.208***
0.655***
-1.563***
-0.460***
-0.955*
-0.788
(0.0673)
(0.144)
(0.414)
(0.143)
(0.530)
(0.655)
Lagged P
roportion G
rantm
aker-R
ecipient S
tate M
atch
0.00286
-0.100
-0.388
-0.238
-0.247
0.623
(0.0971)
(0.0958)
(0.383)
(0.181)
(0.476)
(0.509)
Lagged Lobbying A
ctivities
0.183
-0.0365
0.539
0.250
1.112**
0.615
(0.112)
(0.105)
(0.348)
(0.222)
(0.527)
(0.569)
Lagged P
roportion of E
xpenditures to S
alaries
-1.693***
-0.527
-1.798
-1.408*
0.304
-3.132
(0.436)
(0.321)
(1.392)
(0.719)
(1.874)
(1.946)
Lagged P
roportion of E
xpenditures to Fundraising
0.111
2.012***
-3.614*
-1.481
-4.707
-0.680
(0.650)
(0.658)
(1.977)
(0.956)
(3.066)
(3.855)
Lagged O
utcom
e 
0.821***
0.711***
0.739***
0.579***
0.663***
0.646***
(0.0277)
(0.0445)
(0.0344)
(0.0983)
(0.0292)
(0.0293)
C
onstant
7.125***
3.638
18.45**
8.778
23.48
-19.47
(2.723)
(2.406)
(8.803)
(6.157)
(18.35)
(19.22)
N
onprofit A
ge &
 S
ize (Lagged A
ssets) C
ontrols
X
X
X
X
X
X
O
bservations
1,005
1,005
1,005
1,005
1,005
1,005
Variable
O
LS
 C
oefficients, clustered on E
IN
; Level of observation: Year; S
am
ple: 2007-2011
R
obust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.7 OLS Regression Results of Annual Data, Recession: 2008-2009 
 
 
  
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
LN
 Total 
G
iving
LN
 M
edian 
G
rant $
LN
 TG
 to U
N
Is
LN
 TG
 for 
Social 
Innovation
LN
 TG
 for 
R
esearch
LN
 TG
 for 
H
ealth
C
lassification C
ategory (R
eferent: D
onation Focused)
D
onation B
road
-0.126
0.106
-0.877***
-0.180
-2.258***
-0.878
(0.0912)
(0.0876)
(0.327)
(0.179)
(0.519)
(0.592)
E
ndow
ed Focused
-0.120
0.866***
-0.0240
0.240
0.154
-0.489
(0.0971)
(0.194)
(0.292)
(0.548)
(1.342)
(1.311)
E
ndow
ed B
road
-0.309**
0.655***
-2.532***
-0.481***
-1.436*
-1.621
(0.121)
(0.227)
(0.724)
(0.180)
(0.866)
(1.058)
Lagged P
roportion G
rantm
aker-R
ecipient S
tate M
atch
0.0816
-0.00146
-0.615
-0.460
-0.0562
1.695**
(0.150)
(0.159)
(0.633)
(0.300)
(0.683)
(0.821)
Lagged Lobbying A
ctivities
0.278*
0.0958
0.455
-0.0291
1.103
0.319
(0.150)
(0.172)
(0.490)
(0.282)
(0.809)
(0.892)
Lagged P
roportion of E
xpenditures to S
alaries
-1.888***
-1.239**
0.201
-1.666*
0.343
-3.128
(0.696)
(0.586)
(2.437)
(0.875)
(2.812)
(3.128)
Lagged P
roportion of E
xpenditures to Fundraising
-0.549
2.524**
-13.47***
-0.891
-11.29***
-2.847
(0.908)
(1.053)
(3.784)
(1.083)
(4.135)
(6.084)
Lagged O
utcom
e 
0.765***
0.626***
0.601***
0.636***
0.549***
0.491***
(0.0436)
(0.0576)
(0.0537)
(0.142)
(0.0455)
(0.0448)
C
onstant
7.828*
4.531
20.70
6.219
32.27
-24.28
(4.555)
(3.547)
(14.54)
(8.029)
(25.11)
(28.59)
N
onprofit A
ge &
 S
ize (Lagged A
ssets) C
ontrols
X
X
X
X
X
X
O
bservations
465
465
465
465
465
465
Variable
O
LS
 C
oefficients, clustered on E
IN
; Level of observation: Year; S
am
ple: 2008-2009
R
obust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.8 OLS Regression Results of Annual Data, Post recession: 2010-2011 
 
 
 
  
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
LN
 Total 
G
iving
LN
 M
edian 
G
rant $
LN
 TG
 to U
N
Is
LN
 TG
 for 
Social 
Innovation
LN
 TG
 for 
R
esearch
LN
 TG
 for 
H
ealth
C
lassification C
ategory (R
eferent: D
onation Focused)
D
onation B
road
-0.115
0.0198
-0.471*
-0.542***
0.00277
0.109
(0.0872)
(0.0570)
(0.255)
(0.151)
(0.376)
(0.326)
E
ndow
ed Focused
0.0364
0.307**
0.552
0.00919
0.620
-0.490
(0.101)
(0.136)
(0.470)
(0.521)
(0.572)
(0.945)
E
ndow
ed B
road
-0.104
0.526***
-0.552
-0.457**
-0.125
0.0973
(0.0888)
(0.176)
(0.389)
(0.192)
(0.442)
(0.465)
Lagged P
roportion G
rantm
aker-R
ecipient S
tate M
atch
-0.0838
-0.149
-0.0481
-0.0509
-0.132
0.0128
(0.151)
(0.0939)
(0.404)
(0.215)
(0.452)
(0.478)
Lagged Lobbying A
ctivities
0.0924
-0.126
0.468
0.529
0.598
0.650
(0.154)
(0.0978)
(0.427)
(0.393)
(0.499)
(0.474)
Lagged P
roportion of E
xpenditures to S
alaries
-1.460**
-0.0336
-3.724**
-1.268
0.880
-2.377
(0.679)
(0.347)
(1.473)
(1.026)
(1.666)
(1.829)
Lagged P
roportion of E
xpenditures to Fundraising
0.657
1.436*
4.969*
-1.924
1.620
-0.379
(0.898)
(0.756)
(2.733)
(1.484)
(3.285)
(2.742)
Lagged O
utcom
e 
0.870***
0.843***
0.873***
0.549***
0.776***
0.792***
(0.0379)
(0.0531)
(0.0304)
(0.105)
(0.0346)
(0.0314)
C
onstant
6.186*
2.445
12.31
11.39
13.99
-17.70
(3.326)
(2.343)
(10.37)
(8.269)
(16.64)
(14.27)
N
onprofit A
ge &
 S
ize (Lagged A
ssets) C
ontrols
X
X
X
X
X
X
O
bservations
540
540
540
540
540
540
Variable
O
LS
 C
oefficients, clustered on E
IN
; Level of observation: Year; S
am
ple: 2010-2011
R
obust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.9 OLS Regression Results of Grant Data, 2007-2011 
 
 
  
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
A
ll A
reas
Supporting 
R
esearch
A
rts &
 
C
ulture
Environm
ent
H
ealth
H
ealth - 
D
iseases
H
ealth - C
are
C
lassification C
ategory (R
eferent: D
onation Focused)
D
onation B
road
0.0618
-0.366***
-0.0692
-0.339**
0.107
-0.0631
0.207**
(0.0477)
(0.119)
(0.0699)
(0.132)
(0.0937)
(0.174)
(0.0960)
E
ndow
ed Focused
0.542***
0.524**
0.241
0.654***
0.556**
0.583**
0.560*
(0.124)
(0.239)
(0.181)
(0.190)
(0.252)
(0.290)
(0.322)
E
ndow
ed B
road
0.252**
0.129
0.314**
0.251
0.361*
0.243
0.418**
(0.107)
(0.284)
(0.149)
(0.176)
(0.186)
(0.147)
(0.209)
G
rantm
aker-R
ecipient S
tate M
atch
0.116***
0.0322
0.186***
-0.110
0.296***
0.312***
0.294***
(0.0361)
(0.131)
(0.0441)
(0.0716)
(0.0741)
(0.117)
(0.0648)
Lagged Lobbying A
ctivities
0.130**
0.157
0.184***
0.149
0.474***
-0.0330
0.722***
(0.0651)
(0.100)
(0.0595)
(0.110)
(0.0981)
(0.0670)
(0.123)
Lagged P
roportion of E
xpenditures to S
alaries
1.192
2.029***
-0.895**
3.164***
1.608
1.187
1.816*
(0.745)
(0.745)
(0.452)
(0.907)
(1.004)
(1.248)
(0.974)
Lagged P
roportion of E
xpenditures to Fundraising
0.220
0.807
-0.733
1.074
1.821
2.346
0.891
(1.299)
(1.158)
(1.007)
(1.258)
(1.274)
(2.498)
(1.426)
Lagged Total G
iving to for R
esearch (LN
)
0.00293
(0.00275)
Lagged Average G
rant S
ize (LN
)
0.409***
0.691***
0.208***
0.577***
0.448***
0.626***
0.411***
(0.0495)
(0.108)
(0.0577)
(0.0975)
(0.0595)
(0.107)
(0.0571)
Lagged Total G
iving for O
utcom
e (LN
)
-0.0203
0.0111*
0.00771**
0.00264
-0.0122**
-0.00102
0.00208
(0.0266)
(0.00597)
(0.00362)
(0.00611)
(0.00561)
(0.00716)
(0.00746)
C
onstant
5.091**
2.708
8.506***
-0.520
1.401
2.253
2.202
(2.492)
(6.863)
(3.057)
(5.263)
(5.413)
(8.068)
(5.881)
N
onprofit A
ge &
 S
ize (Lagged A
ssets) C
ontrols
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
O
bservations
351,708
10,634
44,537
20,323
19,939
5,047
15,014
O
LS
 C
oefficients, clustered on E
IN
; Level of observation: G
rant; S
am
ple: 2007-2011; O
utcom
e: LN
 G
rant S
ize
R
obust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variables
*E
quation (1) includes controls for lagged proportion of total giving to universities, schools, &
 hospitals
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Table 3.10 OLS Regression Results of Grant Data, Recession: 2008-2009 
 
 
  
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
A
ll A
reas
Supporting 
R
esearch
A
rts &
 
C
ulture
Environm
ent
H
ealth
H
ealth - 
D
iseases
H
ealth - C
are
C
lassification C
ategory (R
eferent: D
onation Focused)
D
onation B
road
0.0757
-0.341***
-0.00715
-0.382**
0.212**
0.247
0.203**
(0.0581)
(0.128)
(0.104)
(0.172)
(0.0966)
(0.189)
(0.0941)
E
ndow
ed Focused
0.690***
0.635
0.122
0.634**
0.392
0.837***
0.159
(0.201)
(0.406)
(0.150)
(0.299)
(0.330)
(0.275)
(0.400)
E
ndow
ed B
road
0.317
0.518
0.821***
0.776**
0.566***
0.242
0.670***
(0.204)
(0.397)
(0.234)
(0.370)
(0.187)
(0.158)
(0.195)
G
rantm
aker-R
ecipient S
tate M
atch
0.112***
0.264
0.171***
-0.149*
0.309***
0.422***
0.230***
(0.0372)
(0.179)
(0.0513)
(0.0818)
(0.0916)
(0.117)
(0.0863)
Lagged Lobbying A
ctivities
0.186**
0.565***
0.137
0.350**
0.441***
0.133
0.546***
(0.0750)
(0.152)
(0.114)
(0.163)
(0.112)
(0.157)
(0.116)
Lagged P
roportion of E
xpenditures to S
alaries
1.330
2.857***
-2.112**
3.948***
-0.798
1.265
-1.161
(1.070)
(0.783)
(0.972)
(1.247)
(0.903)
(1.595)
(0.924)
Lagged P
roportion of E
xpenditures to Fundraising
0.318
3.053*
-0.575
1.381
2.198
2.654
1.340
(1.658)
(1.756)
(1.589)
(2.135)
(1.627)
(2.532)
(1.637)
Lagged Total G
iving to for R
esearch (LN
)
0.000874
(0.00386)
Lagged Average G
rant S
ize (LN
)
0.335***
0.675***
0.145***
0.407***
0.358***
0.596***
0.288***
(0.0615)
(0.120)
(0.0414)
(0.114)
(0.0621)
(0.0923)
(0.0684)
Lagged Total G
iving for O
utcom
e (LN
)
-0.000740
-0.00168
0.00817
-0.00831
-0.0192***
-0.00481
-0.0224***
(0.0355)
(0.00791)
(0.00516)
(0.00796)
(0.00636)
(0.00970)
(0.00722)
C
onstant
5.807*
-8.929
9.887**
-3.197
2.025
1.772
1.002
(3.165)
(9.026)
(4.666)
(6.435)
(5.172)
(5.889)
(5.387)
N
onprofit A
ge &
 S
ize (Lagged A
ssets) C
ontrols
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
O
bservations
175,344
4,737
20,300
9,475
8,675
2,404
6,357
Variables
O
LS
 C
oefficients, clustered on E
IN
; Level of observation: G
rant; S
am
ple: 2008-2009; O
utcom
e: LN
 G
rant S
ize
R
obust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
*E
quation (1) includes controls for lagged proportion of total giving to universities, schools, &
 hospitals
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Table 3.11 OLS Regression Results of Grant Data, Post recession: 2010-2011 
 
 
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
A
ll A
reas
Supporting 
R
esearch
A
rts &
 
C
ulture
Environm
ent
H
ealth
H
ealth - 
D
iseases
H
ealth - C
are
C
lassification C
ategory (R
eferent: D
onation Focused)
D
onation B
road
0.0445
-0.324**
-0.0708
-0.219*
0.0731
-0.264*
0.176*
(0.0484)
(0.125)
(0.0549)
(0.120)
(0.111)
(0.141)
(0.104)
E
ndow
ed Focused
0.321***
0.356*
0.257
0.527**
0.803**
0.385
0.853*
(0.116)
(0.209)
(0.213)
(0.215)
(0.404)
(0.360)
(0.495)
E
ndow
ed B
road
0.157*
0.00490
0.242**
0.206
0.343*
0.251
0.369*
(0.0908)
(0.243)
(0.101)
(0.171)
(0.181)
(0.220)
(0.190)
G
rantm
aker-R
ecipient S
tate M
atch
0.122***
-0.106
0.197***
-0.00212
0.359***
0.181*
0.369***
(0.0431)
(0.0838)
(0.0589)
(0.0792)
(0.0889)
(0.105)
(0.0952)
Lagged Lobbying A
ctivities
0.0219
-0.150
0.113
-0.142
0.477**
-0.424**
0.726***
(0.127)
(0.142)
(0.102)
(0.125)
(0.202)
(0.170)
(0.228)
Lagged P
roportion of E
xpenditures to S
alaries
0.962*
2.140**
0.625
2.826***
2.500**
0.974
2.679**
(0.491)
(1.042)
(0.428)
(0.880)
(1.252)
(0.948)
(1.192)
Lagged P
roportion of E
xpenditures to Fundraising
-0.0589
0.446
-0.753
1.425
1.140
2.230
0.0826
(0.877)
(1.346)
(1.013)
(1.260)
(1.115)
(2.141)
(1.914)
Lagged Total G
iving to for R
esearch (LN
)
0.00647*
(0.00370)
Lagged Average G
rant S
ize (LN
)
0.554***
0.682***
0.423***
0.754***
0.517***
0.645***
0.460***
(0.0459)
(0.0857)
(0.0366)
(0.0837)
(0.0789)
(0.0949)
(0.0653)
Lagged Total G
iving for O
utcom
e (LN
)
-0.0651***
0.0309***
0.00916**
0.0304***
-0.000524
0.0342**
0.0176*
(0.0246)
(0.00932)
(0.00394)
(0.00740)
(0.0127)
(0.0170)
(0.0101)
C
onstant
4.923**
3.400
6.181***
1.562
0.713
6.563
0.207
(2.023)
(5.625)
(2.369)
(5.080)
(6.162)
(8.322)
(6.538)
N
onprofit A
ge &
 S
ize (Lagged A
ssets) C
ontrols
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
O
bservations
176,364
5,897
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE RACE FOR A CURE: COLLABORATORS OR 
COMPETITORS? MODELING THE EFFECTS OF COMPETITION IN DISEASE-
SPECIFIC CHARITIES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Economic theory holds that competition promotes innovation in the private market. In the 
third sector, however, the role of competition is uncertain. Multiple public charities and foundations 
working toward the same goal likely mean higher transaction costs in increased fundraising, 
marketing, and salaries as the organizations compete for market share. Previous literature on the 
effects of competition in nonprofit organizations has focused on the trade-offs from increased 
marketing for donation dollars in response to market concentration (Thornton, 2006) and the effect 
of competition on the fundraising expense ratio (Ashley & Faulk, 2010; Feigenbaum, 1987). But 
theory is still lacking on the subject of the effect of competition between nonprofits on their ability 
to produce public goods: “Relative to their for-profit counterparts, the particular incentives guiding 
nonprofit managers are not well understood by economists” (Thornton, 2006, p. 206). 
 The ultimate questions of interest regarding philanthropic organizations are How much public 
good are they producing? Is this cost-effective relative to the public sector? and How can nonprofits be more efficient 
public good providers? From a public policy perspective, these questions are important because of the 
advantageous charitable tax policies provided to nonprofits and their donors under the assumption 
that they are providing public goods. Unfortunately, public goods are often difficult to measure and 
highly subjective, posing challenges to empirically evaluating their effectiveness. However, answering 
these questions has major consequences for the organization, regulation, and value of the third 
sector. 
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 This paper begins to address these questions by examining the markets of disease-specific 
public charities.8 Disease-specific charities seek to find cures for diseases, improve treatments, and 
provide patient support and advocacy. In recent years, they have become more aggressive in funding 
research and providing public advocacy, even if their cause affects a small number of people. While 
research funding from disease-specific charities has grown to more than $1 billion a year (Chronicle 
of Philanthropy, 2011; Haugh, 2010), it is unknown whether the rate of progress has improved. 
This paper provides insights on the path to a cure by developing an innovation production model to 
evaluate the conditions that promote and deter progress in finding cures for diseases, with careful 
attention to the role of competition. This paper contributes to the nonprofit and research & 
development literatures by developing the first innovation production function for disease-specific 
charities and empirically testing the model to examine the effect of competition. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. A brief discussion of disease-specific charities (Section 2) is 
followed by a review of the theoretical foundations for the nonprofit production function (Section 
3). Section 4 then puts forth the model of nonprofit innovation production, and Section 5 
empirically evaluates the model. Section 6 presents the results and section 7 provides a discussion. 
 
4.2 Disease-Specific Charities 
Most disease-specific nonprofits are public charities that focus on supporting and treating 
those affected by a specific disease, with the ultimate goal of curing that disease. Disease-specific 
charities can focus on diseases that affect many people but remain incurable or on “orphan” diseases 
that affect a small number of people and thus do not appeal to pharmaceutical companies as 
potentially profitable (Feldman & Graddy-Reed, 2014). These organizations are mission-oriented 
                                                
8 Public charities are a class of 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations that typically receive contributions 
from many sources or receive income from fee-for-service activities. For more information on the 
distinction, see http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Public-
Charities  
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and often operate in an entrepreneurial vein (Shaywitz, 2012). They serve as links, connecting 
patients and families to information and support structures, increasing knowledge, and providing 
advocacy (Leopold, 2012). For rare diseases, these nonprofits serve as a direct and aggressive means 
of saving family members. Often created by parents (e.g., Hannah’s Hope Fund) or patients (e.g., 
Chordoma Foundation) desperate for cures, they are the prime collectors and allocators of resources 
toward fighting the disease (Chronicle of Philanthropy, 2012; Poulos, 2014). 
Today, the US has more than 1,400,000 nonprofit organizations, including approximately 
950,000 public charities and 97,000 private foundations (National Center for Charitable Statistics, 
2013a). Health-related organizations account for roughly 12% of reporting public charities (Pettijohn, 
2013). Approximately 26% of these health-oriented charities are disease-specific and/or research-
centered organizations. These charities, classified with a G (specific diseases) or H (medical research) 
major code by the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE), 9 account for 3% of all active 
public charities (Table 4.1).  
While health has been a major focus of nonprofits throughout US history, disease-specific 
nonprofits have had a shorter existence. The American Cancer Society was formed in 1913 to raise 
awareness and educate the public about cancer but did not begin its research program until 1946 
(American Cancer Society, 2014). The American Heart Association developed in reverse, forming in 
1924 when a group of physicians and social workers sought to conduct studies on heart disease and 
later expanding its services to the public (American Heart Association, 2014). The March of Dimes 
Foundation began in 1938 to cure polio. After reaching that goal, the foundation transitioned to a 
new mission, improving infant survival (Chang, 2010). 
                                                
9 The NTEE serves as the topical classification system for nonprofit organizations used by the IRS, 
National Center for Charitable Statistics, and Foundation Center. The hierarchical system groups 
organizations into twenty-six major categories to allow for better analysis of the nonprofit sector 
(http://nccs.urban.org/classification/). 
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Health charities have changed their techniques significantly over time, most notably in the 
1960s and 1980s. Prior to the 1960s, the few major health charities divided the year for individual 
fundraising campaigns. However in the 1960s, the women volunteers who had previously run these 
efforts shifted their focus to spend less time fundraising (Leopold, 2012). This change in strategy 
had two major consequences: year-round fundraising by organizations, and the creation of multiple 
organizations dedicated to fighting the same disease (Leopold, 2012). The 1980s brought about a 
shift in lobbying strategies. Disease nonprofits previously acted together to lobby for overall funding 
increases in biomedical research (Best, 2012). However, when AIDS and breast cancer groups had 
great success with separate lobbying efforts, other disease charities began to opt out of the aggregate 
and instead increase targeted disease-specific lobbying efforts. This approach resulted in a drastic 
increase in the overall amount of money spent on lobbying (Best, 2012). These organizations are 
now changing their approach to funding research. 
 
4.2.1 Leveraging Venture Philanthropy in the Drug-Development Pipeline 
Nonprofits have emerged as an important partner in the drug-development pipeline. Pharma 
has joined with them to form public-private partnerships and utilize their funding streams to help 
support the creation of drugs to treat rare diseases (Bottazzi, Miles, Diemert, & Hotez, 2006; Hale, 
Woo, & Lipton, 2005; Kaitin, 2010).10 Figure 4.1 shows the drug-development pipeline process. 
Previously, federal funding supported basic research, and venture capital then supported clinical 
trials and marketization of drugs. However, federal funding has decreased, and both federal and 
                                                
10 Pharma has typically avoided rare diseases viewed as offering low profits because of their small or 
poor potential markets (Hale, Woo, & Lipton, 2005). Yet the need for these drugs is high. As a 
result, the US government has attempted to provide incentives to develop drugs to treat rare 
diseases. In 1983, Congress passed the Orphan Drug Act, and by 1999, more than 200 drugs to treat 
rare diseases were introduced, a sharp increase from the 10 such drugs introduced in the preceding 
decade (Grabowski, 2002). Then in 2007, the US FDA launched a program that gives priority review 
vouchers to companies for these types of drugs (Waltz, 2008), resulting in a six-month decrease in 
approval time for such drugs (Kaitin & DiMasi, 2010).  
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industry funders have become more risk-averse, creating the research funding valley of death 
(Feldman & Graddy-Reed, 2014). Further, chances of success are low, with only 1% of preclinical 
drugs reaching the clinical trial stage and 22% of those compounds gaining FDA approval 
(Grabowski, 2002). The time and cost of these attempts continue to rise and now average almost $2 
billion and ten years from discovery to launch (Feldman & Graddy-Reed, 2014; Kola, 2008; Powell, 
Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). 
Disease-specific nonprofits are now providing much-needed capital support in this funding 
valley, leveraging smaller amounts in the early stages to show viability of projects to industry funders 
for later-stage development (Feldman & Graddy-Reed, 2014). These much-needed early stage funds 
not only fill a gap but also offer branded support to help researchers obtain follow-on funding from 
investors (Shamp, 2014; Wallace, 2010). Some nonprofits are also creating their own research labs to 
decrease the cost of studying a drug (Shaywitz, 2012). Further, since the size of patient populations 
often poses problems for rare-disease clinical trials (another factor that deters pharmaceutical 
companies from entering the market), nonprofits are using their networks to create patient pools for 
clinical trials (Feldman & Graddy-Reed, 2014; Wallace, 2010). 
The desire for greater effectiveness leads the rise in nonprofit funding. Organizations are 
turning to strategic approaches to giving (venture philanthropy) to meet their mission and find cures. 
This strategic or venture approach reflects the view that funding research constitutes an investment 
rather than a gift. These nonprofits have more involvement with the project than would previously 
have been expected. They play a role in forming teams of researchers across institutions, instituting 
benchmarks and milestone agreements, and incorporating clawbacks, royalties, and licensing terms 
into clauses regarding outcomes (Feldman & Graddy-Reed, 2014). 
Disease-specific nonprofits are interested in the entire drug-development pipeline from 
academic research to drugs on the market (Shaywitz, 2012) with the goal of ensuring that their 
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patients receive the benefit of the funded research through new drugs and treatments. The Cystic 
Fibrosis Foundation, ALS Association, Muscular Dystrophy Association, and Wellcome Trust all 
require royalties from pharmaceutical companies when drugs go to market (Chronicle of 
Philanthropy, 2011). These terms provide sustainability to the organization to further benefit their 
goal. While this trend is widespread, many disease-specific nonprofits consciously choose not to add 
outcome terms in an effort to speed up the drug-development process. For example, the Chordoma 
Foundation partners with firms to quickly test preclinical drugs against the foundation’s panel of 
cells without signing licensing agreements. The goal of accelerating the time to product has 
motivated the foundation to make models available to firms to ease the process (Poulos, 2014). This 
approach highlights an important implication: many of these nonprofits are directly funding research 
by for-profit companies. This relationship prompts concerns regarding transparency to donors, 
conflict of interest in the independence of the research, dissemination of research results that may 
be negative, and the flow of funds between sides (Feldman & Graddy-Reed, 2014; Paluzzi, 2012). 
These issues need to be considered when evaluating the benefits of this approach. 
 
4.2.2 Partnering and Lobbying 
Nonprofit organizations operating under these strategic principles often work to form 
research teams and partnerships that cross academic and industry boundaries. They also stipulate 
terms for data sharing among researchers and the research community as well as mandate attendance 
at conferences (Bercovitz et al., Working Paper). The Michael J. Fox Foundation, for example, hosts 
an annual conference that brings together academics and industry players to share their research on 
Parkinson’s disease (Nocera, 2013). 
Disease-specific nonprofits are also continuing traditional nonprofit work of lobbying and 
advocating for additional attention and funding on behalf of their patients. For example, the JDRF 
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(formerly the Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation) is working to educate doctors and obtain support 
for payment from insurance companies because regulatory approval is not enough to get new 
therapies to patients (Wallace, 2010). Best (2012) has shown that this advocacy produces political 
outcomes at the institutional level, with the most organized patient groups generating more research 
funding for the disease overall. 
While many examples of success through strategic efforts exist (Als-Nielsen, Chen, Gluud, & 
Kjaergard, 2003; Best, 2012; Feldman & Graddy-Reed, 2014; Paluzzi, 2012), questions remain about 
their contributions and results. The amount of research funding from disease-specific nonprofits has 
been growing rapidly since 2000 and now amounts to roughly $1.2 billion per year for researchers 
(Chronicle of Philanthropy, 2011; Haugh, 2010). Genetic Engineering & Biotechnology News (GEN) 
ranked the top twenty grantmaking disease nonprofits (which contributed a combined $700 million 
to research) by percentage of total revenue spent on grants (table 4.2). While this is a large sum, it is 
a fraction of the average $2 billion required to bring one drug to market (Kola, 2008). In addition, as 
GEN notes, the list includes four Parkinson’s disease–related organizations, raising questions about 
the best use of funds and role of competition in the nonprofit sector (Genetic Engineering & 
Biotechnology News, 2013). 
 
4.3 Developing a Nonprofit Innovation Production Function 
Properly assessing the role of competition in disease-specific charity markets requires a 
production function that draws on multiple theories. Innovation production theory provides the 
theoretical framework for the model developed here. The field models innovative outputs as a 
function of innovative inputs. This paper applies it to the market of disease-specific charities to 
determine which attributes and actions contribute to the creation of innovation. The nonprofit 
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literature on markets and competition complements this foundation to incorporate the unique 
aspects of the third sector. 
 
4.3.1 The Production of Innovation 
Griliches (1979) first put forth the innovation production function to estimate the 
contribution of R&D activity to economic growth and technical knowledge. Many researchers have 
expanded this approach, modeling a variety of innovative outputs as a function of a series of 
innovative inputs (see Freel, 2005 for additional examples). Griliches assumed a Cobb-Douglas 
function and modeled the contribution of R&D through current and past investment along with 
aggregate industry knowledge and traditional inputs of labor and capital toward the creation of new 
knowledge (Griliches, 1979). R&D is generally accepted as the largest contributor to innovation. 
 Subsequent work has focused on knowledge spillovers. This work has found important 
distinctions in the role of firm size and geography (Audretsch & Feldman, 2004). Small firms are 
more connected to regional knowledge networks than are large firms (Almeida & Kogut, 1997) and 
benefit more from the knowledge spillovers (Audretsch & Vivarelli, 1996; Feldman, 1994). 
Knowledge spillovers appear to have a stronger impact in industries where new economic 
knowledge plays an important role (Audretsch & Feldman, 1996). Geographically, location matters 
for innovation because of availability of knowledge (Slavtchev & Fritsch, 2005) and the spillovers it 
produces (Feldman, Gambardella, Harhoff, & Mariani, Working Paper; Ponds, Van Oort, & 
Frenken, 2010). 
Most empirical estimations follow Griliches (1979) and assume a Cobb-Douglas production 
function of an innovative output as a function of innovative inputs that is then linearized through 
natural logs (Crépon & Duguet, 1997; Fritsch, 2002; Kortum & Lerner, 2000). Many other studies 
model the production function at the firm level (Audretsch & Feldman, 2004). However, concerns 
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exist regarding the ability to find a causal relationship between inputs and innovation at the firm 
level, leading to a preference for spatial or industry units of observation. The theoretical nonprofit 
model developed here allows for analysis at both the organization and disease levels to account for 
these challenges. 
 
The Role of Competition in Innovation 
It is a recurring question as to whether competition or market power encourages innovation 
(Blundell, Griffith, & Van Reenen, 1999). Schumpeter (1934, 1942) argues that large firms and 
concentrated markets promote innovation and that perfect competition is not necessarily the best 
structure for encouraging R&D (Gilbert, 2006). The empirical research on the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis of firm size and innovation has yielded inconclusive results (W. M. Cohen & Levin, 
1989). Some studies support the finding that process innovation is more profitable for large firms 
but product innovation is more likely in competitive markets (Gilbert, 2006). Other research has 
found that small firms tend to be more innovative in “less crowded” areas (Almeida & Kogut, 1997). 
Empirical results regarding the role of competition on innovation are also inconclusive (W. 
M. Cohen & Levin, 1989) depending on the industry and innovation type (process or product) 
(Gilbert, 2006), with theory making both arguments (Audretsch & Feldman, 2004), in part because 
of the difficulty of including all of the relevant factors empirically (Gilbert, 2006). Some research has 
found that monopolies have a negative effect, while competition stimulates innovation (Geroski, 
1990) in part because competition provides a high level of diversity in ideas and trials that one firm 
cannot provide (Gilbert, 2006). Others have found support for an inverted-U-shaped relationship 
where competition encourages firms to innovate when they are relatively equal but discourages 
innovation when firms are lagging behind, a finding that would complement Schumpeter’s theory 
(Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, & Howitt, 2005). Research has also found variation by the unit 
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of analysis, with less competitive industries having fewer innovations than competitive industries but 
firms with a large market share within an industry linked to more innovation (Blundell et al., 1999). 
However, many studies cite both competition and cooperation as essential to innovation 
(Teece, 1992). Firms participating in “innovation networks” (cooperating/collaborating) gain access 
to inputs they otherwise could not afford and expand their in-house capacity (Freel, 2005). 
Cooperation among network firms in an industry can reduce disadvantages from size and increase 
small firms’ chances of survival (Audretsch & Feldman, 2004). When the geographic area includes 
more potential collaborators, the possibility for cooperation increases as a result of the greater 
likelihood of both random and planned collaboration (Feldman et al., Working Paper), increasing 
potential gains. 
 
Innovation in Nonprofit Organizations 
Little work has been done on the production of innovation within nonprofits. McDonald 
(2007) explores the role of organizational mission on innovativeness and finds that organizations 
with focused missions can more efficiently innovate (McDonald, 2007). Backus & Clifford (2012) 
find that in the UK, large charities have been growing faster than smaller ones. Backus & Clifford do 
not test the effect of this phenomenon on innovation but say it could have either a positive effect 
(large charities are effective providers) or a negative effect (large organizations are less likely to 
innovate) (Backus & Clifford, 2013). Jaskyte & Lee (2006) examine the role of inter-organizational 
relationships on innovation given that relationships across organizational type (industry, government, 
and nonprofit) are a means of responding to competition by increasing capacity through 
partnerships. They find significant correlations between some types of innovation and certain 
characteristics of partnership agreements (Jaskyte & Lee, 2006). 
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Role of Competition in Nonprofit Markets 
As the number of nonprofits grows, the amount of funding available remains steady, 
increasing competition for scarce resources (Barman, 2002; Chetkovich & Frumkin, 2003). However, 
little is known about the effect of competition in the nonprofit market. Most of the literature on the 
subject is focused on the role of the fundraising ratio—how competition affects nonprofit behavior 
through the decision to pay for more or fewer fundraising efforts. While fundraising does bring in 
new donations, spending too much on fundraising may discourage donors who are sensitive to 
administrative cost ratios and thus decrease program expenditures (Rose-Ackerman, 1982). 
Empirical work has found that nonprofits collectively spend inefficient levels on fundraising, with 
expenditures increasing at a decreasing rate as market concentration increases (decreased 
competition) (Thornton, 2006). 
Other theoretical work has focused on individual nonprofit responses in the face of 
competition. Depending on the nature of the competition, nonprofits in a competitive environment 
work to increase their share of the market by differentiating themselves, cooperating with other 
organizations, co-opting other organizations, or diversifying into less dense fields (Barman, 2002; 
Ritchie & Weinberg, 2000). In mixed markets (those containing for-profits and nonprofits), 
competition may produce positive externalities as the presence of nonprofits creates pressure for 
for-profits to provide for the public good (Hirth, 1997; Lakdawalla & Philipson, 2006; Rosenau & 
Linder, 2003).  
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Competition for Disease-Specific Charities  
“A foundation which decided, for instance, to support only a particular area of medical research 
might find itself left high and dry when this particular area encounters success.” 
(Boulding, 1962, p. 64) 
 
While nonprofits have an advantage over for-profits in their longevity, as Boulding points 
out, reaching their goals should mean an end to the organizations. The idea that a goal is reached 
when the organization is no longer needed is counterintuitive to the private sector but is 
fundamental to nonprofits.  
In the last ten years there has been a 25% increase in the number of 990-filing disease-
specific charities (G or H major code) with an average of 15-20 new organizations created each 
month (table 1).  Multiple organizations being created to tackle the same diseases raises questions 
about the effectiveness of having multiple organizations with the same mission competing for the 
scarce dollars available. Whether charities decide to compete across diseases, compete within a 
particular area, or collaborate, they must distinguish themselves from the other organizations to 
remain viable in the short run. However, just as with nonprofits in general, little theoretical or 
empirical work has explored the role of competition on outcomes for disease-specific charities.  
The field of disease-specific charities is currently dominated by cancer organizations, with the 
American Cancer Society raising $1 billion, Susan G. Komen bringing in $400 million, and the 
Leukemia and Lymphoma Society reporting $320 million in revenues annually (T. Cohen, 2012). 
These organizations have secured such large market shares by effectively fundraising through 
efficient use of volunteers, brand building, marketing, and differentiation (T. Cohen, 2012). Yet 
questions remain about whether this is a valuable approach within disease—Would a single 
organization be more effective at fundraising and program work than multiple organizations 
(Genetic Engineering & Biotechnology News, 2013)? 
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Many observers feel that collaboration is more effective for nonprofits, given the large 
number of organizations. FasterCures, a think tank created to speed up medical research by working 
on connections among people, hosts an annual meeting to facilitate the mixing of fund-raisers, 
donors, and industry representatives with a goal of accelerating discoveries by decreasing 
competition, increasing collaboration, and stopping duplicate efforts (Anft, 2011). Parkinson’s 
disease organizations have adopted this strategy: the National Parkinson Foundation has tried to 
position itself as complementary to rather than competitive with the Michael J. Fox Foundation, 
citing the disease as the true competition (T. Cohen, 2012). However, no work has tested which 
approach is more effective.  
Feigenbaum (1987) is the only previous effort to examine the effect of competition on 
outcomes. She develops a model of nonprofit competition for donations in medical research 
organizations with the hypothesis that with new nonprofits entering the market, a larger share of 
revenue will go toward fundraising activities, with an unknown effect on program services. 
Feigenbaum finds that geographic competition (a decline in market concentration) increases the 
amount spent on fundraising but also increases research expenditures. Her results indicate that 
competition within the disease-charity market facilitates research (Feigenbaum, 1987). 
  
4.4 A Disease-Specific Charity Innovation Production Function 
This paper presents the first innovation production function for disease-specific charities. 
Many observers have called for theoretical development of the role of competition in nonprofit 
performance while citing the challenges of generating such theory (Boulding, 1962), yet only limited 
development toward nonprofit competition theory has occurred, especially regarding effects on 
outcomes. The lack of strong and accurate outcome measures as a result of abstract missions 
complicates the challenge of evaluating nonprofit effectiveness. Disease-specific charities provide a 
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slight advantage in such assessments by seeking outcomes that are usually products—drugs, 
therapies, or vaccines that will save lives. This provides a grounding similar to that of for-profit 
structures, allowing for work toward theoretical development using for-profit models. 
 This theory focuses on public charities rather than private foundations. While private 
foundations can and sometimes do focus their work on specific diseases, their legal and financial 
structure removes them from the competition debate. While public charities depend on donations 
that they use to sponsor research and provide advocacy, private foundations operate with interest 
earned from their endowments. They (usually) have no fundraising or marketing expenditures 
because their source of revenue is secure. As a result, they do not compete for dollars as public 
charities do. It is possible that in high-supply fields, they compete for grantees, but common 
knowledge of the difficulty of obtaining grants disproves that prospect. The role of private 
foundations in the fight to cure diseases is important, since they also contribute research funding, 
adding to the aggregate knowledge of a disease. As a result, their presence is incorporated in the 
model through total “industry” knowledge. 
 
Level(s) of Analysis 
Following Griliches (1979), disease-specific charities require an innovation production 
function that models a charity’s innovation as a function of its inputs and of existing knowledge. 
Given previous literature on innovation production functions and the unique aspects of the 
nonprofit market, two Cobb-Douglas production functions are developed: one at the organizational 
level (Equation 4.1) and one at the disease level (Equation 4.2). !""#$%&'#"! =   !(!"#$%&!!)(!"#$%&'(&!!)(!"#$%&'(&!!) (4.1) 
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The organizational-level function resembles the firm-level model, evaluating the role of the charity’s 
inputs for the ith nonprofit in the nth disease and the surrounding environment on the creation of 
innovation. !""#$%&'#"! =   !(!"#$%&!!)(!"#$%&'(&!!)  (4.2) 
The disease-level model resembles regional or industry production functions and models progress 
created for the nth disease overall from the inputs across organizations and the institutional setting. 
 
Innovative Outputs 
For disease-specific organizations, the most accurate measure at either the disease or 
organizational level of production is new drugs and therapies to market (Acemoglu & Linn, 2003). 
However, given the incremental nature of innovation (Freel, 2005) and because experimentation is 
necessary for innovation (McDonald, 2007), some intermediate outcomes are also of interest to the 
process of innovation. These outcomes include receipt of intellectual property rights, drugs and 
therapies in clinical trials, and academic publication of results. These are progress reports necessary 
but not sufficient in the creation of new drugs and therapies and thus signal potential innovations. 
In addition, the receipt of royalty revenue serves as an indicator of financial returns from an 
innovation, providing a longer trajectory to the timeline of a charity’s innovation cycle. 
R&D spending is also an intermediate outcome for these charities and an indicator of 
potential innovations. Product innovations for these organizations exist but are usually indirectly 
produced. The majority of nonprofits work toward innovation as a pass-through—raising revenues 
and then thoughtfully reallocating funds to researchers who then make discoveries. As a result, these 
models are for the indirect production of innovation—inputs lead to research investments, which 
may then produce innovative outcomes, which, in turn, return to the charity in the form of 
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intellectual property or royalty revenues. Thus, while R&D investment serves as an input for for-
profit functions, it serves as an output for the nonprofit function: it is what they can directly create. 
 
Competition 
This model explores the question of the role competition plays in the nonprofit market. 
Charities compete through marketing and advertising campaigns to sell their value and trust to 
potential donors. Charity age and size may lower the amount needed to compete if reputation is 
strongly tied to the organization’s age or if there are economies of scale. Thus, older and larger 
charities are likely to be more efficient with their funding allocations despite the presence of 
competition. However, more concentrated markets could decrease innovation if larger nonprofit 
organizations are less innovative than small ones. 
Competition between charities may have a positive effect on innovation if it leads to an 
increase in the pool of ideas but may have a negative effect if it duplicates efforts and results in 
inefficient spending on fundraising and marketing and overlapping salaries (Aghion et al., 2005; 
Backus & Clifford, 2013; Blundell et al., 1999; W. M. Cohen & Levin, 1989; Feigenbaum, 1987; 
Feldman & Audretsch, 1999; Feldman & Graddy-Reed, 2014; Gilbert, 2006). Alternately, given the 
possibility of cooperation, multiple charities may eschew competition in favor of cooperation by 
specializing and optimizing through gains to trade (T. Cohen, 2012). The hypothesis here is that 
although external competition is seen as valuable in the private market, in the nonprofit (disease-
specific) market, internal competition fosters innovation and external competition leads to waste and 
lack of innovation, since fewer resources are devoted efficiently. Internal competition can refer to 
within the charity or partnerships with other organizations. Thus, the number of organizations in the 
field could have a positive effect if those organizations are specializing and cooperating or a negative 
effect if they are competing. 
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Inputs toward Innovation 
A series of institutional factors, organizational characteristics, and direct inputs affect the 
production of innovation. These elements can positively or negatively affect the process of 
innovation for organizations or for the disease industry as a whole. In the long term, some of these 
inputs are likely to be affected by the production of innovation, but in the current time period (short 
term) they are exogenous. Table 4.3 presents the proposed inputs to be included in the disease-
specific charity production function with their predicted sign and for-profit or nonprofit evidence, 
including competition as discussed above. 
 Regarding characteristics of the disease, prevalence and stigma are expected to impact the 
production of innovation at both the disease and organizational levels. Larger prevalence should 
positively affect innovation production, as market share has been shown to positively affect 
innovation in the private sector (Acemoglu & Linn, 2003; Bhattacharya & Packalen, 2008). However, 
stigma has been shown to have a negative impact in nonprofit empirics on advocacy and lobbying 
efforts, so it is expected to decrease progress toward innovation (Best, 2012). 
 Both existing internal and external knowledge as well as geographic proximity of researchers 
should positively affect innovation for disease-specific charities as they do in the for-profit market 
(Feldman & Audretsch, 1999; Feldman et al., Working Paper; Feldman, 1994; Ponds et al., 2010; 
Slavtchev & Fritsch, 2005). The more knowledge and opportunity for knowledge spillovers, the 
larger the pool for potential innovation. 
 Inputs at the disease and organizational levels include other R&D expenditures toward the 
disease by industry, academia, government, and nonprofit providers (both public charities and 
private foundations), which are expected to positively affect innovation creation by increasing the 
supply of resources dedicated to fighting the disease (Audretsch & Feldman, 2004; Feldman, 1994; 
Kortum & Lerner, 2000; Slavtchev & Fritsch, 2005). Use of collaboration and cooperation across 
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organization types through partnerships and knowledge-sharing conferences (Audretsch & Feldman, 
2004; T. Cohen, 2012; Feldman et al., Working Paper; Feldman & Graddy-Reed, 2014; Freel, 2005; 
Jaskyte & Lee, 2006; Kar, 2010; Pober, Neuhauser, & Pober, 2001; Powell et al., 1996; Teece, 1992), 
nonprofits’ lobbying efforts for greater support (Best, 2012; Feldman & Graddy-Reed, 2014), and 
high labor quality of researchers and advocates (Freel, 2005) should also increase innovation by 
enlarging the pool of ideas that leads to innovation. 
 Organizational-level traits may also influence innovation. Organization size may have a 
positive or negative effect depending on whether larger organizations are less innovative or more 
efficient in the nonprofit market (Audretsch & Vivarelli, 1996; Blundell et al., 1999; Boulding, 1962; 
W. M. Cohen & Levin, 1989; Feigenbaum, 1987; Feldman, 1994; Gilbert, 2006; Henderson & 
Cockburn, 1996). Age of organization, fundraising, and marketing expenditures are all expected to 
take away from the production of innovation, with older firms less likely to innovate and larger 
expenditures elsewhere taking away from innovative investments (Feigenbaum, 1987; Nickel & 
Eikenberry, 2009; Rose-Ackerman, 1982). 
Both functions must also deal with a unique aspect of the nonprofit market: the presence of 
national affiliate organizations. Local chapters of national organizations can operate under different 
structures that range from ostensible full autonomy to complete dependence on the national parent. 
If affiliates are more autonomous, they should be treated as unique organizations rather than 
connected to their national organization (as done by Feigenbaum, 1987). But more dependent sub-
organizations should be merged with their national parent organizations and treated as one 
(Feigenbaum, 1987). The IRS now asks more questions on the subject, and organizations have the 
option of filing a group return that incorporates their affiliates. The model uses this distinction to 
signal whether affiliates are independent. The decision to operate under the spoke-and-wheel 
structure may be an important factor in the production of innovation. The contrasting structures of 
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a national organization with dependent affiliates or those that operate independently could have a 
positive effect if greater size and control contribute to innovation or a negative effect if independent 
organizations connected to each other increase collaboration and innovation. 
 Together, this set of inputs draws from both the for-profit and nonprofit literatures to 
address how disease-specific charities can produce innovation and more effectively reach their goals. 
 
4.5 An Empirical Specification of the Nonprofit Innovation Production Function 
The theorized disease-specific charity innovation production function is next estimated 
empirically through three outcomes—R&D investment, royalty revenue, and lobbying 
expenditures.11 These variables provide indicators of innovation at different stages of the process 
and capture different approaches. Following Feigenbaum (1987), the nonprofit’s grant expenditures 
serve as a proxy for R&D investment. As discussed previously, grant expenditures serve as an 
output for nonprofits because funding researchers is their direct effort in creating innovation. 
Royalty revenue is an indicator of successful innovation that has produced commercial benefits for 
the organization. Lobbying expenditures captures an alternate approach to innovation production 
since nonprofits advocate on behalf of increased funding for and attention to their causes; they 
leverage their vocal presence and smaller funds to gain benefits from more powerful institutions. 
Following the literature, the Cobb-Douglas production function is linearized through natural logs 
(Crépon & Duguet, 1997; Fritsch, 2002; Kortum & Lerner, 2000). The log-linear relationship then 
provides the interpretation of the coefficients as the elasticity of the mean innovation output with 
respect to the input (Equation 4.3). ln !""#$%&'#"!" = ! + ln !"!"#$!" + !"#  !"#$%&! + !"#$%&'&'"(! + !"#$%&'&'"(! + !!"   
(4.3) 
                                                
11 Intellectual property receipt was also examined, but the sample size was too small to analyze. 
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Equation 3 models the innovation produced by an organization, i, as a function of the organization’s 
inputs and traits as well as the level of market competition within the organization’s disease, n, and 
state, g. The error term represents an organization’s innate innovative capacity. 
 
4.5.1 Model Specifications 
The key factor of interest for this analysis is the impact of competition on innovation. This 
impact is measured through four variables that capture the size and concentration of the market. 
Market size is measured by the number of organizations at the geographic level of state and the 
“industry” level of disease group. Disease group is classified by using the NTEE codes, which group 
organizations by their focus area, combining G (Specific Disease) & H (Medical Research) 
nonprofits so that all cancer organizations are grouped in one category, all autism organizations are 
grouped in another category, and so forth. 
To address concentration, the four-organization market concentration ratio is used. This 
ratio measures the share held by the top four nonprofits. Here, total revenue was used to calculate 
the ratio. Feigenbaum (1987) uses the four-organization market concentration at the MSA level for 
her analysis. As discussed previously, research has shown the importance of geography in the 
creation of innovation as a consequence of the knowledge spillovers proximity produces (Audretsch 
& Feldman, 1996; Feldman, 1994). But given the types of organizations on which this work focuses, 
there is also a national market for these charities in terms of donation dollars, leading to an 
additional level of competition, captured here by an organization’s focus area. As with the size 
variables, market concentration is measured in two variables, one at the state level (to capture 
geographic competition) and one at the disease group (following the NTEE codes to assess 
“industry” competition). 
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Table 4.4 shows the annual distribution of market share and size at the disease group level. 
Regarding market share, only allergy-related diseases (e.g., asthma) exhibit a high concentration 
(minimal competition), which has increased over time. The categories of digestive diseases and 
specifically named diseases (excluding AIDS, Alzheimer’s, and autism) have moderate levels of 
concentration and competition, with minimal change in recent years. The vast majority of categories 
are competitive with low concentration levels. However, their rates of change are quite varied, 
ranging from a decrease of just 1% in the category of birth defects and genetic diseases to an 
increase of 165% in the category of specific organ diseases (e.g., diseases of the heart, lung, and 
brain) to become more concentrated. 
Market size varies across concentration level. The allergy-related disease group has both a 
high market concentration and small market size, with 52 organizations. However, the Alzheimer’s 
group also has a small market size (95 organizations) but has a low concentration (competitive) 
market. The groups for cancer, general purpose, medical disciplines, and specific organ diseases all 
have large market sizes, with more than 1,000 organizations and market shares ranging from low to 
moderate concentration. Autism organizations have seen the largest change in size, increasing by 
27% since 2008. 
 Regarding geographic distribution, Appendix table 4.1 lists the annual distribution of market 
share and size by state for public charities with a G (Specific Disease) or H (Medical Research) 
NTEE major group. Most states have either a low or moderate concentration, but there are large 
variations in temporal changes, ranging from 1 to 170% increases and from 1 to 39% decreases. 
South Dakota, Maine, Arkansas, and North Dakota consistently have highly concentrated disease-
specific charity markets. Less variation has occurred over time with respect to market size, with the 
largest increase of 20% in North Dakota and the largest decrease of 21% in Rhode Island. Only 
California and New York have more than 1,000 disease-specific organizations. 
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 Beyond competition, the other inputs capture the organization’s demographics, financial 
priorities, and approaches to mission. Organizational traits include age, size, and structure. Age of 
organization is measured by year of establishment. Size is measured by number of employees, while 
the number of high-paid employees (those making over $100,000 a year) serves as a proxy for 
worker quality. Multiple variables address the organizational structure. National nonprofits with 
affiliates are captured through the presence of having supported organizations and making payments 
to affiliates. The model also includes the number of voting members in the governing body, whether 
the organization is a supporting or operating charity, and an indictor for the NTEE major code. 
A series of controls address the organization’s other financial decisions and strategic approaches. 
Use of collaboration is measured through program-service-related conference, convention, and 
meeting expenditures. An indicator is included if the nonprofit is also a lobbying organization. 
Fundraising and advertising expenditures are also included. 
 The sample is pooled and a series of regressions are run to assess the impact of 
characteristics and behavior at the differential and marginal levels. First, logistic regressions are run 
for each outcome to assess which characteristics affect being a grantmaking organization, receiving 
any royalty revenue, or being a lobbying organization. A series of OLS regressions are then run on 
multiple subsamples for each outcome to estimate the production function and assess what affects 
the amount invested or received. All models use clustered robust standard errors to address serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity. Models are clustered on the organization. Multicollinearity does 
not appear to be a concern, with a VIF under 3 for each model. An endogeneity concern arises with 
the grantmaking and lobbying investment outcomes and concurrent financial expenditures, so these 
control variables are lagged one time period. Since royalties are received after the commercialization 
of a product, current financial allocations do not affect concurrent receipt of royalty revenue. Thus, 
these models also lag expenditure variables. 
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4.5.2 Data and Sample 
IRS Form 990 data are used to compare research-driven disease-specific charities to general 
health charities and to evaluate the innovation production function for the research-driven disease-
specific charities. The data were obtained through NCCS and consist of the Statistics of Income 
(SOI) dataset for 2008–2010. The dataset contains observations for all of the public charities with 
more than $30 million in assets and a representative sample of smaller organizations.12 The IRS 
creates the SOI dataset annually, and each entry is input twice to reduce error. The dataset includes 
entries by tax period year, so that there are entries from 2008 to 2011. This timeframe contains the 
Great Recession that began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009. While this period is of 
concern for its periods of recession and recovery, it does provide perspective on organizational 
behavior in times of economic shock.   
 Table 4.5 presents the descriptive statistics by NTEE major group of health fields. Codes E 
and F consist of organizations focused on health care, and mental health and crisis intervention, 
while codes G and H are those used in the sample for analysis that contain disease-specific 
organizations focused on support and research. Differences exist across organization type, with 
general health care organizations (E) the largest in both employee count and financial measures of 
total revenue and expenditure. 
Disease-specific organizations (G and H) differ from other health organizations in their 
research and advocacy work. More than half of the disease-specific organizations (G and H) make 
grants, while only 43% of health care organizations (E) and 14% of mental health organizations (F) 
make grants. Disease-specific organizations (G and H) also invest a larger dollar amount in their 
grantmaking activities than do other health grantmaking organizations. In addition, they receive 
royalty revenues at a higher rate: 22–23% of disease-specific organizations (G and H) report royalty 
                                                
12 See Appendix table 4.2 for comparison by state of the sample and population frequencies. 
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revenue, compared to 2–3% of other health organizations (E and F). These disease-specific charities 
(G and H) are also more likely to be lobbying than the other health organizations (E and F), with 
roughly a third of disease-specific organizations lobbying, compared to 23% of health care 
organizations (E) and 14% of mental health organizations (F). 
Table 4.6 again shows the descriptive statistics, but in this case, they are divided by whether 
the organization lobbies and makes grants, only makes grants, only lobbies, or neither. The table 
presents the divide for the full sample of health-related organizations (E, F, G, & H) and the 
subsample of disease-specific organizations (G & H). 
Within the full sample, specific disease organizations (G) represent a larger share of lobbying 
and grantmaking organizations (14%) than they do in all other categories (4–6%). Medical research 
organizations (H) represent only 4% of organizations that neither lobby nor make grants but have 
an 8–10% share of all other categories. 
Organizations that lobby and make grants are much larger in total revenue and expenditures 
and in terms of number of employees. They are also more likely to be national organizations that 
support their affiliates, with 14% making payments, compared to 5–7% of other organizations. In 
addition, organizations that lobby and make grants are most likely to receive royalty revenues (16% 
compared to 2–9%), yet the amount is roughly the same share of total revenue as in other 
organizations (3–6%). However these organizations invest a smaller share in grant making (11% of 
total expenditures) than do organizations that do not lobby (46%). 
 Many of these differences are repeated in the subsample of disease-specific organizations (G 
and H). However, in this subsample, organizations that only lobby are most likely to receive royalty 
revenue, with half doing so, compared to 39% of those that lobby and make grants and 17% of 
those that only make grants. Organizations that lobby and make grants invest a higher dollar amount 
on average in both grantmaking and lobbying expenditures in this subsample of disease-specific 
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organizations than in the total sample of health-related organizations. Much of this increase in 
lobbying expenditures comes from a higher amount spent on grants to other organizations for 
lobbying. 
 
4.6 Results 
4.6.1 Results: Feigenbaum, Revisited 
First, Feigenbaum’s (1987) model is recreated with the newer and broader sample (table 4.7). 
Feigenbaum modeled the ratio of grant expenditures to total revenue as a function of the 
organization’s age (year formed), size (total revenue), and MSA market share (four-organization 
market concentration) using weighted least squares with inverse total revenue weights. She estimated 
her model for medical research organizations only (H NTEE major group). Feigenbaum found a 
positive effect from revenue and a negative effect from age and market concentration. The model is 
evaluated against this sample of both G and H major NTEE codes and her restricted sample of only 
H NTEE major code organizations for both the total sample and for only grantmaking 
organizations. The results also show a negative effect of geographic market share using this model. 
While Feigenbaum’s model is important to the development of this work, her model poses concerns 
as a result of under-specification of potential inputs and misspecification from including total 
revenue on both sides of the regression. As a result, it is unclear whether these results will hold 
when the production function model developed here is estimated. 
 
4.6.2 Results: Characteristics of Grantmaking and Lobbying Organizations 
The production of innovation is estimated through a series of outcomes and model 
stratifications. First, the differential affect is assessed for each outcome—what behavior is associated 
with making grants, royalty revenue, or lobbying. Table 4.8 presents the marginal effects resulting 
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from three logistic regressions on each binary outcome. Model 1 estimates the role of organizational 
characteristics and competition on whether an organization makes grants. The results show a small 
but positive association between market share in related-disease organizations (less competition) and 
making grants, in contrast to the results of Feigenbaum’s model. At both the disease and geographic 
levels, market share is not statistically significant for the other outcomes of receiving royalty revenue 
or lobbying. Regarding market size, the number of disease organizations in the state is negatively 
associated with lobbying organizations: a one percent increase in the number of disease-specific 
charity in the state decreases the probability that an organization will lobby by 4.9 percentage points, 
on average. 
However, other organizational characteristics exhibit a larger impact. Organizations with 
revenue of more than $10 million or assets of more than $30 million exhibit a higher probability of 
making grants by 12.6 percentage points and are more likely to receive royalty revenue by 12.4 
percentage points, on average. This cutoff is used following the IRS SOI dataset, which uses a cutoff 
of $30 million in assets to signal large nonprofits. In this sample, the median asset size is slightly 
lower, at $26.4 million. However, some nonprofits spend out their revenue each year and carry over 
nothing in assets as part of their mission or structure. To adjust for this approach, organizations 
with more than $10 million in revenue, the median total revenue in this sample, are also included as 
large organizations. 
For large organizations, the presence of supporting affiliates had a positive effect on making 
grants and lobbying, by 15.7 and 11.1 percentage points on average, respectively, but a negative 
effect of 16.3 percentage points on receiving royalty revenue, on average. This finding may signal 
that large organizations with dependent affiliates invest but cannot necessarily do so in a way that 
effectively produces commercial results. Size also affects these outcomes through employees. 
Having more employees has a negative effect on the probability of making grants and on receiving 
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royalty revenue, but having more high-paid employees positively affects all three outcomes, so labor 
quality appears to benefit innovative investments and returns. 
Also of note is the overlap between grantmaking and lobbying organizations. Being a 
lobbying organization increases the probability that an organization will make grants by 19.7 
percentage points, on average. Similarly, making grants positively affects the probability that an 
organization will lobby by 13.6 percentage points, on average. In summary, on the extensive margin, 
organizational characteristics of size and structure affect the use of innovative strategies. 
 
4.6.3 Results: Grantmaking Investment 
Following the results of the logistic regressions, the marginal effect is estimated for each 
outcome. For grantmaking investment, the innovation production function is estimated using OLS 
regressions of the size of the grant investment for all grantmaking organizations and on the 
subsample of large and small organizations using the cutoff of either revenue of more than $10 
million or assets of more than $30 million. Table 4.9 presents the results. 
For the total sample of grantmaking organizations (Model 1), the results show a positive 
effect of the related-disease organization market share on the size of the investment: a percentage 
point increase in the market share is associated with approximately a 4% increase in grant 
expenditures, on average. This figure increases to 5% when restricting the sample to large charities 
(Model 2). However, market share has no effect for small organizations (Model 3). In contrast, 
market size is statistically significant only for smaller organizations, with a 1% increase in the 
number of disease-specific public charities in the state associated with a 0.71% increase in the grant 
investment, on average. 
Similar to the extensive analysis in table 8, increasing the overall number of employees 
negatively affects the size of the investment, but increasing the number of high-paid employees 
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positively affects grantmaking expenditures, with a 1% increase in the lagged number of high-paid 
employees associated with an increase of .72% in making grants overall and .87% in making grants 
for large organizations, on average. This finding signals the importance of labor quality. 
In contrast to the logistic results, making payments to affiliates negatively affects the size of the 
grantmaking investment. Lagged advertising expenditures has a small negative impact, while lagged 
fundraising expenditures has a small positive impact for large organizations. This finding may mean 
that as organizations spend more to raise funds, they increase their revenue and push more money 
into making grants, while building a brand through advertising takes away from grantmaking 
activities. Smaller organizations differ in direction for many aspects; however, few of these inputs are 
statistically significant, likely as a consequence of the small sample size. 
 
4.6.4 Results: Royalty Revenue 
Looking to returns on investment, table 4.10 presents the results on the intensive margin of 
royalty revenue, applying the production function to the size of royalty revenues received. Because 
of small sample sizes, the function is estimated on the full sample (Model 1), the sample restricted to 
grantmaking organizations (Model 2), organizations that received at least some royalty revenue 
(Model 3), and grantmaking organizations that received at least some royalty revenue (Model 4). Due 
to a small sample size of small organizations, the model was not divided by size, highlighting the fact 
that large size is an important indicator of receiving royalty revenue. 
 As in the logit model for royalty revenue, neither type of market share or market size is 
statistically significant. Instead, organizational structure and size are the most important 
characteristics affecting the size of royalty revenue. Labor quality has the largest and most consistent 
effect across models, with a 1% increase in the lagged number of high-paid employees associated 
with an increase of 1.2–2.3% in royalty revenue, on average. 
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 For models run on subsamples of those with at least some royalty revenue (Models 3 and 4), 
the lagged grant investment size negatively affects the size of royalty revenues received: given a 
nonzero amount of royalty revenue, increasing the lagged size of grantmaking expenditures by 1% 
decreases the amount of royalty revenue received by 0.09–0.17%, on average. 
While the small sample sizes are likely influencing these weaker findings, the limited time frame is a 
more serious offender. Given that the drug-development process takes an average of a decade, the 
previous year’s efforts are not likely to affect the receipt of royalty revenue. Thus, a longer time 
frame with additional lags is needed to properly analyze the factors that affect royalty revenues. 
However, this analysis of royalty revenue highlights potentially important variables for future 
analysis. 
 
4.6.5 Results: Lobbying Expenditures 
Finally, the innovation production function is applied to the outcomes related to lobbying 
expenditures. Lobbying expenditures captures another innovation strategy pursued by nonprofits. 
Organizations advocate on behalf of their cause using their limited resources to draw support from 
larger institutions that may be more able and effective at research. Lobbying could lead to larger 
investments in research by federal agencies than individual charities can provide. This advocacy 
work thus serves as an alternate innovative outcome for public charities. Table 4.11 presents the 
results for this outcome by total lobbying expenditures (Model 1), own lobbying expenditures 
(Model 2), direct lobbying expenditures to contact legislators (Model 3), and lobbying expenditures 
in the form of grants to other organizations for lobbying purposes (Model 4). The sample size was 
too small to run additional estimations on subsamples by size. 
 Model 4 (grants to other organizations for lobbying) has the weakest effects. This finding is 
not surprising, however, as this approach represents the most indirect means of lobbying and thus is 
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a less distinctive strategy. Model 3 (direct expenditures to contact legislators) is the most direct 
method and has the strongest results. While market share has no effect, market size has strong 
negative effects for both related-disease organizations and state organizations, with a 1% change in 
the number of organizations in related diseases associated with an average decrease in direct contact 
expenditures of 1.6%, and a 1% change in the number of disease-specific charities in the state 
associated with an average decrease in direct contact expenditures of 1.8%. These results point to 
the lack of collaboration across organizations, since increases in the number of potential competitors 
or collaborators result in decreases in expenditures toward mission; thus, organizations are diverting 
expenditures to other areas when in larger markets. With overall lobbying expenditures (Model 1), 
market size at the state level has a similar negative effect of a 1.7% decrease for a 1% increase in size, 
on average. Market share does not significantly affect any type of lobbying expenditure. 
 Regarding labor and labor quality, Model 3 exhibits similar effects as in grantmaking 
investments and royalty revenue, with a 1% increase in lagged employment associated with a 
decrease of 1.02% in direct contact expenditures but a 1% increase in the lagged number of high-
paid employees associated with a 1.65% increase in direct contact expenditures. In Model 2 (own 
lobbying expenditures), the number of high-paid employees surprisingly has a negative effect. 
 A divergent effect also exists between Models 2 and 3 on the role of grantmaking 
expenditures: a 1% increase in lagged grantmaking expenditures is associated with an increase 
of .18% for own lobbying expenditures but is associated with a decrease of .15% for direct contact 
expenditures. These differences indicate that type of lobbying in which an organization engages is 
affected by the organization’s structure and strategies for reaching its mission. 
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4.7 Discussion 
This paper expands the discussion and theory on nonprofit competition through the 
development and evaluation of the factors that affect innovation in the face of evolving 
philanthropic practices. 
Paths to Innovation 
The empirical model uses three outcomes that signal innovative activity: grantmaking 
investment, royalty revenue, and various forms of lobbying expenditures. These outcomes capture 
different approaches nonprofits employ to reach their goal of curing and treating disease. The size 
of grantmaking expenditures shows the size of the investments nonprofits make to fund researchers 
who will, in turn, work to find cures and treatments. Royalty revenue serves as a proxy for the 
success of that indirect path, with successful previous investments returning to the nonprofit when 
an innovation is commercialized. Lobbying expenditures show a different indirect approach—
advocating for the cause to other agencies and organizations that can provide more high-quality 
support for the goal. While significant overlap exists between grantmaking and lobbying 
organizations, some disease-specific charities only make grants or only lobby, and they use different 
strategies and structures to reach the same goal. 
Market share appears to influence the production function only on the outcome of 
grantmaking expenditures. The results from the grantmaking investment models indicate a positive 
effect of related-disease organization market share on investment, meaning that for large 
organizations, a more concentrated market (less competition) increases an organization’s investment 
in grants. While this finding initially causes concern, given the positive effect competition is 
suspected to have on for-profits’ production of innovation, the market for nonprofits differs, and 
competition can also mean more money for other expenditures, like fundraising costs, advertising, 
and salaries. In a highly competitive environment, organizations likely are spending inefficient 
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amounts on these other outlays, at the expense of research investments. Thus, a more concentrated 
market likely gives the large nonprofits a substantial brand power that allows them to spend less in 
the other areas and pour more money into making grants. Further, collaboration benefits may arise 
from this concentration. Given the push toward collaboration among nonprofits, evidence shows 
that these organizations are working with other nonprofits to avoid waste by specializing their 
efforts.  
 The weaker results from the royalty revenue likely result from the small sample size and lack 
of sufficient lags. A longer time period is needed to assess the role of competition on the 
commercialization of innovation. The results on the lobbying expenditure models show a negative 
effect of market size, implying that lobbying organizations are not collaborating and instead are 
spending more on other outlays when in larger markets. In both the royalty and lobbying models, 
the amount spent on making grants shows a negative impact. While this finding makes sense for 
lobbying, which is another expenditure, it implies that for royalty revenue, more spending does not 
equate to more results: that is, quality matters. 
This implication is supported by the consistent positive impact of high-paid employees on all 
of the innovative outcomes. Labor quality (as measured using high-paid employees as a proxy) 
increases grantmaking investments, royalty revenues, and direct contact lobbying expenditures. 
Organizations that invest in their employees are also investing more in paths to innovation through 
making grants and lobbying, and they are reaping the benefits through higher amounts of royalty 
revenue. 
A longer time period will allow for additional lags and it will also provide the ability to 
estimate the production function at different time intervals to compare estimates during this time of 
economic recession and recovery to periods of greater economic stability. The production function 
should also be evaluated at the disease level to assess more finely the stages of progress toward 
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innovation and the role of multiple organizations. In addition, the state market share was not 
significant for any outcome, but this geographic level may be too broad. Geographic competition 
needs to be examined on a more micro level, such as MSA. 
 
The Market of Disease-Specific Charities 
Roughly one-fifth of nonprofits were formed after 2001 (Pettijohn, 2013). Nonprofits 
contribute approximately 6% of the US GDP (Pettijohn, 2013). However, a few large organizations 
make up most of this share: 4.4% of public charities account for 86% of total public charity 
expenditures, while 40% account for less than 1% of the total (Pettijohn, 2013). The recent growth 
in nonprofit organizations and the relative power of the large organizations has prompted questions 
regarding efficiency and effectiveness in the sector. The results from this analysis indicate that large 
organizations effectively navigate through these larger markets to invest more toward innovation. 
While small organizations also invest in research and lobbying and receive royalty revenue, what role 
competition plays for them is unclear. With the number of small nonprofits growing, their approach 
should be examined with a larger sample to see how they compete and collaborate with larger 
nonprofits and how they are creating innovation relative to larger organizations. 
Also, given that these nonprofits increasingly seek commercial returns through investment in 
for-profit firms, the regulation and expectations of nonprofits should be adapted to this more 
involved cross-sector funding strategy. A two-way relationship exists between Pharma firms and 
nonprofits, with nonprofits receiving financial benefit and firms receiving marketing and public 
appeal benefits. There is concern that the tax-advantaged nonprofits are at risk of subsidizing for-
profit firms (Paluzzi, 2012). As both nonprofits and for-profits work to generate public goods 
through the production of treatments and therapies, more conversation is needed on how their 
interaction may affect their respective tax policies. 
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Finally, given the finding that market share is positively linked to innovative progress in 
grantmaking investment, greater attention is needed to the role of specialization so that we can 
better understand how these organizations are cooperating in the concentrated markets to produce 
results as well as how significant the results are. As Boulding (1962) points out, there are no antitrust 
laws for nonprofits, so these large organizations wield great political and economic power. Though 
they do seem to be investing more in grants as a result of this power, further examination of the 
consequences of this concentration is needed, and longer-term outcomes must be studied to see if 
these organizations are wielding their power effectively. 
This paper contributes to the nonprofit literature by developing the first innovation 
production function for disease-specific charities and empirically testing the model to examine the 
effect of competition and organizational characteristics through three innovative outcomes. The 
paper also contributes the research & development literature by exploring the nonprofits’ expanding 
role in the drug-development pipeline. The results indicate that market share and size matter, as do 
strategy and structure. With proper measurement and analysis, nonprofits can adapt and improve 
how they approach their goals. 
 
  
  131 
Figures 
Figure 4.1: Drug Development Pipeline with Funding Sources 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Feldman & Graddy-Reed, 2014 
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Tables  
Table 4.1: Health-Oriented Public Charities  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Registered PCs = Public charities registered with the IRS for operation as nonprofits 
990 Filing PCs = Public charities registered with the IRS that file the annual Form 990 
 
Data Source: Internal Revenue Service, Exempt Organizations Business Master Files (Jun 2014, Dec 
2004); Urban Institute, National Center for Charitable Statistics, http://nccsdataweb.urban.org  
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Table 4.2: GEN’s Top 20 Grantmaking Disease Nonprofits 
 
 
 
Data Source: Genetic Engineering & Biotechnology News, 2013  
 
 
Organization % of Revenue Awarded as Grants
Amount of Research 
Grants Awarded
#1. Michael J. Fox Foundation 82.60% 53,858,000$              
#2. Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation 57.00% 110,071,000$             
#3. Myelin Repair Foundation 53.90% 2,873,000$                
#4. Alzheimer’s Drug Discovery Foundation 52.00% 5,522,000$                
#5. Parkinson’s Disease Foundation 46.20% 4,750,000$                
#6. Melanoma Research Alliance Foundation 24.30% 5,104,000$                
#7. Leukemia and Lymphoma Society (LLS) 22.40% 68,398,000$              
#8. Muscular Dystrophy Association 21.70% 33,945,000$              
#9. ALS Association 18.40% 3,500,000$                
#10. American Heart Association 18.30% 116,872,000$             
#11. Cystic Fibrosis Foundation 17.90% 54,707,000$              
#12. National Multiple Sclerosis Society 16.40% 35,273,000$              
#13. American Diabetes Association 16.10% 33,588,000$              
#14. Susan G. Komen Breast Cancer Foundation 15.30% 60,931,000$              
#15. American Parkinson Disease Association 15.10% 1,293,000$                
#16. American Cancer Society 11.50% 106,882,000$            
#17 (tie) March of Dimes Foundation 11.10% 23,387,000$              
#17 (tie) American Liver Foundation 11.10% 947,759$                  
#19. National Parkinson Foundation 9.80% 902,784$                  
#20. Arthritis Foundation 8.80% 9,294,000$                
732,098,543$            Total Awarded:
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Table 4.3: Factors of Innovation for Disease-Specific Charities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Alexandra Graddy-Reed 
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Table 4.4: Related-Disease Organization Market Share & Size 
 
 
 
*Includes organizations of: alliances, technical assistance, professional associations, research 
institutes, supporting, and fundraising 
Note: Based on total revenue values of zero or more; Size based on count of organizations with more 
than zero in revenue 
 
Source: Alexandra Graddy-Reed calculations using data from the Internal Revenue Service, Exempt 
Organizations Business Master File (501(c)(3) organizations, 2008–2011); Urban Institute, National 
Center for Charitable Statistics, http://nccsdataweb.urban.org  
 
  
NTEE CC Group 2011 2010 2009 2008 % Change from 2008 to 2011
G & H 40s Diseases of Specific Organs 0.35 0.34 0.28 0.13 165%
G & H 90s Medical Disciplines 0.29 0.21 0.46 0.44 -35%
G & H 81 AIDS 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.21 22%
G & H 50s Nerve, Muscle, & Bone Diseases 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.26 19%
G & H 00s General* 0.27 0.26 0.36 0.33 -18%
G & H 84 Autism 0.31 0.31 0.36 0.35 -12%
G & H 30s Cancer 0.41 0.41 0.45 0.44 -7%
G & H 83 Alzheimer's Disease 0.39 0.40 0.42 0.41 -7%
G & H 20s Birth Defects & Genetic Diseases 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 -1%
G & H 70 Digestive Diseases & Disorders 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.58 -7%
G & H 80 Specifically Named Diseases 0.53 0.50 0.59 0.53 0%
G & H 60s Allergy-Related Diseases 0.85 0.86 0.77 0.75 13%
NTEE CC Group 2011 2010 2009 2008 % Change from 2008 to 2011
G & H 30s Cancer 1,552 1,559 1,492 1,430 9%
G & H 00s General* 1,666 1,664 1,620 1,557 7%
G & H 90s Medical Disciplines 1,833 1,895 1,870 1,877 -2%
G & H 40s Diseases of Specific Organs 2,398 2,472 2,488 2,412 -1%
G & H 84 Autism 417 419 384 328 27%
G & H 81 AIDS 649 706 711 719 -10%
G & H 50s Nerve, Muscle, & Bone Diseases 904 934 910 842 7%
G & H 70 Digestive Diseases & Disorders 228 235 230 215 6%
G & H 80 Specifically Named Diseases 611 621 616 604 1%
G & H 20s Birth Defects & Genetic Diseases 864 894 901 867 0%
G & H 60s Allergy-Related Diseases 52 52 54 58 -10%
G & H 83 Alzheimer's Disease 95 95 92 94 1%
Less than 100 Organizations
Related-Disease Organization Market Share
Related-Disease Organization Market Size
Low Concentration (Competitive)
Moderate Concentration
High Concentration (Oligopolistic)
Over 1,000 Organizations
100 - 1,000 Organizations
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Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics by Major NTEE Group 
 
 
 
Data Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Division, Exempt Organizations Sample 
(501c(3) Organizations, 2008–2010); Urban Institute, National Center for Charitable 
Statistics, http://nccsdataweb.urban.org   
 
  
E F G H
Health Mental Health Specific Diseases Medical Research
Year Formed 1978 1971 1973 1978
(26.84) (28.20) (28.98) (25.41)
Number of Employees 434.5 287.1 257.4 254.2
(1405.4) (409.7) (584.9) (593.1)
Employees Paid over $100K 35.77 4.128 13.98 20.59
(163.5) (6.637) (34.54) (67.08)
Share with Revenue > $10 Million or Assets > $30 Million 0.72 0.52 0.52 0.67
Total Revenue 86,946,205.8 19,419,896.2 36,912,642.8 43,179,354.7
(850954915.0) (50936609.0) (74535151.9) (108984944.6)
Total Expenditures 85,728,697.9 19,395,397.0 36,453,024.3 44,917,569.3
(839849724.7) (50761440.1) (75802394.1) (115256049.4)
Share Grantmaking 0.43 0.14 0.54 0.55
If Grantmaking:
Share of Expenditures to Grants 0.37 0.17 0.25 0.42
Grants to Organizaions 5,769,485.3 2,150,505.7 12,599,970.5 6,541,900.4
(20233082.7) (6188861.7) (28898825.1) (13906571.9)
Share Receiving Royalty Revenue 0.03 0.02 0.22 0.23
If Receiving Royalty Revenue:
Share of Revenues from Royalties 0.05 0.12 0.04 0.04
Royalty Revenues 5,469,300.7 203,861.2 1,797,922.5 2,432,317.1
(26982846.8) (362693.5) (3664289.6) (6187313.9)
Share Receiving Intellectual Property 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05
Share Lobbying 0.23 0.14 0.32 0.33
Share Collaborating 0.42 0.49 0.66 0.57
Share Making Payments to Affiliates 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.09
Share of Revenue from Government Grants 0.04 0.30 0.13 0.17
Observations 4,848 787 404 419
Variable
NTEE Major Group
Mean (Standard Deviation) or Proportion reported; Sample excludes hospitals and schools    
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Table 4.6: Descriptive Statistics of Grantmaking & Lobbying Organizations 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lobby & 
Grantmaking
Grantmaking 
Only Lobbying Only Neither
Year Formed 1973.5 1981.0 1970.4 1976.7
(28.28) (22.75) (30.15) (28.24)
Number of Employees 1,242.6 154.2 774.1 240.9
(2669.7) (548.0) (1860.2) (449.7)
Employees Paid over $100K 115.8 16.26 38.70 13.83
(355.7) (77.05) (92.99) (54.49)
Share with Revenue > $10 Million or Assets > $30 Million 0.93 0.66 0.84 0.59
Total Revenue 333,394,349.1 31,993,780.5 75,358,831.1 30,801,269.8
(2.07891e+09) (96428420.5) (141566417.1) (96208635.9)
Total Expenditures 332,710,738.1 30,848,489.2 74,076,604.4 30,348,556.4
(2.05181e+09) (91381952.0) (135743474.5) (96875482.4)
Share of Expenditures to Grants 0.11 0.46
Grants to Organizaions 8,331,453.4 5,376,092.5
(27136602.5) (16676631.2)
Total Lobbying Expenditures 211,785.2 59,709.1
(1034216.8) (141892.8)
Grants to Other Organizations for Lobbying 72,479.7 4,620.3
(732384.0) (45485.8)
Expenditures on Direct Contact with Legislators 64,029.0 29,146.4
(225111.8) (86444.3)
Share Receiving Royalty Revenue 0.16 0.06 0.09 0.02
If Receiving Royalty Revenue:
Share of Revenues from Royalties 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.06
Royalty Revenues 7,137,147.0 1,554,273.4 1,502,045.5 1,644,384.0
(30071651.9) (6597845.2) (2515490.0) (3241262.6)
Share Receiving IP 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04
Share Collaborating 0.74 0.34 0.63 0.42
Share of Total Expenditures on Fundraising 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.02
Share Making Payments to Affiliates 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.06
Share of Revenue from Government Grants 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.12
NTEE Major Group
E - Health 0.72 0.82 0.77 0.71
F - Mental Health 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.19
G - Specific Diseases 0.14 0.06 0.04 0.05
H - Medical Research 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.04
Observations 788 1,874 688 3,080
Variable
Mean (Standard Deviation) or Proportion reported NTEE Major Groups E, F, G, & H included in columns 1-4    
All Health-Related Organizations
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Data Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Division, Exempt Organizations Sample 
(501c(3) Organizations, 2008–2010); Urban Institute, National Center for Charitable Statistics, 
http://nccsdataweb.urban.org   
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Lobby & 
Grantmaking
Grantmaking 
Only Lobbying Only Neither
Year Formed 1962.4 1982.8 1962.6 1981.8
(29.12) (22.97) (28.63) (24.96)
Number of Employees 600.4 32.97 476.9 177.6
(898.1) (73.58) (544.4) (496.3)
Employees Paid over $100K 45.13 3.583 29.81 8.754
(96.21) (8.138) (42.93) (31.58)
Share with Revenue > $10 Million or Assets > $30 Million 0.85 0.49 0.85 0.46
Total Revenue 92,439,468.1 13,346,027.3 63,983,183.6 24,566,853.9
(149908911.5) (24500429.2) (76464234.6) (75958510.1)
Total Expenditures 99,363,835.2 12,451,150.4 60,257,359.2 23,979,307.9
(161942589.8) (21382112.8) (71448054.4) (74645585.2)
Share of Expenditures to Grants 0.14 0.47
Grants to Organizaions 14,906,366.1 5,305,569.7
(30884556.3) (11604778.8)
Total Lobbying Expenditures 367,030.4 68,881.9
(1485567.9) (99771.5)
Grants to Other Organizations for Lobbying 232,310.6 1,162.9
(1432255.4) (7204.7)
Expenditures on Direct Contact with Legislators 59,970.9 54,411.8
(159567.4) (97197.5)
Share Receiving Royalty Revenue 0.39 0.17 0.51 0.08
If Receiving Royalty Revenue:
Share of Revenues from Royalties 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.04
Royalty Revenues 2,459,925.2 1,943,772.2 1,513,092.1 2,507,085.7
(4234141.5) (8061045.3) (2514154.1) (4061234.8)
Share Receiving IP 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.04
Share Collaborating 0.9 0.44 0.74 0.55
Share of Total Expenditures on Fundraising 0.1 0.05 0.02 0.03
Share Making Payments to Affiliates 0.3 0.03 0.07 0.06
Share of Revenue from Government Grants 0.11 0.05 0.39 0.2
NTEE Major Group
E - Health
F - Mental Health
G - Specific Diseases 0.58 0.44 0.31 0.55
H - Medical Research 0.42 0.56 0.69 0.45
Observations 183 266 85 289
Disease-Specific Organizations
Variable
Mean (Standard Deviation) or Proportion reported; NTEE Major Groups G & H included in columns 5-8    
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Table 4.7: Regression Results—Feigenbaum’s (1987) Model with Current Sample 
 
 
 
Data Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Division, Exempt Organizations Sample 
(501c(3) Organizations, 2008–2010); Urban Institute, National Center for Charitable Statistics, 
http://nccsdataweb.urban.org  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Sample Total Sample Grantmaking Orgs Grantmaking Orgs
Geographic Market Share (%) -0.983*** -0.701*** -1.213*** -0.957***
(0.107) (0.0807) (0.0943) (0.107)
Year Formed 2.256*** 0.810*** 1.713*** 1.231***
(0.0981) (0.0611) (0.100) (0.104)
Total Revenue 3.77e-07* -2.73e-08 -2.39e-07 -5.53e-08
(2.28e-07) (1.85e-07) (2.60e-07) (2.39e-07)
Constant -4,436*** -1,571*** -3,328*** -2,387***
(196.0) (122.2) (200.6) (209.4)
Observations 398 794 214 426
NTEE Major Group H G & H H G & H
Dependent Variable: Grant Expenditure Ratio to Total Revenue
(1) & (2) Analyze total sample, (3) & (4) analyze subsample of grantmaking organizations
WLS (inverse total revenue); Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.8: Regression Results—Characteristics of Investors, Innovators, & Advocates 
 
 
 
Data Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Division, Exempt Organizations Sample 
(501c(3) Organizations, 2008–2010); Urban Institute, National Center for Charitable Statistics, 
http://nccsdataweb.urban.org 
 
  
(1) (2) (3)
Grantmaking Org Royalty Revenue Lobbying Org
Related-Disease Organization Market Share Percent 0.00406** 0.000103 -0.000514
(0.00201) (0.00225) (0.00137)
Geographic Market Share Percent 0.000548 0.000459 -0.000579
(0.00162) (0.00133) (0.00111)
Number of Related-Disease Organizations Log 0.0134 -0.0186 -0.0393
(0.0514) (0.0436) (0.0302)
Number of NTEE G & H Public Charities in State Log -0.0106 -0.0165 -0.0486*
(0.0318) (0.0302) (0.0281)
Share with Revenue > $10 Million or Assets > $30 Million Binary 0.126** 0.124* -0.00314
(0.0581) (0.0718) (0.0509)
Making Payments to Affiliates Binary 0.157** -0.163** 0.111**
(0.0783) (0.0698) (0.0473)
Year Formed Continuous -0.00116 -0.00192** -0.00170***
(0.00103) (0.000824) (0.000606)
Number of Employees Log -0.114*** -0.0547** 0.0119
(0.0165) (0.0216) (0.0176)
Employees Paid over $100K Log 0.0580* 0.116*** 0.0480**
(0.0309) (0.0324) (0.0222)
Collaborating Binary 0.0156 0.0382 0.0364
(0.0537) (0.0624) (0.0414)
Advertising Expenditures Log 0.00616 0.00823* 0.00384
(0.00496) (0.00483) (0.00328)
Fundraising Expenditures Log 0.0176*** -0.00128 0.00922**
(0.00406) (0.00524) (0.00359)
NTEE Code H - Medical Research (Referent: G) Binary -0.0373 -0.0772 0.0294
(0.0534) (0.0538) (0.0416)
Supporting Public Charity (Referent: Operating) Binary 0.0534 -0.0978 -0.0870
(0.0696) (0.0912) (0.0784)
Lobbying Organization Binary 0.197*** -0.0169
(0.0624) (0.0613)
Grantmaking Expenditures Log 0.0151
(0.0133)
Grantmaking Organization Binary 0.136***
(0.0395)
Revenue from Government Grants Log 0.00933***
(0.00263)
Receiving Royalty Revenue Binary 0.0333
(0.0465)
Observations 823 449 823
Number of Clusters 346 205 346
Sample Full Sample Grantmaking Orgs Full Sample
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable
Logistic regressions, Marginal effects reported 
Form
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Clustered on EIN
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Table 4.9: Regression Results—Size of Grantmaking Investment  
 
 
 
Data Source: Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income Division Exempt Organizations Sample 
(501c(3) Organizations, 2008-2010); Urban Institute, National Center for Charitable Statistics, 
http://nccsdataweb.urban.org 
 
  
(1) (2) (3)
Grantmaking Orgs Large Grantmaking Orgs
Small Grantmaking 
Orgs
Related-Disease Organization Market Share Percent 0.0413** 0.0506** 0.00696
(0.0165) (0.0197) (0.0296)
Geographic Market Share Percent 0.00900 0.0117 0.00408
(0.00890) (0.0118) (0.0139)
Number of Related-Disease Organizations Log -0.0346 -0.158 0.333
(0.229) (0.319) (0.360)
Number of NTEE G & H Public Charities in State Log 0.244 0.169 0.708*
(0.184) (0.247) (0.386)
Making Payments to Affiliates Binary -1.413*** -1.390** -0.649
(0.484) (0.558) (1.070)
Number of Voting Members in Governing Body Log 0.406* 0.379 -0.0617
(0.220) (0.300) (0.414)
Year Formed Continuous 0.00731 0.0112 -0.0175
(0.00612) (0.00689) (0.0130)
Number of Employees Log, Lag 1 -0.530*** -0.702*** 0.0508
(0.154) (0.184) (0.353)
Employees Paid over $100K Log, Lag 1 0.715*** 0.870*** -0.703
(0.250) (0.286) (0.827)
Lobbying Organization Binary -0.187 -0.330 0.701
(0.332) (0.377) (0.770)
Collaboration Expenditures Log, Lag 1 0.00200 0.0263 -0.0380
(0.0362) (0.0458) (0.0515)
Advertising Expenditures Log, Lag 1 -0.0640** -0.0820*** 0.0195
(0.0263) (0.0267) (0.0628)
Fundraising Expenditures Log, Lag 1 0.0627** 0.0793*** -0.0382
(0.0243) (0.0277) (0.0564)
Total Revenue Log 0.749*** 0.799*** 0.568***
(0.110) (0.168) (0.164)
NTEE Code H - Medical Research (Referent: G) Binary 0.305 0.0888 1.017*
(0.320) (0.398) (0.570)
Supporting Public Charity (Referent: Operating) Binary 1.228*** 1.342*** 1.063*
(0.357) (0.442) (0.591)
Constant -16.44 -23.55 32.35
(12.66) (14.67) (25.65)
Observations 270 184 86
Number of Clusters 168 109 63
Variable Form
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Clustered on EIN; Outcome: log of grantmaking expenditures
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Size distinction between large and small organizations based on cutoff of either revenue over 10 million or assets over 30 million
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Table 4.10: Regression Results—Size of Royalty Revenue  
 
 
 
Data Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Division, Exempt Organizations Sample 
(501c(3) Organizations, 2008–2010); Urban Institute, National Center for Charitable Statistics, 
http://nccsdataweb.urban.org  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Grantmaking Orgs Royalty Receipt
Grantmaking 
with Royalties
Related-Disease Organization Market Share Percent -0.00457 -0.00302 -0.0137 -0.0277
(0.0281) (0.0408) (0.0269) (0.0340)
Geographic Market Share Percent 0.0153 0.0109 -0.0158 0.00733
(0.0161) (0.0214) (0.0171) (0.0270)
Number of Related-Disease Organizations Log 0.339 -0.327 0.0173 -0.240
(0.536) (0.796) (1.070) (1.109)
Number of NTEE G & H Public Charities in State Log -0.259 -0.624 -0.463 -0.844
(0.321) (0.439) (0.444) (0.735)
Making Payments to Affiliates Binary -2.985*** -3.010** 0.116 0.515
(0.900) (1.419) (1.381) (1.675)
Number of Voting Members in Governing Body Log -1.004** -1.841** -0.896 -1.641
(0.467) (0.710) (0.598) (1.151)
Year Formed Continuous -0.0484*** -0.0462*** -0.0178 -0.0382*
(0.0118) (0.0157) (0.0142) (0.0199)
Number of Employees Log, Lag 1 -0.496*** -0.561 -0.155 -0.274
(0.181) (0.391) (0.364) (0.503)
Employees Paid over $100K Log, Lag 1 1.980*** 2.339*** 1.299*** 1.173**
(0.362) (0.584) (0.399) (0.493)
Lobbying Organization Binary 1.082 -0.355 0.0372 0.0176
(0.822) (1.185) (0.696) (1.067)
Collaboration Expenditures Log, Lag 1 0.125* 0.155* -0.0204 0.0217
(0.0640) (0.0929) (0.0674) (0.127)
Advertising Expenditures Log, Lag 1 0.0733 0.103 0.0763 0.0885
(0.0592) (0.0867) (0.0530) (0.0872)
Fundraising Expenditures Log, Lag 1 0.0187 0.0351 -0.0597 0.00484
(0.0514) (0.0775) (0.0557) (0.0887)
Expenditures on Grants to Organizations Log, Lag 1 0.0364 0.0593 -0.0925* -0.165*
(0.0399) (0.0694) (0.0502) (0.0924)
Revenue from Government Grants Log, Lag 1 0.0219 0.0324 -0.0550 -0.0218
(0.0439) (0.0615) (0.0497) (0.0654)
NTEE Code H - Medical Research (Referent: G) Binary 0.0286 -0.896 -0.274 0.0615
(0.560) (0.795) (1.049) (1.415)
Supporting Public Charity (Referent: Operating) Binary -1.006* -1.098 -1.241 -0.381
(0.596) (0.887) (1.313) (1.880)
Constant 96.92*** 101.8*** 52.50* 98.65**
(24.94) (32.93) (30.39) (41.91)
Observations 497 277 122 79
Number of Clusters 293 169 69 45
Sample Full Sample Grantmaking Full Sample Grantmaking 
Variable Form
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Clustered on EIN; Outcome: log of royalty revenue 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(3) and (4) restrict the sample to organizations with at least some royalty revenue 
  143 
Table 4.11: Regression Results—Size of Lobbying Expenditures  
 
 
 
Data Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Division, Exempt Organizations Sample 
(501c(3) Organizations, 2008–2010); Urban Institute, National Center for Charitable Statistics, 
http://nccsdataweb.urban.org   
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Lobbying 
Expenditures
Own Lobbying 
Expenditures
Direct Contact 
Expenditures
Grants for 
Lobbying
Related-Disease Organization Market Share Percent 0.000339 -0.0371 -0.00992 0.00489
(0.0668) (0.0673) (0.0602) (0.0331)
Geographic Market Share Percent -0.00211 -0.00805 -0.00789 0.0178
(0.0432) (0.0415) (0.0393) (0.0335)
Number of Related-Disease Organizations Log -1.416 1.254 -1.590* 0.861
(0.892) (0.894) (0.862) (0.530)
Number of NTEE G & H Public Charities in State Log -1.699** 0.638 -1.816** -0.446
(0.796) (0.799) (0.723) (0.654)
Making Payments to Affiliates Binary -2.165 2.165 -1.706 0.250
(1.640) (1.645) (1.438) (1.338)
Number of Voting Members in Governing Body Log 1.623 0.581 2.325** 0.0892
(1.141) (0.960) (1.119) (0.629)
Year Formed Continuous 0.00881 -0.0190 0.0104 0.00403
(0.0226) (0.0225) (0.0200) (0.0124)
Number of Employees Log, Lag 1 -1.048 0.731 -1.023* -0.640
(0.677) (0.653) (0.551) (0.464)
Employees Paid over $100K Log, Lag 1 2.433** -2.337** 1.654** 0.886
(0.930) (0.964) (0.770) (0.630)
Collaboration Expenditures Log, Lag 1 -0.0212 0.0242 0.0510 -0.0989
(0.121) (0.121) (0.118) (0.0827)
Advertising Expenditures Log, Lag 1 -0.115 0.148 -0.00325 0.126**
(0.106) (0.107) (0.101) (0.0510)
Fundraising Expenditures Log, Lag 1 0.110 -0.0327 0.0881 0.0673
(0.118) (0.113) (0.128) (0.0832)
Expenditures on Grants to Organizations Log, Lag 1 -0.117 0.176** -0.150* 0.0394
(0.0816) (0.0776) (0.0787) (0.0486)
Receiving Royalty Revenue Binary 0.462 -0.602 1.653 -0.796
(1.350) (1.309) (1.349) (0.769)
Total Revenue Log -0.414 0.708 -0.537 0.110
(0.606) (0.669) (0.551) (0.297)
NTEE Code H - Medical Research (Referent: G) Binary -0.00410 -1.029 -0.0281 -0.357
(1.241) (1.245) (1.150) (0.753)
Supporting Public Charity (Referent: Operating) Binary 3.492 -0.848 4.354 -2.228
(2.864) (3.400) (2.649) (1.354)
Constant 11.39 17.06 9.359 -12.97
(48.62) (49.93) (41.23) (25.78)
Observations 172 172 172 172
Number of Clusters 99 99 99 99
FormVariable
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Clustered on EIN; Outcome: log of lobbying expenditures
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
 
 
This dissertation aims to address variation in the private provision of public goods that 
crosses over traditional boundaries.  For-profits, nonprofits, and hybrid organizations are engaging 
in innovative practices to better provide for the common good. While their goal is valiant, it is often 
unclear how their new strategies compare to traditional approaches. The dissertation contributes to 
the literature on nonprofit organizations and public goods by building datasets that provide detailed 
multi-dimensional data on nonprofits, their strategies, and their practices. The theories regarding 
philanthropic organizational practices are developed and analyzed to empirically document variation 
not captured by legal structure.  
 
4.1 Stepping Up: An empirical analysis of the role of social innovation in response to an 
economic recession 
Chapter two documents the practices in place by organizations to improve their local 
communities, while highlighting the value of new hybrid legal structures. In regards to the recession, 
the study finds that many organizations did respond to the increase in need by increasing social 
supports, showing the importance of the local safety net to communities. The paper contributes to 
the literature on social innovation by documenting the paths to social progress and the 
organizational characteristics associated with socially engaged practices.  
Recommendations  
More terms are being created and used to identify hybrid behavior.  However, these terms 
lack consistent definitions and have not diffused to rural communities, making them ineffective 
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tools in linking organizations to resources. Support organizations should instead focus on identifying 
and connecting organizations through like practices.  Hybrid supporters need to move away from 
marketing their preferred brand of terminology and instead focus on providing support for 
organizations to incorporate socially innovative practices.  Regarding policy, the results suggest that 
self-selection into hybrid legal structures is appropriate, with hybrid entities providing a more 
extensive set of practices in support of their communities.  This work supports the continued 
adoption of hybrid tax statuses.  These incorporations offer a low-cost option for states to support 
and encourage the provision of social support from private organizations.  
 
4.2 What’s in a Name? Disambiguating philanthropic grantmakers and their strategies 
The third chapter puts for a classification model of grantmaking nonprofit organizations by 
funding source and funding strategy. The model allows for consideration of how revenue streams 
and organizational mission affect grantmaking outcomes. The results show that endowed and 
donation-based focused nonprofits behave similarly in terms of their total giving, but endowed 
nonprofits are providing larger grants to recipients, on average. Regarding the recession, results 
indicate that total giving did decrease; yet grant sizes maintained similar levels with focused 
organizations providing more in grantmaking than their general counterparts.  The results suggest 
there are important distinctions in how these groups operationalize their mission, given revenue 
constraints.  This paper contributes to the literature on grantmaking nonprofits by putting forth a 
generalizable classification system to better assess nonprofit practices and outcomes.  
Recommendations 
These results suggest important recommendations for both nonprofit managers and 
policymakers. Strategic grantmaking pushes the importance of sufficient funding to help grantees 
meet their goals. However, the smaller grant sizes from donation-based focused organizations, as 
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compared to endowed focused nonprofits, indicates they are not operationalizing this value as well. 
Nonprofit managers of each organization type need to better assess whether their grant sizes are 
sufficient to meet their desired goals from grantees.   
Regarding policy, the government currently focuses regulation and evaluation efforts on 
public charities, ignoring the behavior of private foundations, which are also publicly subsidized.  
Policymakers need to adjust to better track the operations of private foundations so that the public 
has a greater understanding of how government is investing in the public good.  In addition, 
policymakers and nonprofit managers need to tackle evaluation.  While public goods are challenging 
to quantify, there are options for assessing outcomes. Grants and organizations need to be evaluated 
to assess how they are contributing to the social good and where improvements can be made. 
 
4.3 The Race for a Cure: Collaborators or Competitors? Modeling the effects of competition 
in disease-specific charities 
Chapter four expands the theory of nonprofit competition and innovation by developing 
and estimating an innovation production function for disease-specific nonprofits. The empirical 
model estimates the function on outcomes of grantmaking investment, royalty revenue, and 
lobbying expenditures. The results capture the importance of certain organizational characteristics 
across outcomes, namely labor quality. The result indicates that nonprofits that are investing in high 
quality employees are also investing more in the paths to innovation. Competition affects 
grantmaking behavior such that larger organizations in less competitive markets have a larger 
grantmaking investment.  This can either imply that these organizations need to spend less on other 
expenditures like fundraising and marketing, or that they are collaborating with fellow nonprofits 
within the smaller markets. This paper contributes to the literature on nonprofit markets by 
developing and estimating the first innovation production function for disease-specific nonprofits.  
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Recommendations 
 The results from this paper that while there are some similarities, the markets of nonprofits 
and for-profits differ in important ways. Nonprofits are public good maximizers as opposed to 
profit maximizers.  Thus, despite the importance of revenue generation for both types, nonprofits 
also need to focus on how money is spent. In an effort to limit other expenditures, like fundraising 
and marketing, charities should make efforts to connect with similar organizations and establish 
collaborative efforts and even potentially mergers that could result in more and more effective 
dollars going towards public goods.  
 The effectiveness of larger nonprofits also points to the role of policymakers.  The low-
barriers to entry in the nonprofit market have led to a flooding the market for most diseases. As a 
result, a large number of small organizations are competing for and receiving a portion of the limited 
donation and grant dollars.  The public would benefit from greater control of nonprofit creation, 
reducing inefficiencies in fundraising and marketing expenditures by organizations and decreasing 
the information asymmetry that exists for potential donors trying to assess the quality of nonprofits. 
Limiting the supply also calls for the need of greater oversight from the public sphere of these 
charities given that the large nonprofits wield large amounts of political and economic power.  
 
4.4 Plans for Future Research 
Each of the three topics explored in this dissertation offer paths for future research. 
Regarding social innovation within hybrid organizations, more research is needed to expand the 
sample and geographical focus of study.  A follow-up study within North Carolina has been 
conducted (in the fall of 2014).  Data from the expanded survey will be analyzed to assess if results 
hold further out from the recession and across industry types. Research will also be done at a larger 
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geographical scale to assess how hybrids organizations are operationalizing their goals across the 
country.  
 Turning to social innovation within grantmaking organizations, the classification model put 
forth and assessed in chapter three should be applied to a larger sample of organizations, and 
behavior analyzed over a more stable economic time period to assess where and how focused and 
general interest nonprofits provide for the public good. Further work needs to be done on the 
outcomes of these organizations with a study on evaluation of grantmaking practices within the 
classification scheme.    
 Finally, regarding the innovation production function for disease-specific nonprofits, a 
longer time period needs to be analyzed to better model the longer-term outcome of royalty revenue 
and address behavior under stable economic conditions. The production function should also be 
evaluated at the disease level to assess the stages of progress toward innovation and how nonprofits 
interact within a disease market.  
 In sum, this dissertation contributes to the literatures on nonprofit organizations and public 
goods by expanding our understanding of how organizations operationalize their goals of public 
good provision across strategies and types of practices.  It documents variation in behavior not 
captured in traditional legal boundaries and assess the organizational characteristics associated with 
greater social engagement. Future work will expand on these models to evaluate how these varying 
strategies impact public good outcomes. The value of third sector is well established – now efforts 
need to be evaluated so they may be improved to become more efficient and effective providers. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 2.1 List of Practices in Use by Legal Structure and Hybrid Terminology Sub-
Samples 
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Appendix 3.1 List of Words Used from Mission Statements and Grant Descriptions 
 
 
 
  
Variable Search Word(s)
collaboration collaborat
cooperation cooperat
decrease duplication decrease duplication
efficient efficiently
evaluation evaluat
expected return expected return
impact impact
Innovation innovat/inventively
lasting lasting
long-term long-term
measure measur
mission-driven mission-driven
outcome outcome
partnership partnership
PRI related investment
return on investment return on investment
social enterprises social enterprises
social entrepreneurs social entrepreneurs
social innovation social innovation
strategic strategic
sustainable sustain
venture philanthropy venture philanthropy
Mission Statement Codes Used
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Grant Description Codes Used in Analysis 
VARIABLE ROOT WORD(S) 
CATEGOR
Y 
SUB-
CATEGORY 
Air air Agriculture Environment 
Bodies of water ocean; sea; river; marine Agriculture Environment 
Climate change 
climate change; climate action; climate 
initiative; climate resilience; global 
warming Agriculture Environment 
Conservation 
conservation; land reclamation; land use 
policies; land restoration; coastal 
protection Agriculture Environment 
Environment environment; nature; eco Agriculture Environment 
Forest forest; tree Agriculture Environment 
Greenhouse gas greenhouse gas Agriculture Environment 
Pollution pollution; emissions Agriculture Environment 
Waste 
prevention waste prevention; recycle Agriculture Environment 
Art art; sculpture; studio 
Arts & 
Culture Arts & Culture 
Museum museum; exhibit; archive; gallery 
Arts & 
Culture Arts & Culture 
Cultural/ethnic ethnic; cultur 
Arts & 
Culture Arts & Culture 
Historic 
preservation historic; preservation 
Arts & 
Culture Arts & Culture 
Dance ballet; dance 
Arts & 
Culture Arts & Culture 
Music 
choir; music; concert; orchestra; 
symphony 
Arts & 
Culture Arts & Culture 
Performing arts 
perform; opera; playhouse; theater; 
theatre; actor; film 
Arts & 
Culture Arts & Culture 
Clinics free clinic; clinic service Health Care 
Health health Health Care 
Hospice hospice; palliative care Health Care 
Hospitals hospital Health Care 
Insurance insurance; underinsured; uninsured Health Care 
Medical medical Health Care 
Medicine medicine Health Care 
Nutrition nutrition Health Care 
Patient patient Health Care 
Pediatric pediatric Health Care 
Personalized 
medicine personalized medicine Health Care 
Prescription 
drugs prescription drug Health Care 
Primary care primary care Health Care 
Public health public health Health Care 
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Reproductive  reproductive  Health Care 
Therapy therapy Health Care 
Addiction addict; substance abuse Health Condition 
Alcoholism alcoholism; alcoholic Health Condition 
Arthritis arthritis Health Condition 
Asthma asthma Health Condition 
Autism autism; autistic Health Condition 
Dementia dementia Health Condition 
Diabetes diabetes; diabetic; insulin Health Condition 
Diagnosis diagnosis Health Condition 
Digestive digestive Health Condition 
Disabilities disabilit Health Condition 
Disorder disorder Health Condition 
Dyslexia dyslexia Health Condition 
Mentally 
disabled  
mentally disabled; mental disabilit; 
developmentally disabled Health Condition 
Obesity obesity Health Condition 
Paralysis paralysis Health Condition 
Rehab rehab; detox Health Condition 
Respiratory respiratory Health Condition 
ALS als Health Disease 
Alzheimer's alzheimer Health Disease 
Autoimmune autoimmune Health Disease 
Brain brain Health Disease 
Breast breast Health Disease 
Cancer cancer Health Disease 
Cystic fibrosis cystic fibrosis Health Disease 
Diseases disease Health Disease 
Genetic genetic Health Disease 
Heart heart Health Disease 
Hemophilia hemophilia Health Disease 
HIV/AIDS aids; hiv Health Disease 
Hypertension hypertension Health Disease 
Kidney kidney Health Disease 
Liver liver Health Disease 
Lung lung Health Disease 
Mental health 
mental health; mentally ill; mental illness; 
depression Health Disease 
Multiple 
Sclerosis multiple sclerosis Health Disease 
Muscular 
Dystrophy muscular dystrophy Health Disease 
Nerve, muscle, 
& bone disease nerve; muscle; bone Health Disease 
Parkinsons parkinson Health Disease 
Prostate prostate Health Disease 
Biomedicine biomedicine; biomedical Health Education 
Gerontology gerontology Health Education 
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Immunology immunology Health Education 
Neuroscience neuroscience Health Education 
Oncology oncology Health Education 
Microcredit 
microcredit; microenterprise; 
microentrepreneurship; microfinance 
Social 
Innovation 
Social 
Innovation 
PRI 
program-related investment; program-
related loan; mission-related investment; 
mission-related loan 
Social 
Innovation 
Social 
Innovation 
Social 
enterprises/entre
preneurs social enterprise; social entrepreneur 
Social 
Innovation 
Social 
Innovation 
Social 
innovation social innovation 
Social 
Innovation 
Social 
Innovation 
Social ventures Social venture 
Social 
Innovation 
Social 
Innovation 
Analysis analysis; analytic; analyze; analyzing 
Type of 
Support Research 
Assessment assess 
Type of 
Support Research 
Basic research basic research 
Type of 
Support Research 
Biology-related 
research 
elements 
bacteria; cell; enzyme; protein; 
biosynthesis; nuclear 
Type of 
Support Research 
Case studies case stud 
Type of 
Support Research 
Clinical trials clinical trial 
Type of 
Support Research 
Data data 
Type of 
Support Research 
Donor registry donor registry 
Type of 
Support Research 
Drug discovery drug discovery 
Type of 
Support Research 
Econometrics econometric; statistical methods 
Type of 
Support Research 
Evidence-based evidence-based 
Type of 
Support Research 
Experimentation experiment 
Type of 
Support Research 
FDA approval fda approval 
Type of 
Support Research 
Feasibility feasibility 
Type of 
Support Research 
Genomics genomics 
Type of 
Support Research 
Instrument instrument 
Type of 
Support Research 
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Interactions interactions 
Type of 
Support Research 
Intervention intervention 
Type of 
Support Research 
Laboratory lab 
Type of 
Support Research 
Methodology methodology 
Type of 
Support Research 
Monitoring monitoring 
Type of 
Support Research 
Phases 
phase I; phase II; phase III; phase 1; 
phase 2; phase 3 
Type of 
Support Research 
Pilot study pilot study 
Type of 
Support Research 
Placebo-
controlled placebo-controlled 
Type of 
Support Research 
Proof-of 
concept proof-of concept 
Type of 
Support Research 
Recruitment recruitment; reduce the drop-out rate 
Type of 
Support Research 
Replicate replicate; reproducible 
Type of 
Support Research 
Research research; R&D 
Type of 
Support Research 
Research tools microscope; telescope; mice; imaging 
Type of 
Support Research 
Translational translational 
Type of 
Support Research 
Treatment treatment 
Type of 
Support Research 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3.2 Comparison of Classification System to Restricted Version 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Classification System Donation Focused
Donation 
Broad
Endowed 
Focused
Endowed 
Broad Unclassified
Donation Focused 85 68 0 0 0
Donation Broad 0 103 0 0 0
Endowed Focused 0 0 85 100 2
Endowed Broad 0 0 0 229 6
Unclassified 0 0 0 0 31
Restricted System
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Appendix 3.3 Sample & Population Comparison  
 
 
  
State Share 
of Sample
State Share 
of Population
State Share 
of Sample
State Share 
of Population
State Share 
of Sample
State Share 
of Population
Alabama 1.32% 1.09% 0.00% 1.15% 0.57% 1.13%
Alaska 0.00% 0.34% 0.25% 0.05% 0.14% 0.15%
Arizona 0.66% 1.63% 0.76% 1.84% 0.72% 1.77%
Arkansas 0.33% 0.22% 0.76% 0.23% 0.57% 0.23%
California 12.87% 12.45% 10.13% 10.28% 11.32% 11.03%
Colorado 1.65% 1.93% 0.76% 2.16% 1.15% 2.08%
Connecticut 2.31% 1.83% 1.01% 1.77% 1.58% 1.79%
Delaware 0.00% 0.04% 0.51% 0.97% 0.29% 0.66%
Dist. of Col. 2.31% 1.53% 0.76% 0.32% 1.43% 0.73%
Florida 1.98% 3.44% 2.03% 5.20% 2.01% 4.61%
Georgia 0.99% 1.63% 1.52% 1.43% 1.29% 1.50%
Hawaii 0.66% 0.80% 0.00% 0.56% 0.29% 0.64%
Idaho 0.33% 0.54% 0.00% 0.40% 0.14% 0.45%
Illinois 5.28% 4.20% 12.91% 5.23% 9.60% 4.89%
Indiana 1.65% 1.61% 1.77% 1.34% 1.72% 1.43%
Iowa 1.65% 1.55% 0.25% 1.33% 0.86% 1.41%
Kansas 0.99% 1.36% 0.51% 0.71% 0.72% 0.94%
Kentucky 1.32% 1.86% 0.00% 0.79% 0.57% 1.16%
Louisiana 0.99% 1.36% 0.00% 0.46% 0.43% 0.77%
Maine 0.33% 0.38% 0.51% 0.33% 0.43% 0.35%
Maryland 2.64% 1.71% 1.01% 2.59% 1.72% 2.30%
Massachusetts 3.63% 3.82% 0.76% 3.84% 2.01% 3.84%
Michigan 3.63% 3.33% 11.39% 2.52% 8.02% 2.80%
Minnesota 3.30% 3.60% 1.77% 1.82% 2.44% 2.43%
Mississippi 0.00% 0.25% 0.25% 0.26% 0.14% 0.26%
Missouri 1.65% 2.13% 1.01% 2.10% 1.29% 2.12%
Montana 0.33% 0.73% 0.00% 0.36% 0.14% 0.49%
Nebraska 0.66% 0.73% 0.76% 1.23% 0.72% 1.06%
Nevada 0.66% 0.80% 0.76% 0.45% 0.72% 0.57%
New Hampshire 0.66% 0.41% 0.00% 0.42% 0.29% 0.41%
New Jersey 1.98% 2.12% 3.29% 4.18% 2.72% 3.49%
New Mexico 0.33% 0.19% 0.00% 0.17% 0.14% 0.18%
New York 8.25% 7.21% 11.90% 11.89% 10.32% 10.32%
North Carolina 3.63% 2.44% 8.61% 2.47% 6.45% 2.46%
North Dakota 0.66% 0.87% 0.00% 0.05% 0.29% 0.33%
Ohio 7.92% 4.19% 0.76% 4.20% 3.87% 4.20%
Oklahoma 1.65% 1.19% 0.76% 1.27% 1.15% 1.24%
Oregon 1.32% 2.15% 0.76% 0.82% 1.00% 1.27%
Pennsylvania 3.96% 5.14% 3.54% 5.97% 3.72% 5.70%
Rhode Island 0.33% 0.32% 0.76% 1.51% 0.57% 1.11%
South Carolina 1.32% 1.06% 0.00% 0.87% 0.57% 0.94%
South Dakota 0.33% 0.59% 0.00% 0.06% 0.14% 0.24%
Tennessee 1.32% 1.90% 0.00% 1.14% 0.57% 1.40%
Texas 6.93% 5.68% 5.06% 4.57% 5.87% 4.95%
Utah 0.00% 0.33% 0.00% 1.18% 0.00% 0.89%
Vermont 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.24% 0.00% 0.20%
Virginia 3.63% 3.20% 9.87% 1.60% 7.16% 2.15%
Washington 0.99% 1.01% 1.52% 1.85% 1.29% 1.57%
West Virginia 0.00% 0.31% 0.00% 0.35% 0.00% 0.34%
Wisconsin 0.66% 1.95% 1.01% 3.31% 0.86% 2.86%
Wyoming 0.00% 0.34% 0.00% 0.15% 0.00% 0.22%
Total 303 40,690 395 79,498 698 120,188
Population Data from NCC SOI 2010 990 and 990-PF reporting positive amounts of grantmaking
Public Charities Private Founations Total
State
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Appendix 3.4 Multinomial Logit Result by Alternate Classifications 
 
 
 
Charity Navigator:  
• No statistically significant differences in subject area 
• Application form required increases probability of being ranked & potentially eligible but 
decreases probability of being not eligible 
• Regional memberships are associated with decreased probability of being ranked and 
increased probability of being ineligible while affinity group memberships have the opposite 
relationship 
 
Guidestar:  
• Health focus is positively associated with the probability of having silver status 
• Impact statement provided has no statistically significant effect  
• Application form required and single-state geographical focus increases the probability of 
having silver status and decreases the probability of not participating 
• Regional membership increases the probability of not participating, while affinity 
membership decreases the probability of not participating 
• Significant results are mostly for not participating as opposed to different levels  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ranked Potentially Eligible Not Eligible Gold Silver Bronze Participant
Does Not 
Participate
Guidestar Impact Statement Provided 0.182*** 0.0544 -0.237** 0.564 1.276 0.401 0.233 -2.475
(0.0507) (0.0390) (0.106) (31.36) (149.4) (42.34) (23.67) (212.7)
Application: Application Form Required 0.189*** 0.111* -0.300*** 0.0403 0.185*** -0.0113 0.0378 -0.251***
(0.0654) (0.0639) (0.0738) (0.0409) (0.0622) (0.0287) (0.0346) (0.0524)
Geographic Focus: Single State -0.0615 0.229** -0.167* -0.0657 0.164** 0.000194 0.0129 -0.111*
(0.0750) (0.0943) (0.0911) (0.0404) (0.0654) (0.0334) (0.0304) (0.0575)
Membership: Regional -0.129** -0.0724 0.201** -0.0649** -0.102 0.0387 -0.0287 0.157**
(0.0640) (0.0505) (0.0964) (0.0255) (0.0677) (0.0569) (0.0284) (0.0676)
Membership: Affinity Groups 0.145* 0.00757 -0.152* 0.0260 0.0534 0.0796 -0.0102 -0.149**
(0.0742) (0.0530) (0.0897) (0.0402) (0.0745) (0.0574) (0.0303) (0.0644)
Subject of Interest: Arts & Culture 0.00380 -0.00557 0.00224 0.0111 -0.0156 0.0380 -0.00427 -0.0293
(0.0705) (0.0615) (0.0845) (0.0416) (0.0705) (0.0392) (0.0288) (0.0569)
Subject of Interest: Health/Science Research 0.0669 0.0150 -0.0817 -0.0115 -0.0270 -0.0138 0.0267 0.0257
(0.0554) (0.0458) (0.130) (0.0308) (0.0611) (0.0345) (0.0290) (0.0557)
Subject of Interest: Environment 0.0473 0.0590 -0.107 0.0196 0.0666 0.00886 -0.0267 -0.0684
(0.0576) (0.0489) (0.0950) (0.0326) (0.0597) (0.0315) (0.0298) (0.0520)
Subject of Interest: Health Care 0.0313 0.0722 -0.104 0.00739 0.122* 0.0123 -0.0548** -0.0866
(0.0711) (0.0681) (0.115) (0.0399) (0.0675) (0.0373) (0.0279) (0.0555)
Salary Share of Expenditures 0.0110 0.0177 -0.0289 0.0392 0.183 -0.380 -0.0535 0.211
(0.0645) (0.0455) (0.0578) (0.187) (0.254) (0.353) (0.181) (0.204)
Total Revenue -0 5.72e-11** -0 -0 3.22e-10 0 -5.16e-10 1.90e-10
(6.13e-11) (0) (6.78e-11) (1.24e-10) (2.18e-10) (6.78e-11) (3.92e-10) (1.82e-10)
IRS Ruling Year -0.00349*** 0.000587 0.00290 4.13e-05 -0.00208 0.000594 0.00164* -0.000203
(0.00123) (0.00106) (0.00198) (0.000734) (0.00136) (0.000730) (0.000961) (0.00120)
Observations 243 243 243 243 243 243 243 243
Cateogry
Charity 
Navigator
Charity 
Navigator
Charity 
Navigator
Guidestar Guidestar Guidestar Guidestar Guidestar
MNL Marginal Effects reported; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variables
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Appendix 3.5 OLS Regression Results of Annual Data by Alternate Classifications 
 
 
 
IRS:  
• Group entities, as compared to public charities, are associated with increases in total giving 
• Supporting organizations, as compared to public charities, are associated with decreases in 
giving to universities 
• There is no statistically significant difference between private foundations and public 
charities, nor is there statistically significant differences of type on research funding 
 
Charity Navigator:  
• Ranked as compared to not eligible is associated with increases in total giving 
• No statistically significant difference on giving to universities or research  
 
Guidestar:  
• Gold, silver, and bronze status are all positively associated with higher giving overall as 
compared to not participating  
• No statistically significant difference on giving to research  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
IRS Status (Referent Group: Public Charity)
Private Foundation -0.254 -0.647 0.449
(0.261) (0.597) (1.814)
Supporting Organization -0.0982* -0.721** -0.154
(0.0543) (0.329) (0.469)
Group Organization 0.282** 0.639 1.941
(0.115) (0.797) (1.216)
Guidestar Level (Referent Group: Not a Participant)
Gold 0.300*** 0.871** -0.161
(0.0874) (0.400) (0.647)
Participant 0.0836 0.905* 0.152
(0.0904) (0.508) (0.744)
Silver 0.133** 0.463** 0.0688
(0.0581) (0.218) (0.370)
Bronze 0.219* 0.508 0.166
(0.117) (0.315) (0.922)
Charity Navigator (Referent: Not Eligible)
Ranked -0.165*** -0.265 -0.555
(0.0566) (0.252) (0.417)
Potentially Eligible 0.0382 0.136 0.0607
(0.0708) (0.278) (0.465)
No Record -0.174 -0.168 2.274
(0.270) (0.783) (2.843)
Lagged Proportion Grantmaker-Recipient State Match 0.0262 0.00814 0.0377 -0.367 -0.392 -0.310 -0.104 -0.292 -0.117
(0.0983) (0.0970) (0.0988) (0.382) (0.387) (0.395) (0.489) (0.483) (0.482)
Lagged Lobbying Activities 0.176 0.172 0.194* 0.513 0.501 0.539 1.111** 1.208** 1.194**
(0.113) (0.112) (0.113) (0.357) (0.352) (0.352) (0.516) (0.538) (0.536)
Lagged Proportion of Expenditures to Salaries -1.663*** -1.602*** -1.729*** -1.416 -0.865 -0.970 0.294 0.566 0.590
(0.434) (0.439) (0.464) (1.348) (1.347) (1.310) (1.981) (1.929) (1.956)
Lagged Proportion of Expenditures to Fundraising -0.0858 -0.0476 0.154 -3.928* -3.707* -2.818 -5.882* -4.361 -4.945
(0.666) (0.652) (0.677) (2.223) (2.021) (1.996) (3.216) (3.133) (3.172)
Lagged Outcome 0.825*** 0.822*** 0.816*** 0.761*** 0.768*** 0.770*** 0.677*** 0.683*** 0.678***
(0.0276) (0.0279) (0.0301) (0.0340) (0.0330) (0.0325) (0.0280) (0.0268) (0.0269)
Constant 6.400** 6.382** 6.036** 14.16* 14.80* 12.76 18.00 18.43 14.91
(2.785) (2.752) (2.791) (8.535) (8.665) (9.843) (17.88) (18.12) (18.68)
Nonprofit Age & Size (Lagged Assets) Controls X X X X X X X X X
Observations 1,005 1,005 1,005 1,005 1,005 1,005 1,005 1,005 1,005
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
OLS Coefficients, clustered on EIN; Level of observation: Year; Sample: 2007-2011
LN Total Giving LN TG to UNIs LN TG for ResearchVariable
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Appendix 3.6 OLS Regression Results of Grant Data by Alternate Classifications 
 
 
 
IRS:  
• Increased grant size is associated with private foundations, supporting organizations, and 
group entities as compared to public charities for overall giving 
• Support and group entities are associated with increased grant size compared to public 
charities for research grant size 
 
Charity Navigator:  
• No statistically significant differences between being ranked as compared to not eligible 
 
Guidestar:  
• Gold status, as compared to not participating, is associated with increased grant size for 
overall funding and research funding 
• Bronze status, as compared to not participating, is associated with decreased grant size for 
overall funding and Silver status is associated with decreased size for health funding  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
IRS Status (Referent Group: Public Charity)
Private Foundation 0.427*** 0.300 0.333
(0.142) (0.218) (0.309)
Private Operating Foundation -0.336** 0.138 0.135
(0.144) (0.199) (0.102)
Supporting Organization 0.421*** 0.899*** 0.492**
(0.124) (0.219) (0.199)
Group Organization 0.370** 0.863*** -0.00422
(0.166) (0.230) (0.271)
Guidestar (Referent: Not a Participate)
Gold 0.256** 0.456* 0.174
(0.0992) (0.274) (0.118)
Participant 0.0261 0.0933 -0.0605
(0.0998) (0.195) (0.180)
Silver -0.0174 -0.00674 -0.190**
(0.0527) (0.153) (0.0934)
Bronze -0.255** -0.00202 -0.317
(0.124) (0.199) (0.222)
Charity Navigator (Referent: Not Eligible)
Potentially Eligible -0.167** -0.275 -0.140
(0.0784) (0.191) (0.128)
Ranked 0.0496 0.178 0.0927
(0.0577) (0.207) (0.113)
No Record 0.281** 0.585** -0.290**
(0.129) (0.254) (0.143)
Grantmaker-Recipient State Match 0.116*** 0.124*** 0.101*** 0.0533 -0.0159 -0.0140 0.289*** 0.297*** 0.252***
(0.0361) (0.0347) (0.0340) (0.105) (0.137) (0.116) (0.0777) (0.0718) (0.0842)
Lagged Lobbying Activities 0.118* 0.110* 0.111* 0.194** 0.177 0.155 0.470*** 0.435*** 0.426***
(0.0645) (0.0591) (0.0661) (0.0874) (0.114) (0.100) (0.101) (0.0910) (0.0987)
Lagged Proportion of Expenditures to Salaries 0.978 0.951 0.837 3.250*** 1.621* 1.877** 1.600 1.717* 1.581*
(0.753) (0.610) (0.666) (0.847) (0.946) (0.791) (1.033) (0.925) (0.950)
Lagged Proportion of Expenditures to Fundraising 0.0296 0.123 0.104 -0.0846 -0.221 0.323 1.811 1.449 1.429
(1.316) (0.888) (0.982) (1.403) (1.162) (1.189) (1.451) (1.028) (1.035)
Lagged Total Giving to for Research (LN) 0.00262 0.00541* 0.00301
(0.00282) (0.00293) (0.00301)
Lagged Average Grant Size (LN) 0.406*** 0.427*** 0.444*** 0.516*** 0.646*** 0.686*** 0.448*** 0.445*** 0.454***
(0.0499) (0.0484) (0.0472) (0.0809) (0.0854) (0.0980) (0.0602) (0.0597) (0.0565)
Lagged Total Giving for Outcome (LN) -0.0263 -0.0307 -0.0625** 0.0138*** 0.00993 0.0106* -0.0140** -0.00986* -0.0154***
(0.0286) (0.0241) (0.0272) (0.00395) (0.00628) (0.00603) (0.00626) (0.00517) (0.00575)
Constant 5.358** 3.765 2.891 1.683 -2.474 -0.502 1.127 1.221 -1.479
(2.563) (2.494) (2.491) (5.008) (6.013) (7.406) (5.536) (5.675) (5.520)
Nonprofit Age & Size (Lagged Assets) Controls X X X X X X X X X
Observations 351,708 351,708 351,708 10,634 10,634 10,634 19,939 19,939 19,939
OLS Coefficients, clustered on EIN; Level of observation: Grant; Sample: 2007-2011; LN Grant Size
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
*Equations (1-3) includes controls for lagged proportion of total giving to universities, schools, & hospitals
Variables All Areas Supporting Research Health
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Appendix 4.1 Geographic Market Share and Size Distribution 
 
 
State 2011 2010 2009 2008
% Change 
from 2008 
to 2011
Ohio 0.35 0.22 0.21 0.13 170%
Georgia 0.20 0.17 0.29 0.32 -39%
Rhode Island 0.49 0.46 0.41 0.36 35%
Indiana 0.44 0.35 0.41 0.33 33%
Utah 0.45 0.57 0.54 0.36 26%
North Carolina 0.45 0.49 0.44 0.37 22%
Colorado 0.28 0.24 0.23 0.23 21%
Florida 0.28 0.27 0.21 0.23 21%
Minnesota 0.45 0.37 0.37 0.37 20%
Oregon 0.35 0.35 0.30 0.29 20%
Kentucky 0.24 0.49 0.26 0.29 -18%
New York 0.30 0.32 0.41 0.36 -17%
Delaware 0.46 0.48 0.51 0.54 -15%
Virginia 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.24 11%
Kansas 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.38 10%
Illinois 0.27 0.24 0.26 0.24 9%
Pennsylvania 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 -9%
Wisconsin 0.25 0.46 0.31 0.27 -7%
New Jersey 0.27 0.23 0.29 0.26 4%
California 0.36 0.37 0.41 0.35 2%
Idaho 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.48 1%
Connecticut 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.35 1%
District of Columbia 0.43 0.45 0.43 0.44 -1%
Texas 0.58 0.56 0.52 0.31 88%
Massachusetts 0.70 0.46 0.45 0.43 63%
Alabama 0.55 0.60 0.36 0.35 57%
Tennessee 0.52 0.46 0.37 0.35 46%
Louisiana 0.59 0.44 0.41 0.41 44%
Michigan 0.54 0.48 0.39 0.38 40%
Nebraska 0.63 0.46 0.43 0.48 32%
Maryland 0.52 0.44 0.73 0.76 -31%
Mississippi 0.67 0.74 0.76 0.80 -17%
Iowa 0.52 0.43 0.40 0.45 16%
Montana 0.74 0.77 0.78 0.87 -15%
Missouri 0.66 0.65 0.67 0.76 -13%
Wyoming 0.73 0.68 0.76 0.82 -11%
Vermont 0.67 0.68 0.65 0.61 10%
South Carolina 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.46 10%
Arizona 0.70 0.70 0.66 0.66 6%
Nevada 0.59 0.62 0.57 0.62 -5%
Hawaii 0.61 0.67 0.64 0.63 -4%
New Hampshire 0.60 0.60 0.63 0.63 -4%
New Mexico 0.74 0.77 0.76 0.72 4%
West Virginia 0.60 0.73 0.78 0.58 3%
Washington 0.69 0.67 0.67 0.67 2%
Alaska 0.61 0.56 0.62 0.60 2%
Oklahoma 0.72 0.74 0.77 0.72 1%
South Dakota 0.80 0.75 0.81 0.73 10%
Maine 0.91 0.92 0.90 0.89 2%
Arkansas 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94 1%
North Dakota 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.89 -1%
Based on total revenue values of zero or more
Geographic Market Share
Low Concentration (Competitive)
Moderate Concentration
High Concentration (Oligopolistic)
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Data Source: Alexandra Graddy-Reed calculations using data from Internal Revenue Service, Exempt 
Organizations Business Master File (501(c)(3) Organizations, 2008–2011); Urban Institute, National 
Center for Charitable Statistics, http://nccsdataweb.urban.org 
State 2011 2010 2009 2008
% Change 
from 2008 
to 2011
California 1,347 1,369 1,372 1,372 -2%
New York 1,019 1,039 1,013 1,000 2%
Florida 661 658 621 568 16%
New Jersey 428 416 409 368 16%
Tennessee 188 179 171 166 13%
South Carolina 133 141 134 119 12%
Georgia 267 273 271 239 12%
Ohio 400 432 431 430 -7%
District of Columbia 152 153 162 161 -6%
Minnesota 204 206 194 192 6%
Missouri 201 212 216 213 -6%
Virginia 332 336 337 315 5%
Alabama 135 139 139 140 -4%
Colorado 228 235 238 219 4%
Texas 611 615 603 587 4%
North Carolina 258 260 252 248 4%
Kentucky 107 116 109 103 4%
Connecticut 179 190 184 174 3%
Arizona 186 192 193 181 3%
Michigan 273 300 295 278 -2%
Pennsylvania 509 503 515 498 2%
Wisconsin 207 207 207 203 2%
Washington 228 229 229 224 2%
Indiana 177 192 189 178 -1%
Maryland 342 370 372 346 -1%
Louisiana 142 145 145 140 1%
Massachusetts 419 426 401 417 0%
Illinois 574 599 585 572 0%
Oregon 148 149 150 148 0%
Kansas 109 107 111 109 0%
Rhode Island 46 51 53 58 -21%
North Dakota 18 19 19 15 20%
Hawaii 43 46 48 50 -14%
Vermont 37 35 32 33 12%
New Mexico 86 87 79 77 12%
New Hampshire 45 46 47 41 10%
Wyoming 18 21 22 20 -10%
Alaska 35 36 36 38 -8%
Montana 28 30 29 30 -7%
Delaware 39 40 38 41 -5%
Idaho 39 48 39 37 5%
Utah 84 87 86 80 5%
South Dakota 21 23 22 20 5%
Arkansas 48 58 54 50 -4%
Mississippi 83 88 86 80 4%
Nevada 58 60 54 56 4%
West Virginia 39 39 38 40 -3%
Iowa 62 69 64 61 2%
Maine 50 48 52 51 -2%
Oklahoma 85 84 88 87 -2%
Nebraska 80 86 82 79 1%
Size based on count of organizations with more than zero in revenue
Geographic Market Size
Over 1,000 Organizations
100 - 1,000 Organizations
Less than 100 Organizations
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Appendix 4.2 State Distribution Comparison 
 
 
Note: Population data based on registered public charities filing form 990, as of November 2010 
 
Data Source: Internal Revenue Service, Exempt Organizations Business Master File (501(c)(3) 
Organizations, 2008–2011); Urban Institute, National Center for Charitable Statistics, 
http://nccsdataweb.urban.org 
State G & H Orgs Percent G & H Orgs Percent
California 95                 11.16% 1,394            11.80%
New York 111               13.04% 1,057            8.95%
Texas 73                 8.58% 668               5.66%
Florida 34                 4.00% 652               5.52%
Illinois 59                 6.93% 602               5.10%
Pennsylvania 59                 6.93% 534               4.52%
Ohio 9                  1.06% 447               3.78%
New Jersey 24                 2.82% 431               3.65%
Massachusetts 47                 5.52% 404               3.42%
Maryland 45                 5.29% 381               3.23%
Virginia 36                 4.23% 335               2.84%
Michigan 21                 2.47% 297               2.51%
Georgia 25                 2.94% 274               2.32%
North Carolina 5                  0.59% 269               2.28%
Colorado 6                  0.71% 252               2.13%
Washington 21                 2.47% 235               1.99%
Missouri 14                 1.65% 226               1.91%
Minnesota 6                  0.71% 225               1.91%
Wisconsin 13                 1.53% 218               1.85%
Indiana 15                 1.76% 204               1.73%
Arizona 9                  1.06% 203               1.72%
Tennessee 4                  0.47% 192               1.63%
Connecticut 9                  1.06% 182               1.54%
Oregon 4                  0.47% 164               1.39%
District of Columbia 20                 2.35% 162               1.37%
South Carolina 6                  0.71% 152               1.29%
Alabama 7                  0.82% 144               1.22%
Louisiana 11                 1.29% 143               1.21%
Kentucky 2                  0.24% 121               1.02%
Kansas 8                  0.94% 112               0.95%
New Mexico 6                  0.71% 89                 0.75%
Utah 3                  0.35% 88                 0.75%
Mississippi 1                  0.12% 86                 0.73%
Oklahoma 10                 1.18% 86                 0.73%
Nebraska 3                  0.35% 83                 0.70%
Iowa -                0.00% 74                 0.63%
Nevada 8                  0.94% 64                 0.54%
Arkansas -                0.00% 53                 0.45%
New Hampshire 2                  0.24% 52                 0.44%
Idaho -                0.00% 50                 0.42%
Hawaii 1                  0.12% 49                 0.41%
Maine 5                  0.59% 49                 0.41%
Delaware 1                  0.12% 44                 0.37%
Rhode Island -                0.00% 44                 0.37%
Vermont 2                  0.24% 40                 0.34%
Alaska -                0.00% 39                 0.33%
West Virginia -                0.00% 34                 0.29%
Montana 2                  0.24% 33                 0.28%
South Dakota -                0.00% 29                 0.25%
Wyoming 4                  0.47% 24                 0.20%
North Dakota 5                  0.59% 21                 0.18%
Total 851               11,811           
Sample Population
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